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Government Officials as Attorneys and
Clients: Why Privilege the Privileged?
MELANIE B. LESuE*
INTRODUCTION
In February ofthis year, Congress's General Accounting Office ("GAO") filed suit
against Vice President Richard Cheney. The GAO sought to require the Vice
President to produce information concerning meetings between members of the
National Energy Policy Development Group (hereinafter "energy task force"), of
which Cheney was chair,1 and executives in the energy industry. Cheney declined to
produce the information. Although the executive branch's first line of defense was
to argue that the GAO was overstepping its statutory authority,2 Cheney's main
concern was safeguarding the government's need for secrecy in formulating policy.
Cheney emphasized the need for frank discussion among government officials, and
stated that he wanted to "protect the ability of the President and Vice President to get
unvarnished advice from any source we want."3 President Bush echoed Cheney's
view, insisting that it was critical that the President be able to get information and
confidential, forthright advice "from anyone at anytime."'
Of course government officials prefer to conduct business in secret. There is little
doubt that assurances ofconfidentialityease conversation amongpublic officials, and
between public officials and select citizens. The law provides government officials
with several doctrines that together create a large zone of secrecy in which the
officials conductofficial business. Among these doctrines are the executive privilege,
the deliberative process privilege, the investigatory privilege, and the attomey-client
privilege.
But as Watergate and the Clinton scandals have shown us, secrecy in government
comes at a cost. The promise of confidentiality may facilitate bad behavior, such as
corruption and influence peddling. In fact, the very point of the GAO's request to
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Associate
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I wish to thank the following people
for extremelyhelpful comments: Richard D. Friedman, Myriarn E. Gilles, Kenneth W. Graham,
Jr., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Paul R. Rice, Allan R. Stein, Edward Stein, and Stewart E. Sterk.
Thanks also to Steven Kaiser, Shoshana Menu, Scott J. Posner, and Daniel S. Gordon for their
superb research assistance and unfailing dedication.
1. Among the government officials included in the task force were the Secretaries of the
Treasury, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, and Energy, and the EPA
Administrator. Dana Milbank, GAOSuesAdministrationfor TaskForceRecords, WASH. POST,
Feb. 23, 2002, at A7.
2. Dana Milbank, White House Girds for Protracted Fight; GAO Lawsuit Seeks Energy
Information, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2002, at A4 (quoting a Bush aide stating, "All we're trying
to do is make sure the GAO operates within its statutory authority.").
3. Mike Allen, GAO to Sue Cheney Within 2 or3 Weeks; HillAgency Seeks Energy Panel
Records, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2002, at A4; David M. Walker, Man in the News; Pressing the
President, N.Y. TmES, Jan. 31, 2002, at C6 (stating that Cheney opposed disclosure of the
requested information because such disclosure would inhibit "open and robust" policy
discussions).
4. Howard Fineman et a]., A New Capital Clash, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 11, 2002, at 28.
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Cheney is to determine whether energy companies that made significant campaign
contributions had a strong hand in formulating the administration's energy policy.'
Too much government secrecy negatively affects the democratic process; citizens are
deprived of the information they need to make informed choices. And when the
government is involved in litigation, privileges that keep evidence from the fact finder
hamper the judiciary's ability to come to just results.
This Article examines one of the tools the government regularly invokes to shield
information fromthe public and the courts-the government attorney-clientprivilege.
Since the Eighth and D.C. Circuits rejected President Clinton's invocation of the
attorney-client privilege (the "Clinton cases"),6 scholars have defended the
government attorney-client privilege with renewed energy. Characterizing the Clinton
cases as radical departures from precedent, most critics argue that anything less than
an absolute attorney-cientprivilege will chill government speech to the government's
detriment. They worry that limits on the privilege will compel government employees
in possession of potentially troublesome facts to be silent or turn to private counsel,
thereby depriving government agencies and executives of the information they need
to protect the government's legal interests and conform government conduct to the
law.' Calls for a renewed judicial commitment to a broad government attorney-client
5. Elizabeth Bumiller, Enron 'sManyStrands: The VicePresident; Cheneyis Set to Battle
Congress to Keep His Enron Talks Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at Al.
6. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th. Cir. 1997); see also
In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
7. See Randall K. Miller, Presidential Sanctuaries After the Clinton Sex Scandals, 22
HARv. J.L. &PuB. PoL'Y647, 673 (1999) (arguing that "one consequence of the D.C. Circuit's
decision in Lindsey is that presidents or other government officials may be required to retain
private counsel in order to obtain confidential legal advice"); see also Lance Cole, The
Government Attorney-Client Privilege After Office of the President v. Office of the
Independent Counsel, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 15 (1997) (worrying that the opinion creates
uncertainties in privilege law that makes it difficult to determine when privilege protection
might apply); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's Attorney-Client
Privilege?, 83 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1998) (arguing that the government has the same need as
a corporation for an absolute attorney-client privilege); Adam M. Chud, Note, In Defense of
the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 84 CoRNELLL. REv. 1682 (1999) (arguing that the
government attorney-client privilege is necessary even in criminal investigations); Amanda J.
Dickmann, Note, In re Lindsey: A Needless Void in the GovernmentAttorney-Client Privilege,
33 IND. L. REV. 291 (1999) (criticizing In re Lindsey); Katherine L. Kendall, Note, In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum: Destruction ofthe Attorney-Client Privilege in the Government
Realm?, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 421 (1998) (arguing that In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum was wrongly decided); Note, Maintaining Confidence in Confidentiality: The
Application oftheAttorney-Client Privilege to Government Counsel, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1995
(1999) (arguing that both cases were improperly reasoned to the extent that they suggest a
limitation on the government's attorney-client privilege); Lisa E. Toporek, Comment, "Bad
Politics Make Bad Law": A Comment on the Eighth Circuit's Approach to the Governmental
Attorney-Client Privilege 86 GEO. L.J. 2421, 2436-39 (1998) (criticizing In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum as putting the government employee to the choice of remaining silent
or getting private counsel); An Unnecessary Defeat for the President and Presidents, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, June 25, 1997, at 10B, available at LEXIS, News Library, Arkdem File
(stating that the Eighth Circuit's decision in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum "will
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privilege are increasingly common.8
surely cast a chill over conversations at the White House long after the present occupants have
moved on"); Harvey Berkman, Lindsey Ruling Impact: Outsourcing, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10,
1998, at A12 (writing that "the July 26 federal appellate court ruling that commands Mr.
Lindsey to testify about his conversations with Mr. Clinton will, ifit stands, affect government
workers far more than anything Mr. Clinton tells Mr. Starr"); Marcia Coyle, In the 8th Circuit:
Privilege Ruling Could Touch All Gov't Attorneys, NAT'L L.J., May 19, 1997, at Al (quoting
attorney critical of Eighth Circuit's opinion as stating that a government privilege "is essential
to getting the information needed to provide legal advice"); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Don't
Confuse Two Different Client Privileges, NAT'LL.J., June 2, 1997, at A 15 (calling the Eighth
Circuit's decision in In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum "wrong, or clearly wrong," and
stating that it "poses serious risks for public officials in need of legal advice"); Michael
Higgins, Was Decision a Whitewater-Shed?: Supreme Court Lets Stand Ruling that Lawyer's
Notes Were Not Privileged, 83 A.B.A.J. 32 (Sept. 1997) (quoting lawprofessorKathleen Clark
as stating that the Eighth Circuit's opinion has "huge implications" because "[i]t should cause
government officials to pause before they reveal anything to their government lawyers," and
quoting attorney W. Neil Eggleston as saying that the Eighth Circuit opinion is part of an
"eroding of confidentiality" that makes it harder for this White House-and future White
Houses-to make good decisions); Terence Hunt, PrivacySlippingAway? Clinton 'sProblems
May Affect Future Presidents, ASHEVILLE CITIzEN-TIMES, Aug. 5, 1998, at A3 (writing that
"[s]eeking advice on sensitive matters, presidents will not be able to turn to their senior aides,
to their own counsel or even to former presidents, if current rulings are upheld"); Abbe David
Lowell, Lawyer-Client PrivilegeIsAbsolute, NAT'L L.J., May 26, 1997, at A21 (criticizing the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning on several grounds); Gary V. Murray, Attorney-Client Privilege
Sacrosanct, Lawyers Say, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, Mass.), Aug. 5, 1998, at Al
(quoting various attorneys who argue that the decision would have a negative effect on the
President's ability to "be legally informed"); Walter Pincus, No Clear Legal Answer: The
Uncertain State of the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 269 (Spring
2001) (criticizing the Eighth Circuit's direction that employees whose actions implicate the
criminal law should seek private counsel) [hereinafter Pincus, No Clear LegalAnswer]; Walter
Pincus, PastAttorney-Client Issue Resonates; White House Lawyer Invoked Privilege in Iran-
Contra Investigation, WASH. POST, June 7, 1997, at A3 (quoting former independent counsel
Laurence E. Walsh as defending a government attorney-client privilege because "[w]e want to
encourage truth"); Robert Schmidt, No Longer Privileged Characters: Will Lindsey Ruling
ChillAllFederalLawyers?, LEGALTIMES, Aug. 3, 1998, at 1 (quoting law professor Thomas
Sargentich as warning that the Clinton cases are "potentially a real chill on government
lawyering" and criticizing the idea that some government employees should be referred to
private attorneys); Herman Schwartz, Executive Restraint, NATION, June 30, 1997, at 4
(arguing that allowing independent counsel to pierce the attorney-client privilege "would also
seriously interfere with governmental operations. Government employees need legal advice
even more than private citizens, to negotiate the often treacherous territory of what they can
or must do in carrying out their duties."); Saundra Torry, The Court Took Notes, and Some
Attorneys Take Exception, WASH. POST, May 12, 1997, at F7 (reporting that "[s]ome called the
[Eighth Circuit] opinion a perverse invasion of the long-standing lawyer-client privilege and
said it threatens to erode the assurance of confidentiality on which all lawyers and their clients
rely"). But see Schnidt, supra, at 1 (quoting law professor Paul R. Rice as stating that "the
inhibitions it will create probably should have been there anyway").
8. See, e.g., Todd A. Ellinwood, "In the Light ofReason and Experience ": The Casefor
a Strong GovernmentAttorney-ClientPrivilege, 2001 Wis. L.REv. 1291 (200 1); Mark J. Biros
& Andrew L. Wexton, Can a Corporate Officer Waive the CorporateAttorn ey-Client Privilege
20021
INDIANA LWJOURNAL
But the Clinton cases were not the first in which courts balked at applying
traditional privilege doctrine to government communications. Government attorney-
client privilege doctrine is laced with cases where courts departed from established
privilege law or manipulated doctrine to deny government attorney-client privilege
claims." The trouble lies with the government privilege's shaky foundation. There is
Against the Wishes of the Corporation?, MET. CORp. CouNs., January 2001, at 16 (referring
to the privilege as "sacred," and arguing that "the corporate attorney-client privilege is at risk");
Linda Greenhouse, A Question ofPrivilege, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1997, § 4, at 2 (arguing that
"every Government agency that relies on the free flow of information" has much at stake in the
attorney-client privilege); Hazard, supra note 7, at A15 (calling the Eighth Circuit's decision
in In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum "wrong, or clearly wrong"); Robert G. Morvillo,
The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 1997, at 3 (writing that "it is
disturbing to me that the privilege-unfriendly federal forum is sculpting the privilege to be less
and less protective..."); David S. Rudolf& Thomas Maher, Behind Closed Doors: Supreme
Court Lets Stand Subpoena for White House Counsel's Notes, 21 CHAMPION 40 (Aug. 1997)
(stating that under current law, the White House "basically has no attorney-client privilege");
Schmidt, supra note 7, at I (quoting law professor Christopher Mueller as saying of the Clinton
cases that "the [D.C. Circuit] is using the independent counsel law to distort the law of
attorney-client privilege").
9. For example, in Lee v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 923 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), the court denied the government's attorney-client privilege claim because the
government did not show that it was "acting in a capacity similar to a 'private party seeking
advice to protect personal interests.'" Id. at 457-58 (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't
of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Professor Paul R. Rice points out that the court's
meaning is unclear, and that it might create a new limitation on the government privilege that
would cause "great confusion." PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED
STATES § 4:28, at 128-29 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter RICE, TREATISE]. And in Tax Analysts v.
IRS, 117 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the court denied the government's attomey-client privilege
claim because the information communicated by the IRS employees to government attorneys
was acquired from third parties. As Professor Rice points out, this decision, as well as prior
cases thathave followed this limitation on the privilege, departs from established privilege law.
Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing Confusion About Attorney
Communications, Drafts, Pre-existingDocments, and the Source ofthe Facts Communicated,
48 Am. U. L. REV. 967, 983-88 (1999) [hereinafter Rice, Continuing Confusion]. As Rice
points out, "[t]he nature of the information contained in the communications from the client
to the attorney is irrelevant to the communications' privileged status. Regardless of where the
client acquired the information, or the information's confidential or public nature, the content
ofthe client's communication with his attorney is privileged." Id. at 985 (emphasis in original).
Another example is Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 1998). In Reed, the court held
that two city council members were not "clients" of the city attorney, and thus the city waived
the attorney-client privilege when two employees shared confidential attorney-client
communications with them. Id. In a previous case, In re Grand Jury Subpoena (United States
v. Doe), 886 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1989), the same court had held that the Detroit City
Council was a client of the city's attorney, when council members met with the attorney in
condemnation hearings. Reading the two opinions together, it appears that whether a particular
government employee can be termed a "client" of the entity's lawyer depends on the subject
matter of the conversation. If the privilege were necessary to encourage employees to consult
with counsel, the Sixth Circuit's approach would be highly problematic, because employees
could not predict whether their interests might later be viewed as "divergent" from other
employees with whom they shared the privileged information.
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a fault line where the instrumental justification meets the realities of the government
structure. This uneven ground prevents courts from constructing a structurally sound
body of government privilege law. Quite simply, the entrenched assumption that a
government attorney-client privilege is necessary to encourage candor in employee-
attorney communications has never been seriously questioned.'0 Instead, courts and
most scholars blindly accept a conclusory two-step argument: a corporate attorney-
client privilege is justified, and government entities are sufficiently similar to
corporate entities to justify a government privilege1 I But on closer inspection, the
argument collapses.
First, the instrumnentaljustification is weak even in the corporate context. At best,
the attorney-client privilege generates only a marginal increase in candor by high
level corporate executives. Second, the analogy between corporate and government
entities does not hold. Given the unique structure and objectives of government
entities, the instrumental justification is much weaker in the government setting. The
promise of a government attorney-client privilege will have no impact on most
government employees' calculations regarding whether and to what extent to confide
in government counsel, and whether to consult private counsel. Although a few
highly placed executive branch employees, most notably the President, might rely on
the promise of confidentiality when communicating with government counsel, the
executive privilege, uniquely calibrated to balance the need for confidentiality with
the public welfare, is the best mechanism for promoting candor by high executive
branch officials. Although the President might occasionally have to turn to private
counsel in the absence of a government privilege, that result is appropriate. In sum,
there is simply no justification for a broad attorney-client privilege that protects all
communications between government employees and attorneys made for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice.
If the government privilege is not necessary to induce candor in government
employees, is a government privilege justifiable on any other ground? Yes, given the
current framework of our adversary system. The government must often protect its
interests in litigation or administrative proceedings. Its adversaries are able to shield
litigation strategy and legal analysis by invoking both the work product doctrine and
the attorney-client privilege. If the government has no comparable ability to prepare
its case in private, the government's (and by extension, the public's) interests will be
compromised. A limited privilege is therefore necessary in order to preserve a level
playing field for government litigators and the employees who communicate with
them in preparing a case.
If only a limited government litigation privilege is justified, how did a broad
government privilege develop? First, courts often misread precedent, quoting the
language but ignoring the facts of the earliest cases sustaining government privilege
claims. In fact, cases decided from 1965 (the year of the first reported opinion
sustaining a federal government attorney-client privilege) to the early 1980s are
consistent with a level-playing-field justification, 2 and are often blatantly
inconsistent with the traditional instrumental justification. But because those courts
10. See infra Part I.
11. Id.
12. See infra Part IV.
2002]
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used perfunctory reasoning and broad language that seemed to validate a government
privilege identical to the corporate one, the privilege slowly expanded. In the 1980s,
as the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") provided a new source of privilege
litigation, courts increasingly ignored the factual details of the early cases and began
to validate broad government privilege claims.
Second, lawyers and scholars aggressively facilitated the trend toward a broad
privilege. For example, twenty years ago, with fewer than a handful of government
attorney-client privilege cases on the books, the drafters of the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence decided to include public officers, agencies, and entities in the
definition of "client."' 3 This radical departure from earlier evidence codes occurred
with little discussion, and was roundly applauded by members of the bar. Most
recently, the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers 4 puts the stamp of approval
on the broadest possible government attorney-client privilege, 5 even though it offers
no justification for the government privilege aside from the level- playing-field
argument. 6 Though the drafters implicitly recognize that a broader privilege is
problematic, they are content to adopt "the generally prevailing rule"'7 with no
13. See 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGi-r&KENNETHW. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERALPRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE 37-38 (1986). Specifically, rejected rule 503 defines "client" as "a
person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either public
or private." The Advisory Committee's Note cites three cases, Connecticut Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), Rowley v. Ferguson, 48 N.E.2d 243
(Ohio Ct. App. 1942), and People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Glen Arms Estate,
Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964), as dispositive of its contention that "the definition
of 'client' includes government bodies." FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(1) advisory committee's note
(Proposed Preliminary Draft 1969). Each of those cases disposes of the attorney-client privilege
issue in a conclusory sentence.
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 (2000).
15. Section 74 reads as follows: "[T]he attorney-client privilege extends to a
communication of a governmental organization as stated in section 73 and of an individual
employee or other agent of a governmental organization as a client with respect to his or her
personal interest as stated in sections 68-72." Id.
16. The comments suggest that
the legal system has recognized the strategic concerns of a public agency or
officer in establishing and asserting public legal rights .... The public acting
through its public agencies is entitled to resist claims and contentions that the
agency considers legally or factually unwarranted. To that end, a public agency
or employee is entitled to engage in confidential communications with counsel
to establish and maintain legal positions.... [courts have recognized that without
a privilege in this scenario] governments would be at an unfair disadvantage in
litigation, handling claims and in negotiations....
A privilege that would cover only litigation, including claims or investigations,
would be a plausible alternative.
Id. at cmt b.
17. After asserting that the privilege is justified when the government is preparing for
litigation, the authors simply conclude, "This Section, however, states the generally prevailing
rule that governmental agencies and employees enjoy the same privilege as non-governmental
counterparts." Id. The authors note, "Some decisions have suggested that a 'contemplation of
litigation' limitation... should be imposed on the governmental attorney-client privilege. That
suggestion is not followed in the Section or Comment." Id.
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attempt to explain or justify it. As others have observed, attorney self-interest has
been a motivating force for expansion of the privilege.
Though a few scholars have appreciated the differences between the government
and corporate entities for privilege purposes, their voices have largely gone unheard.
For example, the drafters of the 1974 revisions to the Uniform Rules of Evidence
withheld the attorney-client privilege from government entities unless the government
could show that the attorney-employee communication "concen[ed] a pending
investigation, claim or action and the court determines that disclosure will seriously
impair the ability of the public officer or agency to process the claim or conduct a
pending investigation, litigation, or proceeding in the public interest." 8 But the
drafters did not offer a compelling justification for limiting the privilege in this way,
and the provision was disregarded by scholars and all but a few states.
Part I charts the development of the government attorney-client privilege, and
shows how the privilege developed, by analogy to the corporate entity. Part II
examines the corporate analogy, and shows that the instrumentaljustification for the
corporate privilege is weak at best. Part III shows how the promise of a government
attorney-client privilege is unlikely to factor into a government employee's decision
regarding how forthcoming to be with government counsel. Part IH pays particular
attention to the question ofthe President, and shows why there is no principled reason
for allowing the President, or any other highlyplaced government executive, to claim
a government attorney-client privilege. Part IV examines other possible justifications
for a broad government attorney-client privilege, and concludes that such a privilege
is defensible only when necessary to provide the government with a level playing
field in litigation. Part V explores how the broad attorney-client privilege has
developed, and shows how the cases that served as the foundation for the privilege
are consistent with the level-playing-field justification, but inconsistent with the
popular-and broader-instrumental justification.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The most stunning feature of the government attorney-client privilege's history is
the absence of thought and analysis accompanying the privilege's recognition.
Although writers of the leading evidence treatises have expressed doubts about
whether a government privilege is justifiable, 9 few courts have seemed intrigued by,
or even mildly interested in, the question whether the traditional justifications for the
attorney-client privilege provide a sufficient basis for extending it to the government.
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the Federal Housekeeping Act20
18. UNni. R. EVID. 502(d)(6) (1974).
19. See 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
503(a)(1)[01 ], at 503-20 (1996) ("[A]ithough the privilege arose in the context of the private
client, courts .. . extend the privilege to organizations and entities. This is somewhat
surprising. An insensible, artificial entity can act only through its agents. Who then is the
client?"); WRIGifr & GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 5475, at 125 ("It is unfortunate that courts and
commentators have not given more consideration to this issue because there are a number of
considerations that militate against the expansion of the privilege to all governmental
entities.").
20. 5 U.S.C. § 822, R.S. § 161 (1875).
2002]
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enabled government officials to prohibit government employees from testifying in
court. There was therefore little or no need for a governmental attorney-client
privilege.2 However, following the amending of the Act in 1958,' and increased
efforts to allow the public access to government information (culminating in the
enactment of the FOIA), government officials began to assert new doctrines to
prohibit disclosure of information in court. The attorney-clientprivilege was one such
doctrine.
Prior to 1963, only two courts had held that communications between government
employees and government attorneys could be protected by the attorney-client
privilege.' Both opinions concerned state or municipal government officials, and
both courts simply assumed without reflection that the privilege applied to
governmental entities, even though neither the Model Rules of Evidence nor the
Uniform Rules of Evidence expressly provided for a government privilege.24 In
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Shields,' the court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the privilege did not attach to communications between government
employees and attorneys, stating that the "[p]laintiffs cite no cases in support of this
position," and reasoning that "[t]he policy of the privilege seems to me to provide no
ground for the distinction which plaintiffs suggest."2 6 Similarly, in Rowley v.
Ferguson," the case upon which the Connecticut Mutual Life court relied, the court
flatly concluded in two sentences that the documents at issue "were confidential
communications between attorney and client," and that "[t]he fact that both attorney
and client were public officials should make no difference."' Both cases appear to
reflect the common assumption among practitioners that the attorney-client privilege
should apply to government clients."9
UnitedStates v. Anderson was the next case to confront the government attorney-
client privilege issue, and the first to consider whether the federal government ought
to be able to claim the privilege. The court sustained the federal government's claim,
simply assuming that the government was entitled to the privilege's protection. In
Anderson, the government was sued by the guarantors of a note held by the Small
Business Administration ("SBA").3 After the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the
21. See Brian S. Gowdy, Note, Should the Federal Government Have an Attorney-Client
Privilege?, 51 FLA. L. REV. 695, 706 (1999).
22. See id.
23. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Rowley v.
Ferguson, 48 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942).
24. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE § 209 (1942); UNIF. R. EVID. 26 (1953); see also
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 5475, at 124-25 ("[I]t is far from clear that the common
law attorney-client privilege could be claimed by governments; the case law is skimpy. Neither
the Model Code of Evidence nor the Uniform Rules of Evidence seem to provide for this.").
25. 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
26. Id. at450.
27. 48 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942).
28. Id. at 248.
29. See WRIGHT& GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 5475, at 125 ("[Most courts have assumed,
with little attention to the issue, that governments can claim the benefits of the privilege.").
30. 34 F.R.D. 518, 522-23 (D. Colo. 1963).
31. Id. at 519.
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guarantors asserted that certain actions that the government took in connection with
the debtor's bankruptcy relieved the guarantors of liability on the note? 2 During
discovery, the guarantors demanded government documents, which had been
generated during the debtor's reorganization proceedings, that contained
communications among government counsel and officials of the SBA and the
Securities and Exchange Commission.33 The government resisted discovery on the
grounds that the documents were protected by the attorney-client and work product
privileges.
3 4
For a case of first impression, the Anderson opinion is remarkably short on
analysis. The court quickly rejected the debtor's argument that a government attorney-
client privilege was unjustifiable,35 citing as dispositive Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
American Gas Ass "n.,36 and United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,37 two
cases that had sustained corporate attorney-client privilege claims. 8 The court
seemed not to consider whether the instrumental justification for the privilege made
sense in the government context, or whether there were other compelling reasons to
deny or tailor a government privilege 9 The court's broad language led future courts
to read the case as sanctioning a broad government attorney-client privilege that the
government could invoke to protect communications between any government
attorney and any government employee in any situation. °
In the decade followingAnderson, only fourpublished opinions considered federal
government claims of attorney-client privilege.4' In the first two cases to follow
Anderson, courts sustained the government's privilege claim perfunctorily. 2 In the
third case, General Electric Co. v. United States,43 the court at least acknowledged
General Electric's argument that the instrumental justification for the privilege did
32. Id. at 520.
33. IS
34. Id.
35. Id. at 522.
36. 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
37. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
38. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. at 522-23.
39. Id. at 523.
40. The following year, Califomiaadopted an evidence code that included "public entities"
within the definition of client. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 175, 951 (1964).
41. United States v. Bd. of Trade of Chicago, No. 71 C 2875, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11307 (N.D. II. Oct. 30, 1973); Thill Sec. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 57 F.R.D. 133 (E.D.
Wisc. 1972); Detroit Screwmatic Co. v. United States, 49 F.R.D. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. United States, No. 81-70, 1972 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 442 (Ct. C1. Sept. 19, 1972).
The court in United States v. Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524 (D. Colo. 1964), recognized in dicta that
the government could assert the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 526. In addition, a California
appellate court sustained a government attorney-client privilege claim in People ex rel.
Department of Public Works v. Glen Arms Estate, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Ct. App. 1964).
42. Thill, 57 F.R.D. at 133; Detroit Screwmatic Co., 49 F.R.D. at 78 (sustaining the
government's attorney-client privilege claim on the ground that the document in question was
"so clearly ... a privileged communication between attorney and client"). In Thill, the court
simply cited Anderson as precedent. See 57 F.R.D. at 139.
43. 1972 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 442 (Ct. Cl. Sept. 19, 1972).
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not hold in the government context," but dismissed it in a whirl of conclusory
reasoning as "unpersuasive, since under such reasoning nothing transmitted to the
Justice Department [from defendant Department of the Navy] would be exempt from.
discovery." '45 By assumingwithout discussion that abroad government attorney-client
privilege existed, the courts in those cases laid the foundation for a privilege doctrine
lacking in justification or coherence.
In only one of the four cases decided in the decade following Anderson did the
court reject the government's privilege claim. In United States v. Board of Trade of
Chicago," the United States invoked the privilege to shield from discovery
documents prepared for the Commodities Exchange Authority by the Department of
Agriculture's Office of General Counsel.47 The memoranda were a response to the
Commodity Exchange Authority's request for a legal analysis of provisions of the
Commodity Exchange Act.4 The defendant, the Chicago Board of Trade, sought
discovery of the documents to establish that the rates the Board charged were
consistent with the government's own interpretation of the Commodities Exchange
Act.49 The government argued that an administrator's report that it had previously
produced to defendants contained all the relevant information, and that the documents
sought were protected by the government attorney-client privilege.50
The court vehemently rejected the government's claim that the legal memoranda
were protected by'the attorney-client privilege, flatly stating that neither "law nor
logic" supported extending the attorney-client privilege to the government realm.5'
After dismissing precedent as nonbinding and "conclusory, unsupported and
unexplained,"'52 the court decreed that "novel privileges should be grounded upon
more pertinent and persuasive precedent than this." 3 Finally, it found theprototypical
attorney-client relationship envisioned by the privilege simply did not exist in the
particular government context, because the association between government
employees and counsel in this case "is more akin to the functioning of a high-level
corporate officer seeking the views of other corporate division chiefs than to the
traditional lawyer and client relationship."'
Ultimately, however, the court backed away from a broad holding rejecting the
government privilege in its entirety, and settled on a narrow ruling denying privilege
protection because, "[elven assuming that a privilege exists," the government had
failed to meet the confidentiality requirement.55 The case, however, was largely
44. Because a statute required Navy personnel to make the communications to the Justice
Department, General Electric reasoned, the privilege was not necessary to encourage the
communication and thus should not apply. Id. at *11.
45. Id.
46. 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11307 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1973).
47. Id. at *1.
48. Id. at *7.
49. Id. at *2.
50. Id. at *1.
51. Id. at *7.
52. Id. at *8.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *9-10.
55. Id. at *10.
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ignored. The government privilege deflected this minor blow and marched on. In
1975, the Supreme Court tacitly endorsed the government attorney-client privilege in
dicta, and the concept became settled law.
No doubt, the complacency of most courts in addressing this issue was caused in
part by the simultaneous development of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence in
the very late 1960s and early 1970s. When the first draft of Proposed Rule 503
(codifying attorney-client privilege) was completed in 1969, there existed a total of
five scattered state and federal opinions that perfunctorily recognized a government
attorney-client privilege,s and one published article by Professor James Gardner that
concluded that the extension of the privilege to any entity was not supportable."
Nonetheless, with little fanfare, the drafters defined "client' for privilege purposes
broadly, as "aperson, public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization
or entity, either public or private." 9 Although the drafting process for the Federal
Rules generated years of intense discussion and debate among academics, judges,
lawyers, and law students, it appears the bulk of debate on privilege issues related to
attorneys' efforts to expand the corporate privilege.'e There is, strangely, no evidence
to indicate that the drafters or those commenting on the drafts gave more than a
moment of thought to the Proposed Rule's radical expansion of the definition of
"client" to include government entities. For example, the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York had this to say: "[Proposed Rule 503] gives a very broad
definition as to what constitutes a client, including within it a public organization or
entity. We believe this is desirable."' Compared to other comments on the client
issue, this remark is relatively expansive. Congress ultimately refused to enact Rule
503, preferring to leave the development of privilege law to the courts. However,
courts since 1973 have cited Proposed Rule 503 as persuasive authorityjustifying an
extremely broad definition of "client."62 Proposed Rule 503, never having been
sufficientlyjustified, now serves as a major justification for a government attorney-
56. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 148-49, 154 (1975) (discussing
whether the government could withhold documents in response to a FOIA request by invoking
th government deliberative process privilege and the attorney work-product doctrine).
57. United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518, 522-23 (D. Colo. 1963); Conn. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Glen
Arms Estate, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964); Riddle Spring Realty Co. v. New
Hampshire, 107 N.H. 271 (1966); Rowley v. Ferguson, 48 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942).
58. See James A. Gardner, A Personal Privilege for Communications of Corporate
Clients-Paradox or Public Policy?, 40 U. DET. L.J. 299, 309, 379 (1963) (finding "no well-
reasoned argument" that would justify the extension of the attorney-client privilege to a
corporation, and that extension of the privilege to government entities is "even more
fallacious").
59. WRIGHT&GRAHAM, supra note 13, at37-38 (textofRejected Rule 503). The Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 503 cites Connecticut Mutual Life, 18 F.R.D. at 448, Rowley, 48
N.E.2d at 243, and People ex rel. Dep't ofPub. Works, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 303, as dispositive of
its contention that "the definition of 'client' includes government bodies." FED. R. EviD.
503(a)(1) advisory committee's note (Proposed Preliminary Draft 1969).
60. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 5471, at 43-64 (chronicling lawyers' campaign
to expand the corporate attorney-client privilege).
61. See Ass'n. of City Bar, Comments, Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence (1969).




Simultaneously with the development of the Federal Rules, other scholars were
revising the Uniform Rules of Evidence. The drafters of Uniform Rule 502, which
governs attorney-client privilege, took a substantially different approach to the
government privilege issue. The Rule provides that public entities may not claim an
attorney-client privilege unless the attorney-employee "communication concerns a
pending investigation, claim, or action and the court determines that disclosure will
seriously impair the ability of the public officer or agency to process the claim or
conduct a pending investigation, litigation, or proceeding in the public interest."
Despite this profound disparity between the Uniform Rules and Proposed Federal
Rule 503, there is no evidence that this attempt to drastically limit the privilege for
state and municipal governments created even a ripple in scholarly discourse.6"
Although a handful of states adopted the UniformRules with their limited recognition
of government privilege,' most either took the Federal Rules as their model, or
adopted the Uniform Rules but dropped the provision limiting the government
privilege, rendering their rules consistent with the Federal Rules.6'
As the 1980s began, cases addressing the existence and scope of the federal
government's attorney-client privilege increased dramatically, in part because courts
interpreted the FOIA, enacted in 1967, as containing exceptions for documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrines.6 8 The impact
ofFOIA cases on the development of the government attorney-client privilege cannot
be understated. In ordinary litigation, courts evaluating privilege claims are mindful
that the privilege carries a cost; it deprives the court of relevant evidence and may
obstruct a just determination. The damage is far less extreme when the government
asserts the attorney-client privilege as a basis for refusing a FOIA request because the
63. See, e.g., Winton v. Bd. ofComm'rs, 188 F.R.D. 398,400 (N.D. Okla. 1999) (holding
that because "Proposed Rule 503 recognizes an attorney-client privilege for public entities and
officers like the Defendants in this case," and because "[t]he Court finds Rule 503's statement
to be a sound reflection of the common law[,I Defendants may, therefore, exercise an attorney-
client privilege").
64. UNiF. R. EviD. 502(d)(6).
65. This may be due, in part, to the fact that the Commissioners' rationale for drastically
limiting the government's privilege was based entirely on the importance of open government.
According to the records, there was no debate regarding whether the privilege's instrumental
justification was persuasive in the government context. See Proceedings of the Annual
Conference Meeting in Its Eighty-third Year, 1974 NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST.
LAWS 57-58; see also Proceedings of the Annual Conference Meeting in Its Eighty-second
Year, 1973 NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. LAWS 74-75.
66. At least four states, Arkansas, Maine, North Dakota, and Oklahoma, have adopted the
narrowed government privilege advocated by Uniform Rule 502(d)(6). See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-41-101 (Michie 1987); ME. R. EVID. 502(d)(6); N.D. R. EvID. 502(d)(6); OKLA. STAT.
ANN tit. 12, § 2502(D)(6) (West 1993).
67. IDAHO R. EviD. 502; Ky. R. EviD. 503; Miss. R. EviD. 502; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §19-
13-2 through 5 (Michie 1994); TX. R. EVJD. 503; UTAH R. EVID. 504; VT. R. EVID. 502.
68. See Gowdy, supra note 21, at 710 (noting that"many lower courts have cited [NLRB
v.] Sears for the proposition that the government is entitled to an attorney-client privilege,"
despite the fact that the Sears court did not hold that Exemption 5 incorporated that privilege,
but rather addressed the deliberative process and work-product privileges).
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documents often are not necessary to a case. Thus, courts adjudicating government
privilege claims in the face of FOIA requests were likely to sustain the government's
claim with little hand wringing.' 9 Unfortunately, the large number of FOIA cases
sustaining government claims of attorney-client privilege created a large body of
precedent and validated the doctrine.
The fact remains, however, that neither courts nor scholars have made a
compelling case foragovemment attomey-cientprivilege. ° Instead, courts, scholars,
and students recite, like a mantra, two justifications: first, that the government is an
entity like a corporation, and if a corporate privilege is justified, so is a government
privilege.7 The second is that the privilege is necessary to ensure that government
actors communicate freelywith government lawyers to ensure that government actors
receive the sound legal advice necessary to the successful functioning of the
government 2
II. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR THE GOVERNMENT
ATORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
In developing the government attorney-client privilege, courts relied heavily on a
familiar but dangerous legal technique: reasoning by analogy. If other "clients" are
69. See infra notes 352-362 and accompanying text.
70. Only one article and a smattering of student notes have addressed the question whether
the government should have an attorney-client privilege. Professor Gardner argued that the
attorney-client privilege was, and should remain, personal in nature. See Gardner, supra note
58; see also Lory A. Barsdate, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for the Government Entity, 97
YALE L.J. 1725, 1738-42 (1988) (arguing that the government should not be able to assert the
privilege, and rejecting the corporate analogy); Gowdy, supra note 21 (arguing that the
privilege is not necessary in the government context because public officials have a duty to
faithfully execute the laws).
71. See, e.g., Galarza v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 291, 295 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (applying
Upjohn Co. v, United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), to sustain the government's claim of
attorney-clientprivilege); see also RICE, TREATISE, supra note 9, at 137 (stating that"t] he U.S.
Government is the largest employer in the world. Its agency structures and problems are as
complex as those of any private enterprise. To the extent that the protection of the privilege is
justified in any corporate context, the need within the government is equal, if not greater");
Paulsen, supra note 7, at 495-98 (arguing that the government has the same need for the
privilege as a corporation does).
72. See, e.g., Galarza, 179 F.R.D. at 295 (sustaining the United States' privilege claim
because the government attorney "needs full and frank disclosure by the employee/physician
in order to properly give sound legal advice to the United States"); Feshbach v. SEC, 5 F.
Supp. 2d 774, 784 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that "[u]ltimately, the attorney-client privilege
helps improve the quality of agency decisionmaking by safeguarding the free flow of
information that is a necessary predicate for sound advice"); Chud, supra note 7, at 1711-13
(arguing that the privilege is necessary to ensure that government employees make full
disclosure to government attorneys); Ronald I. Keller, The Applicability and Scope of the
Attorney-Client Privilege it; the Executive Branch ofthe Federal Government, 62B.U. L. REV.
1003, 1025 (1982) (arguing against "an overly constricted [government] attorney-client




entitled to a privilege for communications with their lawyers, government clients
should receive the same benefit. More particularly, if the privilege is available to
corporations-which, like the government, can act only through agents-then the
government, as an entity, should be entitled to a comparable privilege.
Evaluation of these analogies, however, requires an examination of the
justifications for the attorney-client privilege with respect to individuals and
corporations. The analogies do not hold at all if the justifications for the individual
and corporate privileges are not equally applicable in the government setting.
Moreover, if the justification for the corporate privilege itself rests on shaky
foundations, analogy to the corporation provides a weak basis for creating a
comparable privilege for government clients.
I This Part examines the general justifications for the attorney-client privilege and
the justifications for extending the privilege to corporate clients. This examination
reveals that the privilege rests most comfortably on the need to encourage clients to
be open and honest with their lawyers, and that when corporate clients are involved,
agency costs reduce the likelihood that, the privilege will encourage clients to
communicate openly with their lawyers. These conclusions serve as a background for
evaluation of the government attorney-client privilege.
A. Justifications for the Attorney-Client Privilege
Justifications for the attorney-client privilege have changed over time.73 Currently,
the prevalent justification for the privilege is instrumental; the privilege is necessary
to encourage clients to reveal all facts within their knowledge to their attorneys to
enable attorneys to give sound legal advice to their clients.74 In the planning context,
the privilege enables clients to conform conduct to the law;' in the litigation context,
the privilege facilitates thorough and efficient case preparation. 6 Although accepted
as gospel among attorneys today, the instrumental justification has had its critics.
From Bentham on,' scholars have argued that the justification is on shaky ground;
while it is certain that the privilege obstructs the search for truth, whether it actually
encourages client candor cannot be empirically verified.78 Moreover, clients who do
73. See Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and thePurpose ofPrivilege, 2000
Wis. L. REV. 31, 48-50 (tracing the evolving justifications for the privilege).
74. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291, at 550 (John T. McNaughton ed.
1961) (urging that the privilege is necessary to free clients from fear of compelled disclosure
of attorney-client communications to enable them to speak freely to attorneys); see also Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
75. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
76. Id. at 390-92.
77. See 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, in THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 473-75, 477, 479 (Bowring ed., n.p. 1842) (1827), quoted in WIGMORE
supra note 74, at 549-51. As Bentham famously put it, the consequence of a denial of the
attorney-client privilege will be "[t]hat a guilty person will not in general be able to derive
quite so much assistance from his law advisor, in the way of concerting a false defence, as he
may do at present."
78. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351
(1989) (questioning whether current strict confidentiality rules are necessary to ensure that
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not feel "guilty" will not hesitate to disclose to counsel even without assurances of
confidentiality, while "guilty" clients who intend to withhold the truth during
discovery may be the privilege's primary beneficiaries."'
The utilitarian justification seems most defensible when the client is a defendant
in a criminal case; the client is most unlikely to be familiar with the details of
controlling law, is likely to be in possession of facts that she maybe hesitant to reveal
absent assurances of confidentiality, and the lawyer's lack of knowledge of those
facts might seriously compromise her ability to defend the case or reach an
appropriate plea agreement. Moreover, the client is protectedby the Fifth Amendment
and is under no compunction to reveal compromising facts to his adversary. The
client, and more importantly, the lawyer who advises the client about what the client
should disclose, both know that the facts communicated will not be revealed to the
prosecutor unless the lawyer could be compelled to reveal them. As a result, the
lawyer is likely to advise the client not to reveal compromising facts critical to the
defense unless the revelations are privileged.
In the civil context, however, the instrumental justification is more problematic;
discovery rules require disclosure of every relevant fact. Thus, the client with
something to hide is usually required to reveal it to opposing counsel during a
deposition or in response to interrogatories. If a lawyer explains that fact to a client,
there is no reason why the client should hesitate to reveal the facts to her own
attorney, the person she is paying to represent her best interests. Therefore,
Bentham's charge that the privilege protects only the wrongdoer has some force in
the civil context. The privilege affords the greatest benefit to those clients who intend
to lie or skirt the truth. Thus, although it seems intuitively correct that the privilege
encourages some individual clients to make full disclosure to counsel, reasonable
minds could differ regardingwhether the benefits of the privilege outweigh its costs. 0
clients make full disclosure to lawyers, and discussing the necessity for further empirical
evidence to test underlying assumptions of confidentiality rules).
79. WIGMORE, supra note 74, at 553-55; seealso Edmund M. Morgan, Forwardto MODEL
CODE OF EVID. 25, 26-27 (1942); Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1, 23 (1998) (agreeing with Bentham, but going further to state that "the privilege in
fact harms the innocent. The harm exists because the privilege makes it more difficult for the
innocent credibly to communicate that they have nothing to hide."); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social
Desirability, 102 HARv. L. Rv. 565, 568 (1989) (arguing that the privilege reduces the
expected sanction that a party faces for an unlawful act).
80. Professors Ronald J. Allen, Mark F. Grady, Daniel D. Polsby, and Michael S. Yashko
offer an interesting spin on the instrumental justification; in their view, the fact that the
privilege is costly is not a detriment, but a benefit. See Ronald 3. Allen et al., A Positive Theory
ofthe Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 363-
66 (1990). The privilege makes the opponent's fact gathering more expensive, and thus
encourages the client to confide fully in her attorney. See id. at 363. This increased candor is
useful to the extent that it encourages clients to reveal facts that the client may perceive as
damaging, but which the attorney must know to develop "contingent legal claims." The authors
define certain legal claims as "contingent" because their "validity is contingent on the existence
of unfavorable information about the client." Id. at 362. The privilege is valuable because it
enables the attomeyto develop such claims, which, in turn, furthers the instrumental objectives
underlying those claims. See id. at 365-66.
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Modem scholars have offered otherjustifications for the attorney-client privilege.
Charles Fried, for example, views the privilege as a necessary extension of client
autonomy." Others argue that the privilege flows from the client's right to privacy,'
or the attorney's moral obligation of loyalty.83 It is not clear why those morality-based
concerns justify elevating attorney-clientrelationships above other social and intimate
relationships to which the same concerns apply.84 Nonetheless, morality-
The authors give the example of the contributory negligence defense: If a driver hits a
pedestrian, the driver can deny she was negligent, or argue that the pedestrian was
contributorily negligent. Id. A client who does not understand the law might be likely to simply
deny she was negligent. However, if the attorney can assure the client that their
communications will be privileged, the client may admit negligence and offer facts that indicate
that the pedestrian was contributorily negligent. Id. In this instance, the privilege has facilitated
a just outcome, has reduced perjury, and the policy underlying the contributory negligence
defense has been furthered. Id. at 366.
According to the authors, the privilege also reduces perjury in litigation because it
encourages clients to assert truthful affirmative defenses rather than to simply deny the charges
in the complaint. Id. at 365.66. Thus, "[rjeducing the cost of litigating contingent claims" by
privileging the facts the client relays to the lawyer "gives potential clients an incentive to
substitute away from dishonest details." Id. at 366. Thus, "[t]he question is not whether the
privilege increases perjury but whether the increased costs created by the privilege can be
justified by the reduced perjury that the privilege brings about and by the greater number of
contingent claims that it allows to be litigated, with their beneficial real-world effects." !d. at
368 (emphasis in original). They further argue that, where a claim cannot be contingent (such
as in the case of a creditor's action for money owed that does not depend upon the existence
of some problematic fact about the creditor), the privilege is not justified. Id. at 367. Thus,
privilege claims should not be sustained "[w]hen the lawyer could not possibly use information
to develop a contingent claim, and even a relatively ignorant client would know it." Id. at 368.
The authors argue that their analysis explains a fair number of privilege cases. Id. at 374-83.
Although the authors' analysis is persuasive, it is premised on the validity ofthe privilege's
instrumental justification. If the instrumental justification is sound, then the article suggests a
basis for narrowing the scope of privilege doctrine. If the privilege does not in fact encourage
clients to reveal damaging facts to attorneys, however, then the privilege cannot be justified at
all.
81. Charles Fried, Correspondence, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 586 (1977) (stating that it is
"immoral for societyto constrain anyone from discovering what the limits of [the rule of law's]
power over him are").
82. David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TuL L. REv. 101, 110 (1956) (arguing that the right to be left alone by the
state with respect to certain relationships is "more important to human liberty than accurate
adjudication").
83. See CHARLES T. MCCORMCK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 205-06
(Edward W. Cleary ed., 1984). McCormack argues that:
Our adversary system of litigation casts the lawyer in the role of fighter for the
party whom he represents. A strong sentiment of loyalty attaches to the
relationship, and this sentiment would be outraged by an attempt to change our
customs so as to make the lawyer amenable to routine examination upon the
client's confidential disclosures regarding personal business.
Id.
84. See id. § 77, at 186 (noting that "the ultimate strategic significance of evidentiary
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based concerns may provide some justification for the privilege when the client is an
individual.
B. The Corporate Privilege
Although some scholars have argued that a corporate attomey-client privilege can
be justified on noninstrumental grounds,'" the morality-based arguments are even
weaker when the corporation is the client." For example, it is difficult to perceive an
entity has having a right to privacy akin to an individual's. At any rate, moral
justifications for the attorney-client privilege have been superceded by instrumental
objectives and have fallen out of favor in judicial discourse. In Upjohn v. United
States, 7 the Supreme Court unequivocally embraced instrumental objectives as the
controlling justification for the corporate attomey-client privilege.88 Yet the
privilege as a bastion for defending privacy values may be doubted"); see also Allen et al.,
supra note 80, at 373-74 (arguing that neither privacy nor client autonomy are successful
justifications for the attorney-client privilege); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy:
The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 157, 190
(1993) [hereinafter Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy] (arguing that the privacy argument, in the
context of corporate secrets, is "merely a myth" and that the law, in favoring attorneys and
other professionals over family members and others, "denigrates the general importance of
private intimate relationships"). Professor Daniel R. Fischel puts it well:
Lawyers are not the only people in society who learn secrets. Friends, partners,
relatives and business associates, among countless others, learn private
information, frequently with the express or implied understanding that the
information will be kept confidential. No doubt those other groups also face the
occasional dilemma of whether to maintain confidentiality or to disclose the
information in order to prevent harm to a third party.... And regardless of what
nonlawyers would do voluntarily, they are subject to compelled disclosure by
subpoena and face civil or criminal penalties if they refuse. Not so with attorneys.
Fischel, supra note 79, at 2.
85. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations ofthe Lawyer
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1076 (1976) (arguing that the corporate privilege is
justified by concerns for client autonomy).
86. For a thorough and compelling argument regarding why the leading nonutilitarian
arguments in favor of the attorney-client privilege are not compelling when the client is a
corporation, see Thomburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 84, at 182-92.
87. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
88. Id. at 389-90. Specifically, the Court stated that the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege
is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or
advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the
lawyers being fully informed by the client. As we stated last Term in Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980): "The lawyer-client privilege rests on the
need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons
for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out." And
in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.39 1, 403 (1976), we recognized the purpose
of the privilege to be "to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their
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instrumental justification for the privilege is weak. At most, the privilege's effect on
client candor is marginal. First, in most business settings sufficient incentives for
client candor exist-there is simply no compelling need for the additional incentive
that is allegedly provided by the privilege. Second, in many situations in which some
additional incentive might be necessary to encourage corporate employees to be fully
forthcoming with corporate counsel, the privilege does not supply that incentive. Only
when high-level executives engage in highly sensitive transactions is the privilege
likely to provide sufficient incentives for disclosure. Given the substantial costs that
the privilege imposes, speculative gains from increased disclosure to lawyers provide
a shaky justification for the corporate privilege.
Two distinct situations give rise to attorney-client communications. The first
situation arises when the client seeks advice regarding prospective conduct-contract
negotiations, business planning, acquisitions, or mergers (the "preconduct' setting).
The second situation occurs after certain conduct: for example, a corporation may
fear that certain actions it has already taken maybe actionable, or a corporation learns
that an employee has engaged in questionable conduct (the "postconduct" setting).
The following sections explore each context in turn.
1. The Privilege and Preconduct Advice
The justification for the corporate attorney-client privilege in the preconduct stage
is that the privilege encourages clients to make full disclosure to counsel and thereby
obtain the legal advice necessary to enable the corporation to conform its conduct to
the law.89 Yet, scholars have argued that the attorney-client privilege is largely
irrelevant to clients engaged in routine business transactions and planning. The
empirical research (admittedly scant) offers support for that view."*
attorneys." This rationale for the privilege has long been recognized by the Court.
[citations omitted] Admittedly, complications in the application of the privilege
arise when the client is a corporation, which in theory is an artificial creature of
the law, and not an individual; but this Court has assumed that the privilege
applies when the client is a corporation [citation omitted], and the Government
does not contest the general proposition.
Id.
89. See, e.g., id. at 392 (rejecting the "control group" test and adopting a broader definition
of the corporate client for privilege purposes because the control group test "threatens to limit
the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law").
90. To date, there have been only four attempts to test empirically the assumptions of the
instrumental justification. Two of those surveys targeted individual, as opposed to corporate,
clients, and are thus of limited usefulness here. See Note, Functional Overlap Between the
Lawyer and OtherProfessionals: Its Implicationsforthe Privileged Communications Doctrine,
71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962) (presenting a survey comparing individual clients' interactions with
lawyers and other professionals); see also Zacharias, supra note 78 (detailing a survey
evaluating the impact of lawyer confidentiality rules on attorney-client communications). One
other survey was targeted at studying a range of ethical issues facing corporate attorneys, and
so gave insufficient attention to the attorney-client privilege issue to be of much help. See Eric
P. Sloter & Anita M. Sorensen, Corporate Legal Ethics-An Empirical Study: The Model
Rules, The Code of Professional Responsibility, and Counsel's Continuing Struggle Between
Theory and Practice, 8 J. CoRP. L. 601 (1983). The fourth survey was conducted by Professor
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It seems reasonable to assume that when corporate actors consult lawyers about
routine transactions, they intend to conform corporate conduct to the law.9 With the
pressing concern for the bottom line, not many employees would want to risk
exposing the corporation to liability inadvertently. Moreover, many industries are
heavily regulated, and compliance with regulations is a necessary feature of any run-
of-the mill transaction.' Corporate actors who wish to comply with the law will not
worry that their communications with counsel will eventually be revealed, because
revelation would show only that the corporation did not pursue avenues that violated
applicable law or regulations.93 Thus, inmost preconduct situations, the law need not
provide additional incentive to encourage corporate employees to be candid with
counsel.94
In 1989, Professor Vincent Alexander conducted a survey of corporate executives,
corporate in-house attorneys, and partners of large law firms in New York City.95
That study offers some admittedly unscientific support for this view.96 Among the
Vincent Alexander, and appears to be the only existing in-depth survey evaluating the impact
ofthe corporate privilege. See Vincent C. Alexander, The CorporateA ttorney-Client Privilege:
.A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 191 (1989).
91. See Thornburg, SanctifyingSecrecy, supra note 84, at 175; see also Morgan, supra note
79, at 26; John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443, 463-64 (1982) (questioning whether the privilege is
necessary to induce corporate actors to communicate with corporate counsel); Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV.
L.REv. 464,474(1977) (stating that the financial stake that corporations have in their activities
render corporations and lawyers "ineluctable bedfellows').
92. See Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 84, at 176; see also Zacharias, supra
note 78, at 364 (stating that the increasing complexity of legal matters would motivate clients
to seek out legal advice even absent confidentiality rules).
93. Fischel, supra note 79, at 29.
94. See Alexander, supra note 90, at 247-48. Professor Alexander's study offers some
limited support for critics' argument that other sufficient incentives for full disclosure exist.
Surveyparticipants identified eight factors in addition to the attorney-client privilege that might
induce client candor: 1) trust or confidence in the particular lawyer, 2) the client's faith in the
attorney to solve its problems, 3) trust that the lawyer would obey her ethical obligation to
refrain from revealing the client's commercial secrets, 4) the client's understanding that the
lawyer needs all the facts to render good advice, 5) a corporate norm that encourages honesty,
6) the employee's fear of reprisals if she is not cooperative with counsel, 7) the understanding
that all of the facts may eventually come out in litigation, and 8) the employee's predisposition
for honesty. Id. In particular, some respondents indicated that the corporation's need for the
attorney's problem-solving expertise and the understanding that the attorney can render better
advice if she knows all the facts are strong inducements to client candor. Id. Ultimately,
however, executives noted that their trust or confidence in the particular lawyer was the largest
factor affecting candor. Id. Because this element of trust could be fostered by the privilege, the
study indicates that the privilege might increase candor among upper management at the
margins. Id. at 248.
95. See Alexander, supra note 90, at 202-03.
96. In 1968, Professor Alexander published the only study to attempt to determine whether
the corporate attorney client privilege was necessary to encourage corporate actors to make full
disclosure to corporate counsel. Alexander sent a survey to members of three groups: in-house
counsel for large, New York City-based corporations, partners in large New York City law
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attorneys surveyed, nonlitigators often indicated that they paid little notice to the
privilege in their daffy practice, unless the matter was an unusually "sensitive"
transaction or personnel matter.' Clients gave a similar response.98 Of course, if
upper management is generally aware ofthe privilege's existence, that awareness may
contribute to an atmosphere of openness even in routine attorney-client interactions. 9
It seems more likely, however, that the privilege has some influence when
corporate management engages, not in routine transactions, but in unusual or highly
sensitive ones. One survey reveals that corporate attorneys, and many of their clients,
believe that the privilege plays a role in encouraging corporate attorney-client
communications in this context, at least at the level of upper management."°
Corporate executives face pressure to generate profits, which creates an incentive
to seek every benefit that the law will allow. It is not always clear in advance whether
a court or a government regulator will later determine that corporate acts fall within
the law's parameters. Thus, a corporation could legitimately seek to push the law to
firms, and corporate executives. Id. Responding to the survey were fifty in-house attorneys,
fifty-two law firm partners, and fifty-two corporate executives. Id. at 206.
97. Among the transactions that executives and attorneys described as "sensitive" were
hostile takeovers, mergers, tax planning, and personnel matters. In descending order of
frequency, the following transactions were also identified as "sensitive": internal investigations,
written opinion letters, compliance with government regulations, and government
investigations. Id. at 239.
98. Id. at 238-39.
99. Id. at 244-45.
100. Alexander's study indicates that, as a general matter, a strong majority of corporate
executives and corporate attorneys surveyed believed that the privilege plays some role in
encouraging client candor. Specifically, 62% of in-house counsel surveyed, 88.5% of outside
counsel surveyed, and 75% ofexecutives surveyed believed that the privilege encouraged client
candor. Id. Moreover, most attorneys believed that most employees in upper management are
aware of the privilege. Of the attorneys surveyed, 73.5% believed that all or nearly all upper
management was aware of the privilege. Only 18.6% believed that middle managers were
aware of the privilege, and only 4.9% believed that lower-level employees were aware of the
privilege. Id. at 236. But when corporate executives were asked specifically how often, during
the past five years, the privilege had played a role in their communications with corporate
counsel, 46.2% of the executives responded "never" or "rarely," (specifically, 21.2% of
corporate executives stated that the privilege "never" influenced their communications with
counsel, and 25% of respondents stated that it "rarely" did. Id. at 242. 9.6% said that the
privilege "frequently" was of concern, and 3.8% said it "always" was. Id.) while 40.4%
responded "occasionally." Only 13.4% said "frequently" or "always." Id. On the other hand,
78.8% of the corporate executives surveyed indicated that they "had been concerned about the
applicability of the privilege at least once in five years." Id. Moreover, two-thirds of attorneys
indicated that they had raised the issue with clients for the purpose of encouraging candor in
communications at least once in the past five years. Id. at 243. However, 70% of those lawyers
admitted that, often, their primary objective in raising the privilege was tactical; they wanted
to ensure that they could later assert the privilege in discovery. Id. at 243-44.
Alexander's study, though important, is of limited value, given the small sample. Moreover,
it is quite possible that the respondents exaggerated the role that the privilege plays in
encouraging candor, given the strong business and tactical advantages the privilege affords. See
id. at 263 (stating that "[o]ne may reasonably suspect.., that the role of the privilege as an
incentive to candor was exaggerated by the participants").
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its limits to maximize profits. Corporate actors in ihis position might, in fact, be
somewhat hesitant to speak to counsel absent assurances that their communications
will not later be used against them should the government or some other party later
claim that the corporation crossed the line. Such disclosures could have an adverse
effect on the bottom line.
Even here, however, the privilege's effectiveness is questionable. Professor
Elizabeth Thornburg points out that, given the uncertainties of privilege doctrine, a
corporate client cannot be sure at the time of the communication that a court will later
find it privileged.'' For example, a different corporate actor might waive the
privilege's protectionby disclosing the communication to those who do not constitute
"the client" for privilege purposes."° In addition, she notes, whether the privilege
applies to aparticular communication will depend on whether a court determines that
the communication concerned primarily legal, as opposed to business, advice. 3
Maintaining confidentiality is out of the speaker's control; the corporation's counsel
might inadvertently disclose the communications, which will, in some jurisdictions,
constitute a waiver.'" As a result of these uncertainties, Thornburg argues, corporate
actors are unlikely to rely on the privilege in deciding whether to disclose delicate
facts. 105
Yet Alexander's survey suggests that employees are simply not aware of the details
of privilege law, other than perhaps a vague awareness of the need to keep
101. SeeThomburg, SanctijyingSecrecy, supra note 84, at 166-73. For example, courts take
radically different approaches to whether an inadvertent disclosure is a waiver of the privilege.
Compare In re United Mine Workers, 159 F.R.D. 307,311 (D.D.C. 1994) (stating that litigant
who inadvertently or involuntarily produces a privileged document waives the right to protect
all "corresponding communications relating to the responses to and requests for, legal advice
on the same subject") (citations omitted), with Bayer AG & Miles, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No.
92 CIV 0381, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17988, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994) (excusing
inadvertent waiver where "millions of pages of documents were made available for inspection,
thousands of documents were copied, an elaborate screening process was utilized and only a
dozen documents slipped through the net," and finding that plaintiff's one-year wait to attempt
to retrieve privileged documents was not negligent given the circumstances of the case). For
a discussion regarding whether a corporation's voluntary disclosure to a government agency
is a waiver of the privilege for all purposes, compare Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d
1214, 1219-1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981), in which the D.C. Circuit held that disclosure of
confidential communications to a government agency waives the privilege for all purposes,
with Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596,611 (8th Cir. 1977), in which the
Eighth Circuit allowed a corporation to assert attorney-client privilege in litigation against a
private party even though it had revealed the confidential communications to a government
agency.
102. Whether a particular employee personifies the "client" may depend on thejurisdiction
in which that issue is subsequently litigated. See Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note
84, at 169-72.
103. See id. at 167-68.
104. See, e.g., Int'l Digital Sys., Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445 (D. Mass.
1988) (finding that attorney-client privilege was waived when party's attorney inadvertently
disclosed document); FDIC v. Singh, 140 F.t.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992).
105. See Thomburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 84, at 169-72.
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communications confidential."° Employees who rely on the privilege in speaking
candidly to counsel seem to rely not on a thorough knowledge of privilege law, but
on vague notions that attorneys are ethically bound to keep confidences and cannot
reveal client confidences in court'0 Even if the corporate attorney-client privilege
were abolished entirely, lawyers would still be ethically bound to keep client
confidences.' If corporate employees have only a hazy understanding of the
differences, the privilege is not likely to have an impact on the degree of candor in
some employee communications with counsel.'I
In sum, the most that can be said about the privilege's effectiveness is that it may
encourage candor among upper-level executives involved in sensitive business
transactions. But, even if the privilege might encourage candor in some situations,
does it achieve its ultimate objective, which is to encourage compliance with the
law?'o The answer is unknown. "' In some number of cases, a court or regulator will
determine that the corporation's act was within the law's bounds. In those instances,
the privilege will have served its purpose. In other cases, the privilege will facilitate
lawless behavior.12 As ProfessorDaniel Fischel has argued, confidentiality rules may
106. Alexander, supra note 90, at 240 (indicating that 43.2% of lawyers indicated that they
advise corporate clients about the need to keep attorney-client communications confidential);
see also, Zacharias, supra note 78, at 382 (stating that "[p]erhaps the most striking revelation
of the Tompkins County survey is that lawyers overwhelmingly do not tell clients of
confidentiality rules").
107. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 383 (relating that 79.1% of clients who had not been
schooled in the confidentiality rules by their attorneys claimed knowledge of confidentiality
rules from unknown sources, friends, television, or books).
108. See MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983) (discussing confidentiality of
information relating to the representation of the client); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSInxrrY Canon 4 (1983) (discussing the preservation of a client's confidences).
109. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 365-66 (arguing that if clients have only a vague or limited
understanding of confidentiality rules, creating limited disclosure exceptions would probably
not affect the candor of clients' disclosure).
110. Professor Thornburg argues that the privilege protects only those corporate planners
who wish to push the law past its limits, for they are those who fear later revelation of attorney-
client communications. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 84, at 175-77. For the
reasons stated in this paragraph, that argument oversimplifies the issue.
111. See Zacharias, supra note 78, at 365-69 (noting that the claim that confidentiality rules
facilitate client compliance with the law is empirically unverified, and arguing that "enabling
clients to discuss planned misconduct with impunity might even promote misconduct").
112. Professor Thornburg stresses that corporate management faces far stronger sanctions
for failure to perform profitably than it does for illegal behavior, and that a corporation's
objective in seeking legal advice might often be to obtain assistance in pushing the law past its
limits. See Thorburg, SanctifyingSecrecy, supra note 84, at 176; see also, Sexton, supra note-
91, at 472 (claiming that the less defined the boundaries of protection are, the less likely the
privilege will serve its purpose); John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick":
An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386,
394-95 (1981) (stating that the "risk preferrer [manager] will be likely to chance profitable
illegal behavior" because the chance ofbeing caught is very low). Moreover, an empirical study
by Professor Robert L. Nelson reveals that most attorneys tend to share the values of their
corporate clients and are happy to accommodate clients' demands in this regard because, in
part, they wish to attract future business. See Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and
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facilitate noncompliance in one of two ways. First, a client that was disinclined to
engage in questionable activity may change his mind after receiving legal advice that
more accurately estimates the likelihood that the activity will result in sanctions."'
Second, the client may use legal advice to his advantage by learning how to decrease
the odds of detection or by using the legal advice to lessen the severity of the
sanctions."" Thus, in the preconduct setting, the privilege's costs may well exceed its
marginal benefits.
2. The Privilege and the Postconduct Context
The case for a corporate attorney-client privilege in the postconduct setting is even
less compelling. In the postconduct setting, management becomes aware that past
corporate activity may be actionable or discovers that a particular employee has acted
in a way that may expose the corporation to liability. In these instances, the action
giving rise to potential liability has already occurred, and corporate counsel needs
access to all the facts, either to prepare its case or to respond to and negotiate with
government investigators. Attorneys may gather internal facts through informal
meetings or interviews. Or, the corporation may launch an organized internal
investigation.
Courts have assumed that the privilege is necessary to enable counsel to obtain all
the relevant facts necessary to give appropriate legal advice or to conduct litigation.
Thus, two questions are relevant. First, is the privilege necessary to encourage the
corporation management to set the investigation in motion so that all relevant facts
might be discovered? Second, does the privilege encourage particular employees to
be forthcoming with counsel regarding facts within their knowledge? The answer to
both questions is no.
First, the corporation as an entity already has plenty of incentive to discover all
relevant facts. The system, as it currently stands, contains built-in incentives to ensure
that management and corporate counsel make every effort to marshal all relevant
facts. In the litigation context, counsel will be aware that the broad rules of civil
discovery will make revelation of al relevant facts likely.' 5 The corporate attorney
Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37
STAN. L. REv. 503, 504-05 (1985).
113. Fischel, supra note 79, at 29.
114. Id. at 30.
115. See, e.g., FED. R. Cv. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (requiring parties to disclose information "that the
disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment");
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (defining the scope of discovery as involving "any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party" and directing that "[flor good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter"); see also 8
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (2d ed. 1994)
(stating that the discovery rules are "an integrated mechanism for narrowing the issues and
ascertaining the facts," and that the courts have construed the rules liberally to this end); id. §
2007, at 94 (stating that Rule 26(b) allows "broad scope to discovery and this has been well
recognized by the courts"). For a general discussion of recent amendments to the discovery
rules and their likely impact on practice, see Gregory P. Joseph, The 2000 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Preliminary Analysis, SF02 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1 (2001).
2002]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
has incentive to inform corporate management of that fact, and to emphasize to her
client the importance of revealing all relevant information to her first. As an ethical
matter, the litigator must fulfill her duty to represent her client."16 As a practical
matter, no litigator wants to be in a position of having her adversary discover facts of
which she is unaware." 7
The same forces are at work when a corporation faces a government investigation.
No attorney worth her salt would relish the thought of government regulators
discovering damaging facts before corporate counsel do. Given the government's
broad investigatory powers, this scenario could occur if the corporation does not
move quickly. Moreover, failure to discover those facts puts the corporation in a
position of weakness in working out a settlement or compromise. Of course, the
attorney-client privilege makes an internal investigation a more appealing prospect
for the corporation, allowing the corporation to gather the facts prior to negotiating
or possibly litigating with the government. But it is not clear why giving corporations
this advantage is worth suffering the costs the privilege imposes. In most instances,
an internal investigation will not serve the lofty purpose of enabling a corporation to
conform with the law. If the law has already been violated, the internal investigation
simply affords the corporation a mechanism for getting the troops in line and their
stories straight, while requiring its adversary to gather the facts in a much more
expensive, and less accurate, manner." The Upjohn Court's reverence for the
internal investigation is confusing, at best. Thus, the privilege cannot be justified as
providing an incentive for a corporate entity to investigate.
Even though the corporation would investigate if there were no privilege, is the
privilege nonetheless necessary to encourage individual employees to be candid with
counsel? In most cases, no. First, examine the situation of lower- to middle-level
employees. A lower-level employee faces several incentives to be candid with
counsel. For one thing, the employee's boss will require her to cooperate, and so she
will, in an effort to keep her job."9 Second, corporate counsel should explain to the
employee that the facts are discoverable in litigation, so it is better for the
In contrast to the relative accessability of facts, the corporation's legal strategy will be
protected by the work-product doctrine. See generally WRIGHT ET AL, supra, § 2026 (stating
that an attorney's mental impressions, legal theories, and the like are protected).
116. See MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.3 (1999) (stating a lawyer must
provide competent representation, including thoroughness and preparation, and must act with
reasonable diligence); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'LREsr oNStBILrY DR 6-101 (A)(2), EC
7-1 (1980) (forbidding a lawyer from handling a legal matter without adequate preparation, and
stating a lawyer's ethical duty to represent his client "zealously').
117. See Thomburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 84, at 177.
118. As Professor Fischel puts it,
Confidentiality does create an incentive to investigate by giving the client the
ability to bide any negative information discovered. The [Upjohn] Court was
correct, therefore, in concluding that absent confidentiality, investigations would
be less thorough. But this does not mean that more violations of the law would
result [absent the privilege]. The opposite is true.
Fischel, supra note 79, at 31.
119. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 84, at 175.
[Vol. 77:469
WHY PRIVILEGE THE PRIVILEGED?
corporation, and thus for the employee, to discover them sooner rather than later.20
The employee who faces these incentives, yet is still reluctant to be candid may
have one or more of the following reasons for being hesitant. First, and most likely,
the employee might fear her employer. If her superior becomes aware of the facts, the
employee might suffer reprisals. Second, the employee might fear damage to her
reputation if the facts become public knowledge. In either case, the employee might
also lie or withhold the truth during a deposition. Will the attorney-client privilege
encourage such an employee to reveal potentially damaging facts? No. The employee
is afraid of her employer, not of a potential revelation in court.'2' The employee will
know that the corporate lawyer in whom she confides can, and will, report the
substance of their communications to upper-level management. For such an
employee, then, the privilege provides no incentive for candor.
The third, and least likely, possibility is that the lower-level employee might fear
that the facts will be revealed in court and will cause damage to the corporate entity.
Will the corporate attorney-client privilege encourage this employee to be candid?
Several scholars have argued that it will not" because the employee does not control
the privilege, and the corporation may later waive it over her objection." Thus, the
argument runs, no reasonable employee would rely on the privilege in deciding
whether to confide in corporate counsel. This argument depends on the assumption
that corporate employees are aware of the privilege's limits. This assumption,
however, is of questionable validity. 2' As Professor Rice has noted, the perception
of corporate executives that the privilege plays an important role in encouraging client
candor is based on a misunderstanding of the privilege's limits'--a
misunderstanding that is facilitated by corporate counsel. This lack of understanding
is likely to be more pronounced faither down the chain of command. Thus, the
privilege might marginally increase candor of lower- and middle-level employees if,
and only if, those employees are reluctant to disclose solely because they fear
damaging their employer in court. This benefit is marginal, at best.
120. Id. at 172 (stating that, at least in theory, the facts are discoverable by interrogatory or
deposition).
121. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
122. See Sexton, supra note 91, at 466-67 (noting that the ability of a corporation to waive
the privilege may encourage employees not to speak to an attorney); see also Thomburg,
Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 84, at 173-74 (stating that the employee's interests are not
protected by the privilege).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 295,296 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that
acorporation could waive the privilege over the objections of the speaker/corporate employee).
124. In Alexander's study, for example, more than halfofthe lawyers surveyed believed that
"virtually no one at any level of the corporate hierarchy" is aware that the corporation may
waive the privilege over the employee's objection. Alexander, supra note 90, at 249. The
remaining attorneys thought that only a few corporate employees in any given corporation were
aware of the limitation. Id. A full 59.6% of the corporate executives surveyed answered that
theywere unaware that the corporation could waive the privilege over the speaker's objection.
Id. at 250. Perhaps more astounding, fewer than half of the attorneys had ever informed a
corporate employee that the privilege was not personal, and a third of those who had done so
admitted that they had rarely done so. Id. at 252.
125. Paul R. Rice, The Corporate Attorney-ClientPrivilege: Loss ofPredictabilityDoesNot
Justify Crying Wolfinbarger, 55 Bus. LAW. 735, 742 n.38 (2000).
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Does the privilege encourage upper-level management and those controlling
corporate affairs to be more forthcoming with counsel? Perhaps. Executives are often
mindful of the privilege when conflict looms. 26 These employees tend to identify
their interests more closely with the corporation's. 27 They are less likely to assume
that their interests and the corporation's will diverge, and are likely to believe that
they have sufficient influence to preclude a corporate decision to waive the privilege
over their objection." On the other hand, they are also most likely to understand the
importance of full disclosure to counsel, and to understand that a court may later
determine that the privilege does not protect their attorney-client communications.
Finally, upper-level corporate actors may fear personal liability; if so, the knowledge
that the corporation may eventually waive the privilege over their objections may be
a reason to keep quiet. Thus, whether the privilege encourages executives and
directors to be candid with counsel is unclear.
In sum, then, it seems that the instrumental justification for the corporate privilege
is weak at best. Perhaps it affects the candor of upper management at the margins.
But it often does so in service of dubious ends. It is not at all clear that giving
corporations an attorney-client privilege confers a net benefit on the justice system,
or society more generally.12 9
Even if corporations and government entities were structurally similar, the
justification for extending the attorney-client privilege to government would rest on
questionable foundations. But, as the following sections will show, the case for the
attorney-client privilege is even weaker when the government is the client than when
the client is a private corporation.
III. THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Of the few courts or scholars that have bothered to offer a justification for the
government attorney-client privilege, none have asserted that the assorted
noninstrumental justifications that have been offered in support of the privilege
generally could serve as a basis for extending the privilege to the government.'30 Nor
126. Alexander, supra note 90, at 242-43. The same evidence shows that litigators are more
likely than other attorneys to inform corporate actors of the privilege's existence. Id. at 238.
127. Id. at 250-51, 262.
128. Id. On the other hand, at least some respondents in Alexander's survey indicated that
their newfound understanding of the privilege's limitation would negatively affect their
willingness to be candid with counsel. Id. at 250-51.
129. A persuasive explanation for the strength and breadth of the privilege lies in the
benefits it provides to attorneys. The privilege, combined with ethical rules of confidentiality,
gives attorneys a marked advantage over other professionals, and a powerful tool with which
to wear down noncorporate adversaries in litigation. Several scholars have persuasively argued
this point. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 79, at 18-26; Morgan, supra note 79, at 26; Deborah
L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 613-14 (1985);
Zacharias, supra note 78, at 353 n.7.
130. Although the focus ofthis Article concerns civil litigation, the analysis presented herein
is equally applicable to the criminal context. Generally, government attorney-client invocations
of the attorney-client pivilege are rarer in the criminal context. Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16(a)(2) confers broad protection over most government work product. Specifically,
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should they; certainly concerns for client "privacy" or "client autonomy" carry no
weight when the client is the government A proponent of a broad government
attorney-client privilege, then, must make the case that the privilege is necessary to
enable government employees to obtain sound legal advice.
The government, like a corporation, can act only through its agents. Courts and
scholars have assumed that this superficial similarityjustifies the superimposition of
the corporate privilege onto the government structure.'3' For example, in an article
analyzing aspects of the government attorney-client privilege,'32 Professor Michael
Paulsen states simply that "the United States government possesses, as a matter of
common law, the same attorney-client privilege that exists for a corporation or other
organizational entity"'133 and seals the deal by subsequently referring to the
government as "USA, Inc.," 34 and the President as "the Chief Executive Officer of
USA, Inc."' 35
Yet this reflexive assumption leads to bizarre results, both in theory and in
practice, as courts and commentators struggle to apply the instrumental justification
in the government context. For instance, the point of Paulsen's article is to establish
that, in light of Morrison v. Olson,"'36 the Independent Counsel may, upon a proper
showing, waive the privilege on the government's behalf, even if the White House
or other government entity opposes waiver."3 This thesis reveals that even Paulsen
doubts the extent to which government actors rely on the privilege in consulting with
counsel-what President would disclose damaging information to counsel in reliance
on a privilege when control of the privilege can flow so easily out of his hands?
Courts, too, have struggled with the lack of fit between the privilege and the
operations of government. For example, some recent cases have radically departed
from established privilege law to deny government claims of privilege. For example,
in Tax Analysts v. IRS,'38 the D.C. Circuit held that confidential communications
between the chief counsel for the IRS and field personnel who sought legal guidance
in conducting audits are not protected by the attorney-client privilege to the extent
the Rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection ofreports, memoranda, or other internal
government documents made by the attorney for the government or other government agents
in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by
government witnesses except as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3500 or Rule 16(a)(1)(A), (B), (D)
& (E). Given Rule 16, the government does not often need to invoke the common law attorney-
client privilege. It is most likely to do so to protect prelitigation communications between
agency employees and government attorneys. However, the common law privilege is expressly
limited by the Brady doctrine, which requires the prosecution to turn over evidence favorable
to the accused that is material either to guilt or punishment if the defendant requests it.
131. See, e.g., RICE, TREATISE, supra note 9. "The U.S. government is the largest employer
in the world. Its agency structures and problems are as complex as those of any private
enterprise. To the extent that the protection of the privilege isjustified in any corporate context,
the need within the government is equal, if not greater." Id. at 137.
132. See Paulsen, supra note 7.
133. Id. at 474.
134. Id. at 479.
135. Id. at 475.
136. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
137. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 479.
138. 117 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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that they contain information provided by taxpayers.' According to that court,
attorney-client communications are protected only if the facts communicated are
unknown to any third parties. 4 ' Professor Paul Rice, a leading authority on the
attorney-client privilege, has strongly criticized the court's decision, and the
precedent leading to it, as contrary to established privilege law.'4' Says Rice, "The
nature of the information contained in the communications from the client to the
attorney is irrelevant to the communications' privileged status. Regardless of where
the client acquired the information, orthe information's confidential or public nature,
the content of the client's communication with his attorney is privileged."' 42
In two recent high-profile cases the courts determined that the Office of the
President could not assert the attorney-client privilege in response to federal grand
jury requests.4 3 Never before had a court suggested that the availability of the
privilege hinged on the setting in which it was asserted. The courts' opinions-if not
the results-are inconsistent with privilege law outside the government context, and,
to some extent, with the instrumental argument for the privilege. If one truly believes
that an absolute privilege is necessary to encourage government actors to be candid
with government attorneys, it cannot follow that the availability of the privilege
should turn on the nature of the proceedings in which the privilege is asserted.
These are just a few of the many cases where courts betray an underlying unease
with the privilege in the government setting. The unease is warranted, for upon close
inspection, the justification fora government privilege dissolves like Jell-O. This Part
explores how the attorney-client relationship in the government context differs from
the relationship in the corporate context, and what impact those differences have on
the justification for an attorney-client privilege. The Part first demonstrates that the
"public trust" held by government lawyers does not, by itself, provide a sufficient
basis for rejecting the attorney-client privilege. The Part then explores the incentives
facing government officials-first lower- and middle-level employees, and then
agency heads, and ultimately the President. The exploration reveals that the existence
of a privilege will have little impact on the behavior of employees at lower and
middle levels. For top government officials, the existence of a privilege may
encourage open communication with lawyers, but those officials already enjoy a
privilege that adequately protects the government's need for confidentiality-the
executive privilege. So long as the privilege's concern is with governmental rather
than personal needs, there is no need for additional privilege protection.
A. The Public Trust Doctrine
The first, and most obvious, difference between corporate and government actors
is that government actors occupy a position of public trust. The few rugged souls who
139. Id. at 619.
140. See id.
141. Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 9, at 983-88.
142. Id. at 985 (emphasis in original); see also RICE, TREATISE, supra note 9, at 131-33
(noting that the Court's insistence that the attorney-client communication contain confidential
information is a misunderstanding of privilege doctrine).
143. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997).
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have questioned the soundness of the government privilege have leaned heavily on
this point.1" To them, the specter of government employees invoking the privilege
against the very citizens they are bound to serve is offensive. Indeed, it was that
belief, coupled with concern that government employees would abuse the privilege,
that motivated the drafters of the 1974 Uniform Rules of Evidence to recommend
only a qualified government attorney-client privilege limited to communications
concerning a pending investigation or litigation.
14
144. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920 ("[T]he general duty of
public service calls upon government employees and agencies to favor disclosure over
concealment. The difference between the public interest and the private interest is perhaps, by
itself, reason enough to find Upjohn unpersuasive in this case."); see also WRIGHT&GRAHAM,
supra note 13, § 5475, at 125-26 (noting that "it can be argued that granting the government
the power to suppress evidence of communications between government employees and
government lawyers is inconsistent with the openness to scrutiny that is thought by some to be
the hallmark of a truly democratic republic"); Barsdate, supra note 70, at 1738 (arguing that
"the government entity has a unique public function. The government has an obligation to
advance the public interest in litigation ... [t]he government attorney must seek a fair result
beyond.., the interests of the government client"); Gowdy, supra note 21, at 720-21; William
Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty
When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 How. L.J. 539, 555 (1986) (discussing the position of the
Professional Ethics Committee ofThe Federal Bar Association, which was that the government
lawyer "assumes a public trust," and is "responsible to the people").
145. Transcripts of the annual Conferences of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Revised Rules of Evidence, for the years 1973 and 1974 reveal that the Commissioners were
greatly influenced by the Watergate proceedings, and most were strongly of the view that a
broad government attorney-client privilege's primary function would be to enable government
employees to hide the truth from the public. First, the Commissioners made it crisply clear that
their intent was to deprive public officers of privilege protection in most instances:
Mr. Eastham: Does [section (6)] mean that if the governor of a state
communicates with a lawyer on some matter of concern to him, a court
could say the lawyer is required to testify as to what the governor told
him? That's the way I read it. Is that the intention?
Mr. Jestrab: Yes, sir. That was the intent, Commissioner.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings, Annual
Conference in Its 82nd Year, Revised Uniform Rules of Evidence 74-75 (1973). Later,
Commissioner Green was more specific, contending that the government privilege was largely
used to hide evidence:
Mr. Green: I happen to have a suit pending against the Corps of Engineers
right nowwhere Iwas thoroughly frustrated when the Corps of Engineers
ultimately made its decision, in effect, to do nothing, and managed to
hide it. They managed to get a letter out of Washington from their house
counsel which they claimed authorized the Kansas City District to do
nothing, rather than get a letter from a superior officer who is not a
lawyer in Washington, and they claimed privilege, and are hiding what
they are doing. This is public business. This is the kind of business that
the public has a right to know about. And this seems absurd.
Id. at79.
The following year, when the Committee met for the final time, the issue was discussed once
more at length. Again, the Committee defended its decision to deprive government entities of
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But the "public trust" argument begs the question; if in fact the privilege enables
public officials to obtain sound legal advice-advice that officials could not obtain
absent the promise of confidentiality-then the privilege does further the public
interest, at least some of the time. Therefore, to determine whether a government
entity should hold an attorney-client privilege, it is necessary to determine whether
and to what extent the instrumental justification holds in the government context. If,
upon examination, the instrumental justification is of dubious validity, then abroad
government attorney-client privilege cannot be allowed to stand, because it enables
public officials to shield evidence from private citizens for no sound purpose.
The public trust argument aside, the structural differences between government
entities and corporations are sufficiently substantial that the instrumental argument
becomes even weaker in the government context. As in the analysis of the corporate
privilege, the division of legal advice into preconduct and postconduct settings helps
clarify the analysis.
B. The Instrumental Justification in the Government Context
1. The Lower- or Middle-Level Executive Branch Employee
a. Preconduct Legal Advice
Most executive branch employees have even greater motivation to speak freely
with counsel in the preconduct stage than their corporate counterparts in lower and
middle management. Recall that, in the corporate context, the ever-present push to
maximize profits can sometimes conflict with the incentive to follow the law. This
tension should not be present when executive branch employees seek legal advice.
Although employees may face budget considerations, those financial considerations
are not on the same order of magnitude as the corporate imperative to make money.
The absence of a profit motive influences government employee conduct in a few
ways. First, government actors have little incentive to push official conduct to or past
a broad attorney-client privilege by emphasizing the privilege's potential for abuse:
Mr. Krivosha: It seems to me that the very thing that we have been going
through in this country for all of these months has to do with this very
privilege.... It seems to me that at some point we have got to recognize
that when the governor or the speaker of the house or the attorney general
says, "Well, let's do it this way. Nobody will know about it," or "We'll
do it this way, and tell them it's something else," that's the very thing that
we're attempting to put an end to once and for all.
There is no need or requirement for a privilege to public officials.
They ought to have the guts to say to their constituents [sic], or they
ought not to say it.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings, Annual
Conference in Its 83rd Year, Revised Uniform Rules of Evidence 57-58 (1974).
Finally, on behalf of the Committee, Mr. Jestrab stated: "[I]n our view, the public business
should be done in public ... we decided that in a state there were no such things as state secrets.
And here again we don't think there is any purpose in keeping the public business a secret."
Id. at58.
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the law's boundaries. Itseens reasonable to assume thatmost government employees
have compliance with the law as a paramount concern, and thus need no additional
incentive to disclose fully to government counsel. In a sense, then, government actors
are analogous to those corporate planners who wish only to comply with, not to
stretch or exceed, the law's boundaries. They will be forthcoming with counsel
because they need not fear that later revelation of attorney-client communications will
compromise or embarrass them.'" Second, employees should generally be less
reluctant to discuss potentially dicey plans with counsel, because eventually
revelation of contemplated but rejected courses of conduct cannot hurt the
government's "bottom line," and by extension, the employee's job.
Moreover, the disincentives to candor that corporate employees encounter are
absent in much ofthe work that government employees do. The image of an ignorant
client who may hesitate to reveal confidential facts unless encouraged bythe privilege
fails to describe the attorney-client relationship that exists when the "client" is an
employee of a government agency who is performing the agency's policymaking,
interpretation, or enforcement functions. In those situations, the image of "client"
fails because the employee's communications with government attorneys simply do
not contain confidential facts about the agency. Extending the attorney-client
privilege to protect communications made in these settings serves no compelling
purpose.
For example, when agency employees are engaged in rule- and policymaking, they
generate many documents that they may later seek to shield by invoking the attorney-
client privilege. Yet discussions of the scope and affect of changes in agencypolicy,
and formulations ofstockresponses to citizen complaints, do not involve confidential
"facts" known only to government employees. The agency employees will seek the
legal advice necessary to enable them to perform their job descriptions even if they
know that their communications will not be protected in subsequent litigation. A
number of courts (most notably the D.C. Circuit), have understood this, and have
denied the government's claimof attorney-client privilege when government activities
at issue could not have involved confidential facts concerning the agency. 47 Other
courts, however, apply the privilege to such communications.
Consider Arizona Rehabilitation Hospital, Inc., v. Shalala.'" A health care
institution sued the federal government after the Department of Health and Human
146. See Evans v. Atwood, 177 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1997) (realizing that some documents
should not be protected by the attorney-client privilege, where government employees
consultedwith attorneys prior to terminating agency employees and terminated employees later
sued the government for age discrimination, because the advice concerned conforming
government conduct to the law).
147. See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 618-20 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (following
precedent to find that Field Service Advice Memos ("FSAs") are generally not protected by the
attorney-client privilege because the facts contained within them are known to the taxpayers);
Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 253 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (reversing lower court's ruling that three documents drafted by government attorneys
were privileged because the facts that the client had supplied to counsel, and upon which
counsel relied in formulating its opinion, were not "confidential" because they were known to
third parties).
148. 185 F.R.D. 263 (D. Ariz. 1998).
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Services (the "Department") changed its medicare reimbursement policy. 49 During
discovery, the plaintiff demanded that the Department produce documents
memorializing communications between the Department's employees and the
Department's general counsel's office.' The documents explained the proposed
changes in the regulation and the proposed rule for public comment. The court found
that the documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege because they were
between attorney and client, made for the purpose of seeking, giving, and receiving
legal advice, and were kept confidential.'
Similarly, in Lacefield v. United States,"5 the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
reversed its previous policy when it revoked the tax exempt status of the plaintiffs
disability pension payments.5 3 When the plaintiff, Lacefield, made a FOIA request
for documents concerning the change, the IRS withheld a large number of documents
citing exemption five, which incorporates the attorney-client, attorney work-product,
and deliberative process privileges." The court sustained the IRS's claim that a
variety of documents between IRS employees and IRS counsel seeking and receiving
advice regarding the new policy, as well as an attomey-drafled document suggesting
language that agents could use in responding to questions from affected taxpayers,
were protected by the attorney-client privilege. 5 As in Arizona Rehabilitation
Hospital," the characterization of the communications as legal "opinions" sufficed
as the basis for the court's holding.'57 Thus, in both cases, and scores of others, the
government has been allowed to shield its inner workings from private citizens
affected by its decisions for no reason even remotely connected to the rationale for
the attorney-client privilege." 8
The same criticismis applicable to attorney-client communications generated as
government agencies apply and enforce policy. Although in these instances
communications between government employees and attorneys contain factual
149. Id. at 265.
150. Id. at 265-66, 270-71.
151. Id. at 270 (finding specifically that all elements ofthe attomey-client privilege had been
established).
152. No. 92 N 1680, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4521 (D. Col. Mar. 10, 1993).
153. Id. at *1.
154. Id. at *l, *7.
155. Id. at *10-12. Specifically, the court protected a memorandum from an attorney in the
IRS's National Office to a district counsel attorney responding to a request for "legal advice"
regarding the new policy, a memorandum from a district counsel attorney to an IRS employee
explaining the new policy, a fax "from a [d]istrict [c]ounsel attorney to the National Office
requesting legal advice," and a memorandum from the Acting Chief of the Examination
Division requesting legal advice regarding the new policy. Id.
156. 185 F.R.D. 263 (D. Ariz. 1998).
157. Id. at *11-12.
158. Courts have also protected these types of communications under the deliberative
process privilege, a qualified privilege that shields documents that memorialize agency
deliberations. Although a critique of the deliberative process privilege is beyond the scope of
this Article, the analysis presented herein casts doubt on whether the deliberative process is
necessary to encourage agency deliberations. Fora thorough critique ofthe deliberative process
privilege, see Gerald Wetlaufer, Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliberative
Privilege, 65 IND. L.J. 845 (1990).
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descriptions, the facts communicated are obtained entirely from the targeted citizen
or corporation, and are thus not confidential. As a result, no incentive is necessary to
encourage the government employee to transmit those facts to government counsel
to receive necessary legal advice. 59
Unfortunately, this point has been lost on many courts. For example, courts have
sustained numerous IRS claims of attorney-client privilege in which IRS agents and
attorneys exchange written communications regarding taxpayer audits."6 Typically,
159. For example, in Lee v. FederalDeposit Insurance Corp., 923 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), the court ordered the government to produce several memoranda created by government
attorneys prior to the government's approval of a bank merger. According to the court, the
documents were not privileged because they contained
standard legal analysis of the law relevant. .. in determining whether an
employee of an operating subsidiary of a national bank can serve as an officer of
an investment company, whether an operating subsidiary of a national bank can
provide administrative services to open-end and closed-end investment
companies, including proprietary mutual funds, and whether an operating
subsidiary of a national bank can serve as an administrator for limited liability
companies.
Id. at 457. Because the documents were "neutral, objective analyses of agency regulations,"
they were not privileged. Id. The privilege was not necessary to induce client disclosure,
because the communications did not concern confidential facts with respect to the government.
The privilege, therefore, has no role to play in encouraging client communications.
Similarly, in Schlefer v. United States, 702 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court ordered the
United States to produce "CCOs," which were generated when Maritime Administration
officials, in response to requests for loans or subsidies and other matters presented to the
agency by outsiders, requested advice from the Chief Counsel. Id. at 235. In rejecting the
government's claim that the CCOs were protected by the attorney-client privilege, the court
emphasized that
the factual information contained in the CCOs... is not provided by the
"client"-the Agency official who solicits the Chief Counsel's advice-but
by a third party-the outsider who seeks a ruling from the Agency. The
outsider's communications to the official do not contain any confidential
information concerning the Agency; when the official transmits the relevant
facts to the Chief Counsel, no new or confidential information concerning the
Agency is imparted.
Id. at 245 (emphasis omitted).
160. For example, in Direct Response Consulting Service v. IRS, No. 94cvl 156,1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12586, at *1-3, *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 21,1995), the court sustained the government's
privilege claim over a memo written by IRS district counsel to the Assistant Chief Counsel that
evaluated an individual taxpayer's income and expense claims. The documents discussed the
legal issues involved, applicable code sections and cases, and legal analysis. The court found
that the memorandum was protected by both work-product (because the citizens being audited
might eventually litigate the issues raised in the audit) and attorney-client privileges because
"it amounts to a presentation of legal advice to the IRS from its counsel which was clearly
meant to be held confidential between the two." Id. at *13. See also Buckner v. IRS, 25 F.
Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ind. 1998), in which the plaintiff, who was allegedly harassed by the IRS
when the IRS attached his wages and forced him into bankruptcy, sought files of an IRS agent.
The court sustained the IRS's claims of attorney-client and work-product privileges over
documents that contained communications between government attorneys andbetween the IRS
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agents auditing individuals or corporations request legal advice concerning the
application of specific code provisions to the specific taxpayer's return. In some
cases, such requests for advice result in a flurry of memos among IRS attorneys in
various offices. All of the facts communicated in the requests for legal advice, and
in memos providing such advice, have been provided by the taxpayer. There are no
confidential facts concerning the agency communicated by the IRS employees to IRS
counsel.' 6'
In some cases when agencies are performing an auditing or compliance function,
some type of privilege protection might be necessary. For example, once an audited
citizen contests the IRS's determination, legal opinions may fairly be said to be made
in preparation for litigation. In such a case, the relevant inquiry should be whether
some type of work-product protection is necessary-arguably, requiring the
government to spell out its legal analysis and strategy would put it at an unfair
disadvantage in subsequent litigation with the taxpayer. Part IV contains an analysis
of when a privilege justified by that rationale may be warranted.
Similarly, abolition of the government attorney-client privilege should not require
government employees to reveal documents generated in the course of ongoing
criminal and civil investigations. Such a requirement could compromise ongoing
investigations, and force the government to reveal its case in advance of trial. The law
enforcement investigatory privilege, which has been adopted by federal courts in at
least five circuits, is the proper tool for protecting ongoing criminal and civil
investigations.'62
In sum, the instrumental justification for the attorney-client privilege does not
provide a rationale for privileging communications generated as government
employees seek legal advice prior to acting. There is no reason to think that an agency
employee doingherj ob needs to be encouraged to reveal nonconfidential facts. When
agencies are engaged in policymaking and compliance, confidential facts are not at
issue, and allowing the government to claim attorney-client privilege over such
and its attorneys. See also Rollins v. IRS, No. H-90-3170, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10884 (S.D.
Tex. June 30, 1992) (rubberstamping IRS claims of work-product, deliberative process, and
attorney-client privileges).
161. For example, in Pully v. IRS, 939 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1996), an IRS agent
conducting an audit received an oral answer to inquiries to counsel regarding whether the
audited citizen's financial practices violated IRS regulations. The auditor made handwritten
notations memorializing counsel's advice. Id. at 434. When the taxpayer later made a FOIA
request, the court upheld the government's assertion of attorney-client privilege and the
government did not produce the notes. Id. at 433-34. But the employee would have
communicated with counsel even absent the privilege; communicating to counsel the facts
learned from the audit would not have opened the agency up to additional liability or harmed
the agent in any way. Additional incentive to disclosure was unnecessary.
162. See, e.g., In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 181 F.R.D. 680, 686-89 (N.D.
Ga. 1998) (explaining in depth the doctrinal requirements ofthe investigatory privilege, noting
that at least four other circuits had adopted the privilege, and concluding that "the Eleventh
Circuit would recognize the strong policy justifications underlying the privilege"); Friedman
v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336,1341 (D.C. Cir. 1984); McCoRMICK, ET
AL, supra note 83, § 108 at 167; Note, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official
Information Privilege, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 142, 157-62 (1976).
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documents is simply not justifiable. 63
Of course, the government actor seeking preconduct advice might fervently wish
to keep her communications with government counsel secret from a party with whom
the government is engaged, such as a corporation with whom it is contracting, or an
employee it is contemplating terminating. But the government actor need not worry;
because there is no currently pending litigation, and given the attorney's ethical
obligation to keep client information confidential, the adverse party would have no
way of accessing those communications while negotiations are progressing. And,
because the government actor seeks (or should seek) to comply with the law, the
potential for postconduct revelation of the communications should not create much
of a chilling effect. Whatever need the government actor has for temporary
confidentiality is satisfied without the need of a special government attorney-client
privilege.
Thus, the court in Murphy v. Tennessee Valley Authority,' 4 should not have found
that documents generated by the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA"), a corporation
wholly owned by the federal government, in the course of negotiations for the
settlement of a contract dispute, were protected by the attorney-client privilege. In
Murphy, Zum Industries had contracted to design and construct cooling towers for
the TVA. 65 When the TVA decided to defer construction, the TVA and Zum began
a year-long settlement negotiation." After the TVA and Zurn settled, one of Zurn's
subcontractors filed a FOIA request in which it sought documents generated during
the negotiations."
The court held that two documents between TVA employees and the TVA's
general counsel were protected by the attorney-client privilege. 68 The documents
were communications requesting and giving legal advice with respect to the TVA's
position during negotiations.'" Itis difficult to imagine what confidential information
was contained in the memos that TVA employees would not have revealed absent the
privilege. Presumably, TVA employees were'under a duty to make the best possible
deal with Zum within the confines of the law. There was no allegation by the TVA
that the facts within the memo were germane to national security or any other special
concern. The TVA counsel kept the information confidential until the TVA and Zurn
reached a final settlement, so the TVA's position was not compromised. 170 As
government agents required to operate within the law's boundaries, it is hard to
163. Professors Allen, Grady, Polsby, and Yashko put it differently; to them, the privilege
cannot be justified when the employee-lawyer communication contains facts obtained from
third persons because a client would reveal such information without the privilege, and thus
the privilege is not necessary in this instance to facilitate the development of contingent claims.
See Allen et al., supra note 80, at 381. They also suggest that the privilege is not defensible
when the client's case will not be affected by unfavorable facts about the client, again because
privilege protection would not assist in the development of contingent claims. Id. at 367.
164. 571 F. Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 1983).
165. Id. at 504.
166. Id.
167. Id.





believe that TVA employees would have been less forthcoming with counsel had they
been told at the time of the communication that the documents might be seen by third
parties after the conclusion of settlement negotiations.' The decision cannot be
justified as necessary to facilitate the provision of legal advice.'
As further evidence that the privilege's instrumental justification lacks credibility
in the preconduct context, consider that government privilege law in many states is
inconsistent with the privilege's underlying premise-that government actors will not
be forthcoming with counsel unless they are assured of privilege protection. Some
states, having adopted Uniform Rule of Evidence 502 in its entirety, do not allow
government agents or agencies to claim the privilege unless the communications
concern pending litigation and revelation of the communications would seriously
compromise the government's ability to prosecute or defend its position." There is
no suggestion that government actors in such states are unable to obtain the legal
advice necessary to enable them to conduct government business outside of litigation.
Second, consider the "Sunshine Laws" of various states. The Sunshine, or Open
Meeting, Laws direct that meetings of public officers must be open to the public,
unless the subject of the meeting falls under a specific statutory exception. Several
ofthose state statutes allow no exception for attorney-client comunications' 74-- thus
all consultations between municipal agents and attorneys must be open to the public.
Other states expressly or implicitly provide for only a limited exception for attorney-
client communications concerning pending claims or litigation." 5 Courts that have
171. See also Alamo Aircraft Supply, Inc. v. Weinberger, No. 85-1291, 1986 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29010, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 21,1986) (sustaining government's attorney-client privilege
claim in a FOIA action for documents between government employees and counsel because
"[w]hen the context of the communication strongly suggests that 'the government is dealing
with its attorneys as would any private party seeking advice to protect personal interests,' an
expectation of confidentiality may readily be inferred" (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1980))).
172. The court also found that a number of the documents reflecting communications
between TVA employees were protected by the deliberate process privilege, emphasizing that
"TVA's ability to function as an independent corporate entity ... would be seriously
undermined if the internal documents reflecting its employees' thought processes were subject
to disclosure." Murphy, 571 F. Supp. at 506. Of course, a private corporation would have had
to produce similar documents in response to a discovery request, and no one has ever suggested
that the rules of discovery undermine corporations' ability to do business. Thus, TVA was able
to withhold documents that a private party would have had to produce if the request had been
made in litigation, for no discemable reason.
173. At least four states, Arkansas, Maine, North Dakota, and Oklahoma, have adopted the
narrowed government privilege advocated by Uniform Rule 502(d)(6). See ARK CODE ANN.
§ 16-41-101, Rule 502(d)(6) (LEXIS 1999 & Supp. 2001); Me. R. Evid. 502(d)(6); N. D. R.
EVID., 502(d)(6) (2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502(D)(6) (West 1993).
174. See, e.g., City of College Park v. Cotter, 525 A.2d 1059 (Md. App. 1987); McKay v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 746 P.2d 124 (Nev. 1987); District Attorney v. Bd. of Selectmen, 481
N.E.2d 1128 (Mass. 1985); Laman v. McCord, 432 S.W.2d 753 (Ark. 1968).
175. See, e.g., TEX GOV'T CODE ANN. § 551.071 (Vernon 2001) (providing that a
governmental body may consult with a government attorney privately only if the
communications concern pending or contemplated litigation, a settlement offer, or a
disciplinary matter); Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors,
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created an implied exception for those communications have emphasized that, in the
absence of such a limited privilege, the government entity's adversaries could attend
strategy sessions and settlement conferences, thus subjecting the government to a
distinct disadvantage and undermining its ability to act in the public interest." Yet
none of these courts has suggested that the purpose of the privilege is to facilitate
client candor. Indeed, if these courts were of that view, they would have held that
government agents could meet in confidence with government attorneys whenever
agents sought legal advice. It is revealing that so many state courts decline to extend
the attorney-client privilege beyond the litigation setting, and this fact further
undermines the privilege's instrumental justification.
b. Postconduct Advice and the Executive Branch Employee
Now, examine the typical executive branch employee who seeks legal advice
postconduct. An employee may seekpostconduct legal advice for one of two reasons.
First, a government agency or department may itself become a litigation target (for
example, in an action for breach of contract, a suit brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, or an employment discrimination case)." Second, a government
employee may engage in wrongdoing that does not give rise to government liability
but that the government may nonetheless need to address. 8 In either situation, the
case for the attorney-client privilege is weaker than in the corporate context.
First, the government may become embroiled in litigation. Here, the government
has incentives similar to those of a corporation to direct employees to cooperate with
counsel. When the government needs all the facts to present its position adequately,
69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 487-92 (Ct. App. 1968); Associated Students of the Univ. of Colo. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 543 P.2d 59, 61 (Colo. 1975); Times Publ'g Co., v. Williams,
222 So. 2d 470,475-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); People ex rel. Hopf, 332 N.E.2d 649 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1975); Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, Co.,
554 S.W.2d 72,73 (Ky. 1977); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Hous. & Redevelopment
Auth., 251 N.W.2d 620 (Minn. 1976); Okla. Ass'n of Mun. Attorneys v. State, 577 P.2d 1310
(Okla. 1978); Smith County Educ. Ass'n v. Anderson, 676 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn. 1984).
176. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 251 N.W.2d at 625 (stating that "[a] basic
understanding of the adversary system indicates that certain phases of litigation strategy may
be impaired if every discussion is available for the benefit of opposing parties who may have
as a purpose a private gain in contravention to the public need as construed by the agency");
Smith County Educ. Ass'n, 676 S.W.2d at 334 (stating that a limited attorney-client exception
for discussions involving pending and present litigation is necessary to enable the
government's attorney to fulfill his ethical duty as an officer of the court).
177. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 193 F.R.D. 201 (D. Del. 2000) (regarding a medical
malpractice claim against an Air Force doctor under the Tort Claims Act for care received
during pregnancy and childbirth); Galarza v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 291 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
(regarding a medical malpractice claim against a Navy doctor under the Tort Claims Act for
negligence in performing a hysterectomy).
178. See, e.g., People ex rel Lockyer v. Superior Court of San Diego County (Pfingst), 99
Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussing a district attorney's office that investigated
deputy district attorney for criminal wrongdoing),partially overruled on othergrounds, People




it has incentive to instruct government employees down the chain of command to
cooperate with government counsel. Again, although the government has a legitimate
reluctance to reveal its legal strategy, that reluctance has nothing to do with
encouraging employee candor. Moreover, in contrast to a corporation, the government
need not worry that any leaking of facts it discovers will damage its bottom line.
Is the privilege necessary to encourage government employees to be candid with
counsel? No-whether government employees fully disclose to government counsel
has nothing to do with the assurances provided by the attorney-client privilege. Recall
that corporate employees may be hesitant to reveal confidential facts to corporate
counsel for any of four reasons: fear of career ramifications, fear of loss of
reputation, fear of disclosure in court detrimental to the employer, and fear of
personal liability. Recall also that the corporate privilege will have little, if any, effect
on employees who fear career repercussions or loss of face, but might have some
effect on employees whose fear is solely for the well-being of their employer
(depending upon the employee's knowledge of the privilege's limits), or employees
who fear personal liability (depending upon the employee's position in the hierarchy
and his knowledge of privilege law).
The privilege is likely to have even less impact on candor in the government
setting. First, as in the corporate context, the government employee who is reluctant
to talk for fear of career damage orpublic embarrassment is unlikely to be swayedby
the protection promised by the privilege. The knowledge that other government
actors, and in some cases, the press, may learn the information is sufficient to create
reluctance, and the privilege cannot protect the employee from that. Moreover, the
government employee's fears that his superiors will learn of the attorney-client
communication may be well founded; federal law requires executive branch
employees to report criminal wrongdoing by other employees to the Attorney
General.'79 The statute does not expressly exempt attorneys.' Because the statute's
requirement is clear, a recalcitrant employee is likely to know about it, and will be
less likely than her corporate counterpart to mistakenly believe that the government
attorney is acting in her best interest.'"' The government employee in serious trouble
is unlikely to talk to government counsel, privilege or no privilege, because she
knows that if she does, her superiors will shortly learn the truth.
Second, if the employee's real fear is revelation of facts in court, the privilege is
unlikely to have a substantial effect on candor. Here, the fact that the privilege is not
personal to the employee"r has more bite than in the corporate context.83 Recall that
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994).
180. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit simply assumed that the statute applies to attorneys. See In
re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that
attorneys are bound by the directive).
181. See also 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (1994) (protecting federal employee whistleblowers
from adverse employment action as a result of whistleblowing activities).
182. Edwards v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 99-0458-F, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 473,
at *13 (Dec. 7,2000) (noting that without the speaker/employee's consent, a government entity
may waive the attorney-client privilege and share the employee-attomey communications with
others, including law enforcement).
183. See RICE, TREATISE, supra note 9, at 140-41 (wondering how a government attorney-
client privilege can encourage candor from employees who are not personally protected by it);
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corporate executives often believe that their interests are sufficiently aligned with the
entity's to preclude a corporate decision to waive the privilege over the employee's
objections. Disclosure of the confidential information would hurt the corporation as
well as the employee individually; the employee is therefore likely to assume that the
corporation will assert the privilege. For example, suppose the employee reveals to
counsel that he and other employees accepted bribes in exchange for contracts. The
employee might be willing to disclose the fact of the bribe to corporate counsel,
because he knows that the corporation is unlikely ever to waive the privilege and
reveal the substance of that communication, because disclosure would harm the
corporation. In addition, the higher in the hierarchy the employee is, the more likely
his fortunes will be tied to the fortunes of the executive. The more important the
employee, the more the corporation needs him, and the less likely their interests will
diverge.
Government employees, however, are unlikely to rely on an entity privilege when
conferringwith government counsel. For one thing, often aparticular employee's acts
will not expose the government to entity liability (for example, where the employee
has accepted a bribe). This is usually true in the case of state governments. In such
cases, the government might direct counsel to investigate the matter, so that the
government may take corrective or disciplinary action."' But the employee willhave
no reason to think that the government attorney is acting in her interest, or that the
government would assert the privilege on her behalf.
Even if the government should face liability, the government employee will have
less reason to falsely assume that the government would not waive the privilege over
the employee's objection; the government is not a profit-generating enterprise and
may therefore be less dependent on a particular employee and more willing to cut the
employee loose to protect its credibility. To put it differently, the corporate employee
knows that he has the power to damage, perhaps destroy, the corporation, and all
those who work for it, including his bosses. In such a case, it is in management's best
interests to align itself with the employee. The government employee does not have
as much leverage: at worst, the government may have to pay a civil judgment, but
payment will not threaten the government's health or the job security of all of its
employees. Moreover, the law prohibits the government from taking a position
contrary to its best interests. If, over the course of litigation, it becomes clear that the
government must pin the blame on the employee, it will simply waive the privilege.
Or, employees' superiors may seize the opportunity to take credit in the press for
weeding out corrupt or ineffective employees.
Third, the marginal role the privilege plays in encouraging the candor of employees
who fear personal liability is often absent in the government context. When the
Barsdate, supra note 70, at 1739 (noting that "it is unclear how the attorney-client privilege.
.. can promote candor from individuals who are unable to prevent the ultimate waiver of the
privilege").
184. See, e.g., People ex rel Lockyer v. Superior Court of San Diego County (Pfingst), 99
Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a prosecutor who was the target of a criminal
investigation could not assert the attorney-client privilege because the privilege belonged to
the District Attorney and not the individual employee of the District Attorney's office),
partially overruled on other grounds, People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Co. (Laff), 23
P.3d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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federal government is sued, the government employee or employees whose actions
provided the basis for the lawsuit are often exempt from personal liability. For
example, the Federal Tort Claims Act expressly prohibits direct suit against
government employees. '85 In those cases, no disincentive to use candor exists.
In fact, there is evidence that the federal government recognizes the worthlessness
of an entity privilege for drawing out facts from a recalcitrant employee. By federal
statute, an employee sued in her personal capacity, but represented by government
counsel, has a personal attorney-client privilege with such counsel that the employee
controls and which cannot be waived by the federal government over the employee's
objections.' 6 The reason for this provision is obvious. Although the government
enjoys sovereign immunity in such cases, it almost always agrees to indemnify the
government employee if a judgment is entered against her.'8 Thus, it is in the
government's interest to encourage the targeted employee to be fully forthcoming
with government counsel. Yet the statute authorizes the government to decline or
withdraw representation if representation is not in the United States' best interest.' 8
A government employee is therefore unlikely to be forthcoming with government
counsel unless that employee is assured that she alone controls the privilege, and that
the government will not be able to reveal her confidential communications if their
interests later diverge. The statute recognizes this, and therefore clearly prohibits the
government from using confidential attorney-employee communications against the
employee at any stage of the proceedings.
Consider an example of how courts sustain federal government privilege claims
even though the postconduct attorney-client communications would have occurred
absent the assurance of privilege protection. In Galarza v. United States,89 a medical
malpractice case brought against the Navy,"9 the court held that Navy counsel's ex
parte interviews of the two allegedly negligent Navy doctors were protected by the
attorney-client privilege.' 9' The court reasoned that the government was analogous
185. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1994). The statute states in relevant part:
The remedy against the United States... for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding.... Any other
civil action ... against the employee ... is precluded.
Id.
A government employee cannot be sued in her personal capacity unless the plaintiff can
allege that the individual government employee violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Paragraph (b)(2) states that protection to the employee does not extend when the action "is
brought in violation of the Constitution," or "is brought for a violation of a statute of the
United States under which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized." Id.
186. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 50.15(a)(2)-(4), (a)(8)(v), (a)(10)-(12) (2001).
187. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(c)(1) (authorizing the Department of Justice to indemnify
employees); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public
Officials'IndividualLiability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L. J. 65, 76-78 (1999) (stating that "[a]s
a practical matter, indemnification is a virtual certainty" in a Bivens action).
188. 28 C.F.PR §§ 50.15(a)(2), (a)(8)-(12) (2001).
189. 179 F.R.D. 291 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
190. Id. at 292-93.
191. Id. at 297.
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to a corporate entity, that the government activity in this case was analogous to the
internal investigation in Upjohn, and that therefore Upjohn dictated the result."
The holding cannot be justified, because the privilege simply was not necessary to
encourage the Navy doctors to communicate freely with Navy counsel. The doctors
faced no personal liability.' Any reluctance to speak freely that either ofthemmight
have felt would have to stem from fear forjob security or loss to personal reputation.
The attorney-client privilege could have done little to assuage those fears in this case,
because the doctors must have been aware that Navy attorneys would reveal the
substance of their communications to Navy brass. Moreover, because Navy counsel
characterized the interviews as exparte, the doctors could not have been under the
misimpression that the privilege was personal. Once the facts were out of the bag, the
doctors could not control whether and to what extent they would be revealed in court.
Finally, the doctors knew that the plaintiff would depose them, and that they would
have to tell the truth in those depositions. Thus, the privilege could not help them hide
the facts, unless they planned to mislead plaintiffs counsel in an effort to save their
jobs or reputation." The protection of the attorney-client privilege was simply not
justified.
Of course, there are circumstances in which both the government entity and the
individual employee may face liability as a result of the employee's actions. Even
here, however, the privilege plays little role in enabling a government entity to defend
its legal position. Suppose that a citizen charges that a police officer violated her civil
rights by assaulting her with a nightstick during a public demonstration. Pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983,'9 she seeks to hold both the municipality and the officer in his
individual capacity liable for the violation." Certainly, the municipality needs to
obtain facts from the officer to defend its case. Although the officer faces both
incentives and disincentives to speak honestly with government counsel, his decision
to be fully forthcoming will notbe affected bya government attorney-client privilege.
In this typical example of a § 1983 case, two possibilities exist. One, the officer's and
192. Id. at 295.
193. Id. at 294.
194. The fear that the doctors would distort the truth to avoidjeopardizing their careers and
employment positions was what motivated the plaintiff to seek a determination that the
privilege would not apply. Id. at 294-95.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1999). Section 1983 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. For an excellent analysis of the case law concerning municipal liability under § 1983, see
Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section 1983
Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17 (2000).
196. A municipality may be found liable if the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional
rights is the result of official policy or custom. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658,690 (1978). The individual city employee may escape liabilityby raising
the qualified immunity defense, which enables him to show that he acted in good faith. Gilles,
supra note 195, at 26-27.
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municipality's interests will diverge-the municipality will take the position that the
officer acted outside the scope of its employment, and thus is liable only in his
personal capacity. In that instance,. the officer will take the opposite position, or may
argue that the municipality's policies or practices (such as inadequate training of
police officers) were a substantial cause of the plaintiff s injury." When interests
diverge, the officer will be represented by personal counsel, and he will have no
incentive to confide troubling facts to government attorneys, regardless of whether
the municipality has an attorney-client privilege, because the municipality can use the
facts communicated against him.
The other possibility is that the interests of the municipality and the officer will be
consistent-the municipality will admit that the officer acted in an official capacity,
but will contest that the officer's actions violated plaintiff's civil rights.' In such
cases, the municipality ordinarily will have a statutorily imposed duty to indemnify"s
and represent the officer.2" The officer will have much incentive to reveal the facts
to the municipal attorney-if he fails to cooperate fully with counsel, the municipality
maybe able to reverse its decision to indemnify him. ° Moreover, because the officer
faces no personal liability (because the city will pay any judgment levied against
him), he will not be tempted to withhold information or lie to protect his pecuniary
interests. On the other hand, the officer may withhold information to protect his
career or reputation, or because he fears that the municipality will withdraw
indemnification if it knows the truth--in these instances, the promise of a government
attorney-client privilege will not affect his reluctance, because it cannot protect him
from that which he fears. Thus, a government attorney-client privilege does not
197. See, e.g., Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 907 (2d Cir. 1984) ("If [the
employee] can show that his actions were pursuant to an official policy, he can at least shift
part of his liability to the municipality. If he is successful in asserting a good faith immunity
defense, the municipality may be wholly liable because it cannot assert the good faith immunity
of its employees as a defense to a [§] 1983 action." (quoting Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980))); Minneapolis Police Officers Fed'n v. City of Minneapolis, 488 N.W.2d
817 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that "to avoid section 1983 liability, the city must show that
a police officer's action is not within the officer's official capacity," but that "a police officer,
on the other hand, avoids personal liability by showing that the actions were within the range
of official capacity").
198. See, e.g., Smith v. Daggett County Bd. of Educ., 650 F. Supp. 44 (D. Utah 1986);
Smith v. City of New York, 611 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Sherrod v. Berry, 589 F.
Supp. 433 (N.D. II1. 1984).
199. States' indemnification provisions differ regarding the scope of coverage, extent of
local autonomy over terms and conditions of reimbursement, and limits on amounts of
reimbursement. PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS 88 (1983).
200. See, e.g., Smith, 611 F. Supp. at 1084 (citing section 50-k(2) ofthe General Municipal
Laws of New York State, which requires that a city provide for the defense of any municipal
employee sued because ofan act or omission that occurred within the scope ofemployment and
not in violation of any agency rule or regulation, and section 50-k(3), which requires the city
to indemnify employees on essentially the same criteria).
201. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 50-k(4) (Consol. Supp. 1984) (providing that the
city's duty to indemnify is dependent upon the employee's full cooperation in the defense of
the action).
[Vol. 77:469
WHY PRIVILEGE THE PRIVILEGED?
materially assist the government in defending its case.
In some number of situations, a state or federal government entity may need legal
advice when an employee is being sued, even if the entity is itself technically
immune. A prosecutor may exercise questionable judgment, or engage in an illegal
act. An official may accept a bribe. An FBI agent may be the target of a Bivens claim,
and the government may have to indemnify him in the event of an adverse
judgment. 2 In these situations, there is even less need for the privilege. Because the
government, unlike a corporation, cannot be hurt by the act of its agent, there is even
less need to suppose that it needs an incentive to investigate. Of course, public
officials maybe reluctant to expose wrongdoing that reflects negatively upon them.
But it would be ludicrous to allow the government a privilege to hide problematic
behavior. Public pressure will provide the incentive to investigate.
2. Highly Placed Executive Branch Employees:
Agency Heads and the President
a. The Need for Confidentiality
Although agency heads and the President do not face the tension between concern
for profit maximization and legal compliance often confronted by corporate
management, they obviously have other compelling reasons for desiring
confidentiality in their communications with counsel. Chief among these concerns is
apprehension about the potential political difficulties that might result if discussions
about potential courses of action are later revealed. The political fallout from
revelation of such discussions could result even if highly placed agency employees
ultimately chose a wholly legitimate course of action. This concern is even more
pressing when an agency head or the President seeks postconduct legal advice. If
there were no promise of confidentiality, fear of political fallout if sensitive facts
were revealed could muzzle the client.
The President or an agency head might seek legal advice for one of two reasons.
First, he or she may need legal guidance in performing official functions-for
example, evaluating legislation, formulating foreign and domestic policy, or handling
foreign affairs. Second, the President or agency head might seek advice regarding
past or prospective conduct that threatens to expose the government, or the actor
personally, to liability. Sometimes the conduct occurred as the executive pursued his
official functions; other times, it may be questionable whether the conduct can fairly
be said to be within the executive's scope of employment (for example, Monica
Lewinsky).
In all cases, the promise of confidentiality is probably necessary to encourage the
President, or agency head, to confide freely with counsel. Like in the corporate
setting, the need for the assurance of confidentiality becomes more pressing the
higher up the hierarchy one looks. The chance that government actors might be
tempted to skirt or stretch the law for political gain is similarlypresent in government
202. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (holding that the violation of specific constitutional rights by federal employees gives
rise to a cause of action for damages against those federal employees).
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hierarchies. One might think, then, that the need for a government attorney-client
privilege is strong, at least at the upper levels of the executive branch.
But even here, it is unclear to what extent the promise of an attorney-client
privilege will have the desired effect for most government actors. First, consider the
predicament of an agency head who is in possession of troubling facts that are
relevant to protecting the government's legal or political interests. If those facts put
the agency head in a bad light, or threaten her political future, the promise of a
government attorney-client privilege will not encourage her to disclose those facts to
government counsel, because she cannot be sure that the President will allow her to
assert the privilege to protect herself. The privilege will provide an incentive to use
candor only if the agency head is certain that the President's interests are, and will
remain, aligned with hers.
The promise of privilege protection might be more likely to have the desired effect
(increased candor) when the "client" is the Office of the President. The President
handpicks his closest advisors, including White House counsel, and he presumably
has ultimate decisionmaking authority concerning whether to waive or assert the
attorney-client privilege. Given all this, the argument that a privilege might be
effective at the very highest levels of the executive branch seems persuasive.
The attorney-client privilege, however, is the wrong mechanism for responding to
the confidentiality needs of both agency heads and the Office of the President. The
appropriate mechanism for encouraging disclosure already exists-the executive
privilege. Combined with the attorney work-product doctrine and the President's (or
agency head's) attorney-client privilege when he consults private counsel, existing
incentives to act with candor render a government attorney-client privilege largely
superfluous, and certainly not worth the costs it generates. The following section
explains the executive privilege, 3 and argues that judicial application of that
privilege has resulted in a doctrine that is uniquely suited to addressing government
actors' concerns for confidentiality.
b. The Scope of the Executive Privilege
The executive privilege assures the President and agency heads that consultations
with top-level advisors will be protected from disclosure."' Courts have determined
that the privilege necessarily flows from constitutionally based separation-of-powers
203. Courts and commentators often confuse and conflate the executive privilege, which
applies to the President, agency heads, and their closest advisors, with the deliberative process
privilege, which allows government agencies to shield from discovery and FOIA requests
predecisional documents. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 3 Reporter's Note, cmt. c (2000) (stating that "governmental agencies mayhave an executive
privilege against disclosing internal deliberations of agency officials and advisory opinions and
recommendations"). Because the two privileges have different requirements and serve different
interests, it is important that they be kept separate for analytical purposes. For a thorough
explanation and attack on the validity of the deliberative process privilege, see Wetlaufer,
supra note 158.
204. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705, 708 (1974); Stiftung v. Zeiss, 40
F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966) (sustaining the Attorney General's claim of executive privilege in
response to a discovery request in litigation in which the government was not a party).
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doctrine."' As the Supreme Court has recognized, the privilege is also justified on
instrumental grounds: "Human experience teaches that those who expect public
dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for
appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking
process."2" Because the executive privilege facilitates government decisionmaking,
it serves the public interest.
Of course, when a private citizen or another branch of government seeks
information, the government's ability to shield information by invoking the executive
privilege may cause some public harm. Accordingly, courts have not construed the
executive privilege as conferring absolute protection.' ° Rather, the government's
need for confidentiality in a particular instance must be weighed against the
claimant's need for the information.2"' Thus, courts generally agree that military or
state secrets must receive absolute protection.2" And it is the exceptionally rare case
when a private litigant's need for the information will justify piercing the privilege.
On the other hand, the Court has held that the privilege must give way when the
criminal justice system's need for the protected communications is specific and
compelling but the President's need for confidentiality with respect to the specific
communications is only "general."21 In UnitedStates v. Nixon, the Court emphasized
that the President's need for confidentiality was so important that conversations with
his advisors are "presumptively privileged." '' The Court viewed the assurance of
confidentiality as so important that the executive privilege should give way only when
mandated by the public interest t In the Court's view, the creation of a presumptive
privilege with a very narrow exception would not have too great a chilling effect on
presidential deliberations: "[W]e cannot conclude that advisors will be moved to
205. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 (stating that the executive privilege flows from "the
supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties").
206. Id.
207. See id. at 706 ("[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for
confidentiality... without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of
immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.').
208. See id. at 708-09. According to the Court, the privilege
must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law. This
is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that... "guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer." [citations omitted] .... To ensure that justice is
done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be
available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by
the defense.
Id.
209. See id. at 710 (stating that, as to military and diplomatic secrets, "the courts have
traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities").
210. Id. at 712-13.
211. Id. at 708.
212. See id. at 712-13 (holding that the public interest in the administration ofjustice in a
criminal case outweighed the generalneed for confidentiality. The Court remarked, "[W]emust
weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality... against the inroads of such
a privilege on the fair administration of criminaljustice.'); see also id. at 712 n. 19 (narrowing
the holding by applying it only to the generalized privilege of confidentiality weighed against
the need for evidence in a criminal proceeding).
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temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because
of the possibility that such conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal
prosecution."213
The executive privilege is expressly designed to encourage executive candor in a
way that is consistent with the public interest. In fashioning the doctrine, courts have
taken due account of the special circumstances in which the President and other top
government executives operate, their positions of public trust, and their strong need
for confidentiality. The executive privilege extends to executive conversations with
all advisors, including counsel. The question then becomes, why should a separate
attorney-client privilege be necessary?
c. Given that the Executive Privilege Exists, Can a Separate Attorney-Client
Privilege Be Justified?
Executive privilege doctrine is specifically tuned to the unique role of government
executives. It affords confidentiality to the extent that confidentiality furthers the
public interest, andwithholds protection when protection would undermine the public
interest. To argue in favor ofa separate, absolute government attorney-client privilege
is to argue that the public's concern about the obstructionist effects of government
privilege should cease to matter just because the advisor with whom the executive
confers happens to be an attorney. This argument ignores government executives'
unique role in public life. They are not private citizens or corporate actors. Their duty
is to the public. It is not clear why the executive's duty to the public should matter
less because he consulted a government attorney as opposed to another trusted
advisor.
To make the case for an absolute government attorney-client privilege, one must
argue that the government's interests will be uniquely harmed in the privilege's
absence. One must argue that the minimal chilling effect created by the qualified
executive privilege generally cannot be tolerated when the President or another
executive seeks legal advice. In the case of the President, the only time that
conversation will be chilled is when the President is in possession of facts that may
become relevant in a criminal case, or that maybe antithetical to the public interest.
If the President fears that later revelation of those facts will cause harm, he should
consult a private attorney.214
When the President seeks legal advice to protect his personal interests, the promise
of confidentiality may indeed encourage him to be candid with counsel. Moreover,
he may fear that the protection afforded by the executive privilege might not extend
to protect the communications at issue. If the President is truly concerned that facts
within his knowledge might become relevant in a criminal case, he can consult
213. Id. at 712.
214. Cf The People ex rel. Lockyer v. Superior Court of San Diego County (Pfingst), 99
Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 655 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a deputy district attorney targeted in a
criminal investigation could not assert the attorney-client privilege with respect to
conversations made in the course of his duties, but that he could assert the privilege with
respect to conversations with his personal attorney), partially overruled on other grounds by
People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Laff), 23 P.3d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
[Vol. 77:469
WHY PRIVILEGE THE PRIVILEGED?
personal counsel. The government, as an entity, will not be hurt by the President's
lack of disclosure to government counsel, because the government itself cannot be
exposed to criminal liability.
Professor Stephen Gillers has argued that requiring the President to turn to private
attorneys when his individual interests are implicated is undesirable because those
lawyers will not act in the public interest.2 5 Furthermore, he worries about the effect
of allowing lawyers outside of the government to learn sensitive government
information, and fears that government lawyers will be deprived of that information
to the government's detriment.2"6
Explore eachpoint in turn. First, Gillers's assumption about the role of government
lawyers echoes the popular view that those lawyers should behave differently than
their private counterparts.2t7 While a private attorney's duty runs solely to her client,
the argument goes, the government attorney has a duty to the public at large, which
enables, indeed requires, her to be less than zealous in defense of the government
employee or agency for whom she works if she believes the employee's or agency's
actions violate the public interest.2t But that view has been soundly rejected by most
scholars who have seriously considered the issue." 9 It is likely that most government
lawyers will zealously protect the position of the agency for whom they work, for
many reasons. First, self-interest often motivates government attorneys to behave in
ways that further their careers. ' Second, the ethics rules do not expresslyrequire the
215. Stephen Gillers, A Highly Strategic Legal Chess Game, L.A. TMES, June 7, 1988, Part
M (Opinion), at 1.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Steven K. Berensen, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should and Will
Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789 (2000) (arguing that government
lawyers can, should, and will serve the public interest); Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of
Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 So. CAL. L. REV. 951, 955-57, 980 (1991) (discussing the numerous bar
associations, judges, government attorneys, scholars, and commentators who believe that
"government counsel should temper their advocacy in the interests of 'justice").
218. See, e.g., Caleshu v. United States, 570 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978) (stating that
government attorneys should not engage in forum shopping); Alan B. Morrison, Defending the
Government: How Vigorous Is Too Vigorous?, in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 242,251-52 (Ralph
Nader & Mark J. Green eds., 1976); Berensen, supra note 217, at 789; Eric Schnapper, Legal
Ethics and the Government Lawyer, 32 REC. A.B.N.Y. 649,655 (1977); Jack B. Weinstein &
Gay A. Crosthwait, Some Reflections on Conflicts Between Government Lawyers and Clients,
I TouRo L. REv. 1,9 (1985) (asserting that "a government attorney should exercise discretion
to achieve fairness, and, if necessary, stand up to the client").
219. See Josephson & Pearce, supra note 144, at 563-65; Lanctot, supra note 217, at 951;
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a
Regulatory State, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1119-20 (1995); Geoffrey P. Miller, Government
Lawyers'Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1293 (1987); Fred C.
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45,48 (1991).
220. Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller argue that government attorneys will favor their
personal interests over the public good because 1) in the absence of the market forces that
private attorneys face, government attorneys will engage in inefficient activities, such as being
overly litigious, to build their careers, 2) young government lawyers have incentive to litigate
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government attorneys to treat their clients differently than private attorneys are
required to treat their clients."' Most important, attorneys who zealously represent
their government "clients" may in fact be operating in the public interest, even if a
particular government position is problematic, because zealous advocacy protects the
principles of representative democracyP strengthens the adversary system,' and
facilitates efficient government operation." ' In fact, the pluralistic structure of the
government, with its system of checks and balances, may even require zealous-
advocacy by the government attorney.' Finally, even if some government attorneys
actively seek to further the public interest, the question of exactly what constitutes
"the public interest" in anyparticular circumstance is often impossible to answer, and
leaves the determination to the judgment of individual attorneys.' Allowing a
government attorney to override her agency's position based on her own ideas of "the
public interest" is simply unworkable; when the voters' interests conflict, why should
the government attorney make the call about which view should prevail?"' If
to gain experience, even when litigation is not in the public interest, 3) agency attorneys may
be "captured" by the private market if they hope to one day enter private practice, and 4)
agency attorneys will be influenced by the desire to expand their agency's power, and to
enhance their own power within the agency. See Macey & Miller, supra note 219, at 1115-
1119.
221. Lanctat, supra note 217, at 957-74, 993 (making and developing this point).
222. Id. at 986 (arguing that "in the American political system, the responsibility to decide
which government policy will serve the public good ordinarily rests with elected officials, not
with government lawyers. Ultimately, the agency's decision.., is a matter of government
policy, not legal ethics."); id. at 1015 (stating that ultimately the decision about the public's
best interest lies with elected officials, and once that policy decision has been made a
government lawyer may ethically defend it); see also Miller, supra note 219, at 1295 (arguing
that "the idea that government attorneys serve some higher purpose fails to place the attorney
within a structure of democratic government"); Josephson & Pearce, supra note 144, at 565
(arguing that the final decisionmaking authority regarding government matters should belong
to elected government officials, not to lawyers).
223. Lanctot, supra note 217, at 980-81.
224. Miller, supra note 219, at 1295 (arguing that "[i]f attorneys could freely sabotage the
actions of their agencies Out of a subjective sense of public interest, the result would be a
disorganized, inefficient bureaucracy, and public distrust of its own government"); Josephson
& Pearce, supra note 144, at 565 (arguing that "[a]dequate legal representation will not be
provided under the public interest approach").
225. Miller, supra note 219, at 1296 (developing the argument that the government lawyer
who acts according to his own independent judgment instead of for the benefit of the agency's
position is acting without constitutional authority); see also Josephson & Pearce, supra note
144, at 567-68 (emphasizing that because of the pluralistic nature of our government, when
agencies are at cross purposes, the attorney who acts in the best interest of the agency
strengthens democracy).
226. See Lanctot, supra note 217, at 984-85; see also Miller, supra note 219 at 1294-95
(noting that "[i]t is common place that there are as many ideas of the 'public interest' as there
are people who think about the subject"); Zacharias, supra note 78, at 48 (arguing that the
"public interest" concept "leaves prosecutors with only their individual sense of morality to
determine just conduct").
227. As two scholars put it:
The government lawyer who uses the public interest approach when policy
[Vol. 77:469
WHY PRIVILEGE THE PRIVILEGED?
government attorneys share these views, and it seems likely that many do, then it is
unlikely that they will undermine their agency's position out of some larger concern
for the general public good.
The above points have particular resonance when the attorneys are White House
counsel. The President handpicks his attorneys, who are often people with whom he
enjoys long-standing relationships of trust, and who share his political sympathies.
When a President faces potential trouble as a result of his personal acts, White House
counsel are likely to view vigorous assistance to and defense of the Office of the
President as their ethical obligation, both out of loyalty and out of concern for their
own careers. Moreover, that route would not necessarily be inconsistent with the
public interest; perhaps the President's attackers are politically motivated, and a
vigorous defense of the President is justifiable to protect the will of the electorate.
Experience has shown that itis extremely unlikely that White House counsel will urge
the President to adopt a course of action that is against the President's personal
interests because the attorneys believe that the course of action is in the public's best
interests. There is little reason to think that the public will lose if the President turns
to private counsel when his actions may expose him to criminal liability. 9
Putting the President on notice that he will have to engage private counsel if he has
committed acts that threaten to expose him to criminal or civil liability may, in fact,
serve the public interest, because it will motivate him to obtain legal advice before,
rather than after, he commits questionable acts. Again, the President who seeks to
conform conduct to the law will find sufficient assurance in confidentiality in the
executive privilege, and will be fully forthcoming with counsel. Only the President
who intends to defy legal advice will be muzzled.
Gillers's other points are not entirely persuasive either. The fact that the President
reveals incriminating personal details to private counsel would seem to pose little
danger to the country's interests; private attorneys have every reason to take their
ethical responsibilities of confidentiality seriously. And the fact that government
colleagues are in conflict usurps the function of the client to provide her with
instructions. Inevitably, the lawyer who decides for herself which conflicting
point of view to represent decides what the public interest is. Such a lawyer is not
a lawyer representing a client but a lawyer representing herself.
Josephson & Pearce, supra note 144, at 563; see also Lanctot, supra note 217, at 983-84 (using
concrete examples to show how there is no way for a lawyer to confidently determine what
course of action is in the public interest in most cases).
228. Lanctot, supra note 217, at 955 (arguing, from her experience as a government lawyer,
that "[g]overnment lawyers, for the most part, perceive their role as that of zealous advocates
for their agency clients, just like any other lawyers representing private clients").
229. Some commentators argue that an absolute government privilege is necessary because
government actors may not know in advance whether they need private counsel. See, e.g.,
Pincus, No Clear Legal Answer, supra note 7 (quoting a "critic" who argues that "it is only
after consultation with an attorney that a client should be expected to distinguish liability from
non-liability and civil liability from criminal liability"). This Article has shown that most
government employees will not confess conduct that they fear puts them at risk even if there
is a government attorney-client privilege. See supra text accompanying notes 153-209. As for
the President, the suggestion that the President may have little idea whether certain of his
actions skirt the criminal law borders on the laughable.
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attorneys will be deprived of learning about the troubling facts is not fatal either. In
most instances, the government will not be hurt by this, because the government is not
exposed to liability. Of course, it is remotely possible that troubling facts within the
President's knowledge would be relevant to both the President's personal interests and
the government's interests. Consider the most difficult case: suppose the President has
committed acts that might expose him to criminal liability and the government to civil
liability, or expose him to criminal liability and impeachment. In either case, the
President could speak freely with his personal attorney, and those communications
would be protected by the privilege. But arguably, he might be reluctant to reveal
damaging facts to government attorneys if he knew that his communications would
not be protected by a government attorney-client privilege. In that event, government
attorneys could not obtain the facts necessary to defend the government, or to
represent the President in impeachment proceedings.
Even here, however, a government attorney-client privilege would be unlikely to
do the job. If the President fears that revelation of facts communicated to government
counsel would hurt his criminal case, a government attorney-client privilege is
unlikely to induce him to speak freely to government counsel because there is a strong
chance that the President's successor would waive the privilege. Although the
question whether a new administration could waive the attorney-client privilege to
reveal communications between a former President and government counsel has never
been decided, if courts are serious about the corporate analogy, that scenario is a
distinct possibility-a government, like a corporation, can act only through its agents,
and if the next President believed that waiver of the privilege was in the best interest
of the government "client," she should be able to waive the privilege. ' Given that any
criminal proceedings against the President would be brought after he left office, he
could be mindful of the possibility that the next President could waive the privilege.
Even if one thinks that a government attorney-client privilege might encourage the
President to be candid with government counsel, this scenario is unlikely to occur
often, and is thus an inadequate ground for justifying a broad government attorney-
client privilege for all government employees.
In addition to eliminating the costs created by a government attorney-client
230. In the corporate context, the Supreme Court has held that a corporation's bankruptcy
trustee may waive the corporation's privilege over the objection of the corporation's directors.
See Commodity Futures Trading v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 356 (1985) (holding that the
power to waive the attorney-client privilege "passes to the trustee because the trustee's
functions are more closely analogous to those of management outside of bankruptcy than are
the functions of the debtor's directors.") In his treatise on attorney-client privilege, Paul Rice
takes issue with the suggestion that the same rule should apply in the government context.
RICE, TREATISE, supra note 9 at 136. Although he generally uses the corporate analogy to
support the government privilege, on this issue he suggests that the comparison fails because
the transfer of power in the government context is involuntary, and a rule transferring control
of the privilege is likely to have a greater chilling effect than it would in the corporate context,
where the corporate directors give up the privilege voluntarily, as part of the decision to file
for bankruptcy. Id. This argument seems a little forced; it is a stretch to view the decision to
file for bankruptcy as a "voluntary" surrender of the attorney-client privilege. More likely, all
corporate directors know that there exists a remote possibility of insolvency, and they rely on
the privilege, if at all, despite that remote possibility.
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privilege, eliminating the President's ability to assert the attorney-client privilege will
offer an additional important benefit-the President (or other top executive) will be
forced to assert the executive privilege when he seeks to keep evidence secret. Since
Nixon, invocations of executive privilege carry some cost. Invocations of executive
privilege imply to some segment of the public that the President is trying to hide
information. Assertion of the attorney-client privilege, however, is less costly, because
the attorney may assert it on the client's behalf.21 To the extent that at least some of
the public perceives assertion of the privilege as the act of a lawyer, as opposed to an
act of the President, it may seem more palatable. Because executive privilege must be
asserted by the President directly, and because the assertion of the privilege in
response to a criminal investigation entails greater costs, Presidents might assert that
privilege less easily or frequently than they would the attorney-client privilege. This
will increase the judicial system's ability to ascertain the truth.
d. In re Lindsay and In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
The above analysis sheds light on ln re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum" 2 and
In re Lindsey. 3 In these two relatively recent, highly publicized cases, courts found
that the government could not invoke the attorney-client privilege with regard to
communications between President Clinton and White House counsel,"4 and between
Hillary Clinton and White House counsel in response to a grand jury subpoena.2 5
Commentators have been nearly uniformin their disapproval of these two decisions. 6
However, the decisions are consistent with this Article's thesis that there is no
justification for a government attorney-client privilege that exceeds the limits of the
executive privilege.
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, the independent counsel issued a
subpoena that required White House counsel to produce notes taken during meetings
23 1. For example, in both In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) and In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997), the privilege was asserted by a
government attorney, as opposed to by the client directly.
232. 112 F.3d 910 (8th. Cir. 1997).
233. 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
234. Id.
235. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910.
236. See, e.g., Stanley Brand, A Blow Is Struck Against Attorney-Client Privilege for
Government Lawyers in the Whitewater Independent Counsel Case, 44 FED. LAW. 9 (June
1997) (criticizing the Eighth Circuit's holding); Cole, supra note 7 (worrying that the opinion
creates uncertainties in privilege law that makes it difficult to determine when privilege
protection might apply); Paulsen, supra note 7 (arguing that the reasoning in both cases is
flawed); Chud, supra note 7 (arguing that the government attorney-client privilege is necessary
even in criminal investigations); Dickmann, supra note 7 (criticizing In re Lindsey); Kendall,
supra note 7 (arguing that In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum was wrongly decided);
Note, Maintaining Confidence in Confidentiality: The Application of the Attorney-Client
Privilege to Government Counsel, supra note 7 (arguing that both cases were improperly
reasoned to the extent that they suggest a limitation on the government's attorney-client
privilege); Toporek, supra note 7 (arguing that the Eighth Circuit's opinion will inhibit candor
when government employees consult government counsel). But see Gowdy, supra note 21
(concluding that the government attorney-client privilege is not justified).
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that occurred at breaks in Hillary Rodham Clinton's appearance before a criminal
grand jury. 7 Present at those meetings were White House counsel, Mrs. Clinton, and
Mrs. Clinton's personal attorney." The subjects of the proceedings were the
disappearance, and subsequent reappearance in the living quarters of the White
House, of certain billing records of the Rose Law Firm, and the First Lady's actions
following the suicide of Vincent Foster. 9 The White House responded to the
independent counsel's subpoena by asserting that the notes were protected by the
executive privilege, the attorney-client privilege, and the attorney work-product
doctrine.2" During the proceedings, the White House dropped its executive privilege
claim."4 The district court sustained the government's attorney-client privilege
claim, 42 but the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that, as a matter of policy, the White
House could not invoke the privilege in response to a federal grand jury subpoena.243
InIn reLindsey, Deputy White House Counsel and Assistant to the President Bruce
Lindsey invoked the attorney-client privilege, the executive privilege, and the attorney
work-product doctrine before a federal grand jury, and refused to answer questions
concerning his communications with the President.2" The district court rejected all of
the privilege claims. 5 On appeal, the government contested only the court's denial
of the attorney-client privilege claim.2' The D.C. Circuit held that Lindsey could not
invoke the attorney-client privilege in response to a federal grand jury investigating
possible crimes by government officials and others. 7
In both cases, well-accepted privilege doctrine would have required the courts to
sustain the government's privilege claims." But both courts balked, and instead
strained to create a new exception to the privilege doctrine. Whatever criticisms one
might level at the courts' reasoning, ultimately the cases are instructive because they
expose the weakness of the privilege's instrumental justification.
First, examine In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum."9 In that case, the Eighth
Circuit held that White House counsel could not assert the attorney-client privilege as
a justification for failing to turn over White House counsel's notes of the meetings
between the First Lady, her lawyer, and White House counsel.'" In reaching that
237. 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997).
238. Id. at 914.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. The White House abandoned the executive privilege claim during the district court
proceedings. Id. at 914.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 915, 924.
244. 148 F.3d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1114.
248. As the D.C. Circuit noted, "We have little doubt that at least one of Lindsey's
conversations subject to grandjuryquestioning'concemed the seeking of legal advice' and was
between President Clinton and Lindseywhile Lindseywas 'acting in his professional capacity'
as an attorney." Id. at 1107 (citations omitted).
249. 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997).
250. Id. at 924-26.
[Vol. 77:469
WHY PRIVILEGE THE PRIVILEGED?
result, the court first took pains to characterize the larger question of whether a
government attorney-client privilege could exist in any context as an open one,2' and
emphasized that the broader question was not before it."' Given the small mountain
of precedent sustaining government attorney-client privilege claims, the court's
characterization of privilege law is startling. After setting the stage, the court turned
to the narrower question: whether the White House can assert a claim of attorney-
client privilege in response to a subpoena issued by a federal grand jury investigating
possi'ble official misconduct. After characterizing the issue as one of first
impression,' the court determinedthat even ifa government attorney-cientprivilege
did exist, it must give way in this circumstance, because the logic of Nixon dictated
that "the government's need for confidentiality may be subordinated to the needs of
the government's own criminal justice processes."
In finding that the attorney-client privilege was subject to the same limitations as
the executive privilege, the court took pains to analyze and reject the White House's
argument that Upjohn dictated upholding the government's assertion of the
privilege." The court determined that the government could not properly be
analogized to a corporation for privilege purposes for three reasons. First, White
House "employees," including the President and the First Lady, could not expose the
White House to criminal liability.' The court reasoned that this fact distinguished the
251. The federal court brushed aside the government's contention that Proposed Rule of
Evidence 503, in which the commentary includes "government bodies" in its definition of
"client," provided guidance on the question, noting that the neither the rule nor advisory
committee notes revealed any evidence that the drafters had considered the potential
ramifications of the definition in this particular context. The court also noted that language in
the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS and the UNiFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
reveals the drafters' sense that the privilege might justifiably be modified in the government
context. Id. at 915-16.
252. Id. at 915.
253. See id. at 917. Specifically, the court determined that In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum (Farber), 574 A.2d 449 (N.J. App. Div. 1989), which sustained a county
agency's attorney-client privilege claim, was factually distinguishable because the case
"involved the interaction between a county grand jury and a county agency"-and thus did not
"bear directly on the relationship of a federal grand jury to a federal entity"--and because the
attorney representing the county was a private attorney whom the county had retained, rather
than agovernment attorney. Similarly, it dismissed In re GrandJurySubpoena (Doe), 886 F.2d
135 (6th Cir. 1989), which found that the city counsel ofDetroit could assert the attorney-client
privilege, as "unpersuasive legally" and implicating "potentially serious federalism concerns"
not present in the instant case. In re GrandJurySubpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 917. The
court also found that the huge number of cases sustaining attorney-client privilege claims by
the federal government were not binding because the cases involved civil litigation between
the government and citizens. Id. at 917-18.
254. Id. at 919. The court also determined that the notes could not be protected as the work
product of White House counsel, because the White House was not subject to liability, and
therefore the notes were not made in anticipation of litigation. Id. at 924-25. The court also
considered and rejected the argument that White House counsel's notes were protected under
the common-interest doctrine. Id. at 921-23.
255. Id. at 919-920.
256. Id. at 920.
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government from a corporation, which has an interest in discovering wrongdoing by
employees in order to protect itself.' Second, executive branch employees (including
attorneys) are required by statute to report criminal wrongdoing by other employees."8
Third, the court reasoned, "the general duty of public service calls upon government
employees and agencies to favor disclosure over concealment."' 9 It followed that "the
strong public interest in honest government and in exposing wrongdoing by public
officials would be ill-servedbyrecognition ofa governmental attorney-cientprivilege
applicable in criminal proceedings inquiring into the actions of public officials."2 ° A
contrary holding, the court declared, would result in a gross misapplication of public
assets?
61
Finally, the court understood that limiting the privilege would not inhibit the
President's ability to obtain legal advice, because the President would be inhibited
with counsel only when the President fears he may have violated the criminal law,26
in which case private counsel is appropriate.263 In this case, the court reasoned, the
government would not be harmed by failure to know the facts, because the
government would not face criminal liability.21 Finally, the court noted that this
narrow limit on the privilege would likely have little effect in the preconduct setting,
because "[i]f the attorney explains the law accurately and the official follows that
advice, no harm can come from later disclosure of the advice, which would be
unlikely anyway. 2 65
The Lindsey9" court took a different route to reach the same result. Bound by
precedent from expresslyrejecting any governmentprivilege, the court did not suggest
that the privilege might never be applicable in the government setting 67 The court did
emphasize, however, that, given the special concerns applicable to government
entities, the attorney-client privilege could be more narrowly construed in the
government context than in the private sector,26 a point the D.C. Circuit has
repeatedly made in other contexts.26 The court's ultimate conclusion rested on the










266. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
267. Id. at 1104 (noting that "[c]ourts, commentators, and government lawyers have long
recognized a government attorney-client privilege in several contexts," and citing, among other
cases, Coastal States Gas Corp. v. United States Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)).
268. Id. at 1107-09 (emphasizing that "competing values arise when the Office of the
President resists demands for information from a federal grand jury and the nation's chief law
enforcement officer," as government attorneys have duties to the public).
269. See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Coastal States Gas Corp.
v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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communications at issue were made by the President and sought in the context of a
criminal grand jury investigation, and realized that there was no justification for
giving the attorney-client privilege a broader reading than the executive privilege.270
Both opinions have been roundly criticized by lawyers and scholars, who have
deplored this unprecedented "departure" fromtraditionalprivilege law."' But because
critics assume that the government privilege is justified, they fail to appreciate the
strengths of both opinions.
Professor Michael Paulsen has criticized both courts' reasoning, and delivers a
strongly worded rebuke of the Eighth Circuit's approach to the issue 2 Paulsen is
disturbed by the Eighth Circuit's ambivalence about whether and to what extent the
government enjoys an attorney-client privilege in the first instance, and argues
vociferously that the government is indistinguishable from a corporation for that
purpose.273 However, he argues, the privilege can be waived in limited instances. In
the government context, he argues, the independent counsel, as the equivalent of a
corporation's successors, may waive the privilege.274 In the alternative, the
independent counsel's investigation of criminal behavior by the executive branch is
analogous to a shareholder derivative suit, and thus the privilege can be pierced upon
a showing of a likely violation of fiduciary duty.275
Paulsen offers a penetrating critique of some of the grounds the Eighth Circuit
relied upon to support its conclusion,2 76 and his analysis of the role of the independent
counsel within the executive branch is persuasive. Paulsen's argument ultimately
depends, however, on the need for a government attorney-client privilege, and on this
point his argument-and therefore his criticism of the Eighth Circuit's reasoning-is
unconvincing.
Paulsen's major complaint concerns the court's resolution of the tension between
the Nixon and Upjohn cases.27 Nixon held that the executive privilege was qualified,
and that the President could not assert it in the face of a criminal investigation.
Upjohn, on the other hand, put the stamp of approval on a broad, absolute corporate
270. Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1113-14.
271. See In re.Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997).
272. See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 494-503.
273. Id. at 474 (stating that "[mly thesis in this article is that the United States government
possesses, as a matter of common law, the same attorney-client privilege that exists for a
corporation or other organizational entity"); id. at 495-98 (arguing that the government has the
same need for the privilege as a corporation does).
274. Id. at 479.
275. Id.
276. Specifically, Paulsen argues at length that the Eighth Circuit's attempt to distinguish
Upjohn is wanting on two points. First, he persuasively argues that the statute requiring
government employees to report evidence of criminal wrongdoing is itself not a sufficient
justification for finding that there is no attorney-client privilege in the government context. Id.
at 498-501. Second, he notes that the fact that the White House is not subject to criminal
liability is not, by itself, enough of ajustification for withholding privileged protection. Id. at
496-97. However, both points together do combine to undermine the governmental privilege's
instrumental justification.
277. See id. at 512-20.
278. See id. at 494-97.
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attorney-client privilege. The Eighth Circuit held that Upjohn was not applicable to
the specific government context before it, and that the reasoning in Nixon was
persuasive with regard to establishing the limits of a government attorney-client
privilege.279 Paulsen argues, however, that Upjohn creates a broad privilege for all
4entities," '' and thus answers the questions regarding whether and to what extent the
government has an attorney-client privilege. To Paulsen, the scope of the executive
privilege is irrelevant because the attorney-client privilege and the executive privilege
"are simply two different animals."'
First, Paulsen insists that a government attorney-client privilege that is coextensive
with the corporate privilege not only exists, but is necessary.2 2 He argues that the
court misses this point because it too narrowly defines the relevant government client
as "the White House" instead of "the United States government" as a whole. 3 This
characterization enables the court to downplay the government's need for legal advice
because, in this case, the White House had no compelling need to investigate Hillary
Clinton's actions (because Hillary Clinton's actions could not expose the White
House to liability). According to Paulsen, the Eighth Circuit's conception is "plainly
wrong," and he charges that the court's "sloppiness on this score affects its whole
opinion."' S He then argues that because the government needs legal advice, the
attorney-client privilege is justified. 6
Although Paulsen maybe right that, as an ethical matter, the government lawyer's
client is the government, this begs the question whether the government would receive
adequate legal advice if there were no government attorney-client privilege. Paulsen
swallows the instrumental justification for the privilege whole, and assumes that it
transfers easily to the government setting. Indeed, it is Paulsen's insistence on a broad
definition of the client as "entity" that muddles the analysis and makes the question
too easy. Blurring the distinction between government and corporation, Paulsen
argues that the privilege is necessary because "entities" have legal interests in the
actions of their employees, regardless of whether the entity is likely to be indicted or
charged, and that the privilege is necessary to ensure that the entity gathers the facts
necessary to obtain legal advice to protect those interests.2" He offers an example:
Suppose that employee malefactors have engaged in a course of reprehensible
conduct for which there is no reasonable likelihood that the entity will be asked to
bear legal responsibility in any way. Information about the conduct might be
relevant to legal advice about whether the employee could be fired by the entity on
this ground, without risking suit from the chagrined employee.28
279. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 919-21 (8th Cir. 1997).
280. Paulsen argues that "nothing about Upjohn on its face seems to limit its reasoning to
corporations, as distinct from other organizational clients." Paulsen, supra note 7, at 495.
281. Id. at 494.
282. Id. at 494-98.
283. Id. at 486-88.
284. Id. at 488.
285. Id. at 487.
286. Id. at 496-97.
287. Id. at 496.
288. Id. at 497.
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But he stops short of asking the relevant question: Would the entity in that instance
fail to ascertain the facts, or fail to obtain legal advice, if there were no attorney-client
privilege? Not if the entity were the federal government. If the government faces no
liability, it has every incentive to investigate the conduct of a problematic employee
and to take appropriate steps in response to the misconduct. This no doubt explains
the Eighth Circuit's emphasis on the fact that the government faced no liability in the
case before it. But even if potential liability loomed, government actors would have
sufficient incentive to investigate. Because failure to seek legal advice might expose
the government to liability if it wrongly discharges the employee, it will seek the
advice even if there is no privilege. Because the government's aim in seeking legal
advice is to conform conduct to the law, government actors need not fear that later
revelation of attorney-client communications will cause harm. Finally, for reasons
explained earlier in this Article, the privilege will not encourage other government
employees who may have knowledge of relevant facts to reveal those facts to
government employees conducting the investigation.289
Paulsen also criticizes the court's reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) as a ground for
piercing the privilege."9 Section 535(b), which requires federal employees to report
evidence of criminal wrongdoing by other government employees, has also been cited
in student notes as grounds for eliminating a government attorney-client privilege.29'
Paulsen makes a compelling case that, at most, the statute constitutes only a limited
exception to the privilege, and at the least, the statute is analogous to a corporation's
in-house reporting requirement, and does not abrogate the government privilege at
all. 3 Yet the statute is relevant to the attorney-client privilege debate, regardless of
whether it abrogates the government's attorney-clientprivilege, because it undermines
the credibility of the privilege's instrumental justification. When possible criminal
wrongdoing is involved, the statute chills attorney-employee speech forcefully and
directly. The employee with the guilty conscience is on notice that her superiors will
quickly be informed of the facts that she reveals to the government attorney.
Moreover, the very fact that Congress passed the statute leads one to wonder whether
it was convinced that the privilege encourages the candor that is essential to obtaining
good legal advice. Were it so, the statute's reporting requirement would seriously
289. See supra text accompanying notes 144-197.
290. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 497-501.
291. See Barsdate, supra note 70, at 1739 n.74.
292. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 497-98 (noting that "[o]ne could fairly argue that the crime-
reporting mandate constitutes a statutory abrogation" of the government attorney-client
privilege, but arguing that one could also conclude that the statute creates only a limited
exception for incriminating statements made, and not for all attorney-client communications).
293. Id. at 498-500. Here, Paulsen notes that if a corporation had a similar in-house
reporting rule, the corporation would not be found to have waived the privilege if an employee
obeyed the rule and reported wrongdoing to corporate counsel. Id. at 498-99. He also points
out that a court would not likely find that the statute constituted a waiver if the claim were
made in the context of litigation brought by a private party against the government. Id. at 500.
Rather, he argues, the better reading of the statute is that it imposes an "intra-executive" duty
that does not abrogate the attorney-client privilege "possessed by the executive branch as an
entity." Id.
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compromise the executive branch's ability to function in the gravest cases. Thus,
while § 535(b) may not eliminate the executive branch's attorney-client privilege in
the criminal context, it is important because it reveals the inherent weakness in the
instrumental argument.
In sum, Paulsen does not make the case that the government attorney-client
privilege is needed to enable government actors to obtain appropriate legal advice. As
this Article has established, the instrumental justification is unpersuasive in most
government contexts. It works, if at all, only in the case of the President and other
agency heads, who already enjoy the protection of the executive privilege. Thus, the
strength of the Eighth Circuit's opinion is its implicit realization that a broad
government attorney-client privilege is not justified. In refusing to accept uncritically
abroad government privilege, andin characterizing "the client" as "the White House,"
the court limited its analysis of the scope of the privilege to the situation where the
instrumental justification has some persuasive force. By focusing exclusively on the
question of the President and his closest staff, the court implicitly frames the issue as
follows: Does the President need the promise of the protection afforded by the
attorney-client privilege to speak candidly with counsel? Thus framed, the answer is
simple. Given that the President and his closest advisors already have the protection
of the executive privilege, which exists to encourage candid communications between
all of the President's advisors, including lawyers, there is no need for an attorney-
client privilege in this case. Although the court's three reasons for distinguishing
Upjohn fall short of the mark, the court was correct in concluding that Upjohn is not
applicable here.
Paulsen's other major criticism of the Eighth Circuit's reasoning is that it wrongly
conflates the executive and attorney-client privileges by finding that the attorney-client
privilege should be similarly qualified.294 He criticizes the Lindsey court's analysis on
the same grounds.95 To make this case, Paulsen must persuade us that the President's
consultations with White House counsel would be stifled only if the executive
privilege were in effect. He does not make that case.
Both the Eighth Circuit and theLindsey court found no justification foran attorney-
client privilege broader in scope than the executive privilege. The Lindsey court is
especially clear on this point:
A President often has private conversations with his Vice President or his Cabinet
Secretaries or other members of the Administration who are not lawyers or who are
lawyers, but are not providing legal services. The advice these officials give the
President is of vital importance to the security and prosperity of the nation, and to
the President's discharge of his constitutional duties. Yet upon a proper showing,
such conversations must be revealed in federal criminal proceedings. Only a
certain conceit among those admitted to the bar could explain why legal advice
should be on a higher plane than advice about policy, or politics, or why a
President's conversation with the mostjunior lawyer in the White House Counsel's
Office is deserving of more protection from disclosure in a grand jury investigation
than a President's discussions with his Vice President or a Cabinet Secretary. In
294. Id. at 494-95.
295. Id. at 505-08.
[Vol. 77:469
WHYPRIVILEGE THE PRIVILEGED?
short, we do not believe that lawyers are more important to the operations of
government than all other officials, or that the advice lawyers render is more
crucial to the functioning of the Presidency than the advice coming from all other
quarters.'
Paulsen's attempt to rebut this reasoning amounts to a handful of conclusory
statements: Not only are the privileges "simply two different animals,"'2 but the
attorney-clientprivilege "is a distinct claim, having rather little to do with the factthat
the particular institution in question is the United States government."" Finally, he
argues that the lawyer's advice is simply "different" than the advice provided the
President by his other advisors:9
Becausepersons seeking legal advice often have veryreal legal problems, resulting
from their own questionable conduct, the occasions that call for such advice are
perhaps less likely than most other situations (maybe even including Cabinet
meetings) to produce complete candor bytheperson needing advice and theperson
giving it, if confidentiality should not be assured.3"
He falls back on the conclusion that if the attorney-client privilege is interpreted as
broader than the executive privilege, "the law has endured worse anomalies." 0'
Given his ultimate conclusion-that the independent counsel controls the privilege
in some circumstances-his argument is especially puzzling. His conclusion
undermines his premise; in determining that the independent counsel should control
Ahe privilege, he creates a privilege that is qualified. Even he admits, then, that the
instrumental justification for the privilege is weak. Moreover, if he approves of a
qualified attorney-client privilege in the case of a criminal investigation by a special
prosecutor, why does he insist that there must be two privileges? The incentive
provided by the executive privilege is sufficient. Because he lumps all government
agencies and offices together with corporate entities, this point is obscured.
IV. GOVERNMENT PRIVILEGE AND THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
The preceding Parts have established that federal government employees would
continue to consult candidly with government attorneys even in the absence of an
attorney-client privilege. Does it follow that all communications between government
employees and attorneys should be discoverable? Not necessarily. Privileging
government employee-attorney communications can bejustified in limited instances,
not necessarily to encourage open communication between lawyer and client, but to
ensure a level playing field in litigation. Therefore, in addition to the investigatory and
executive privileges this Article has previously explored, government should be
296. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
297. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 494.
298. Id. at 495.





entitled to the same qualified work-product immunity that other litigants enjoy. As the
following paragraphs explain, extending work-product protection to the government
is justified on fairness grounds; a government attorney should have the same ability
to develop her case as her private adversary. The need to provide a level playing field
in litigation also justifies extending work-product-like protection to oral statements
made by government employees (both legal and nonlegal) in preparation of litigation.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) protects "documents and tangible things"
generated by a party, its attorney, the party's agent, or the attorney's agent in
anticipation of litigation." 2 As interpreted by the federal courts, the rule confers
virtual immunity 3 from discovery on attorney-generated documents that reveal the
attorney's legal analysis, opinions, and case strategy.3 The doctrine also provides
qualified inimunity3° to all other work-product, but, at least in theory, requires that
actual facts discovered by a party be revealed to its adversary if the discovered facts
are responsive to discovery requests (so long as revelation of all or part of documents
containing those facts would not also reveal that party's strategy or legal theories).
Work-product immunity extends to all documents prepared in anticipation of
litigation, whether generated by the client, the client's attorney, or the agent of the
client or the attorney. 6 Although Rule 26 does not protect oral statements made in
anticipation of litigation, most courts agree that the common law confers similar, if not
greater,307 protection to oral statements made in furtherance of trial preparation.0 8
302. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
303. See Jeff A. Anderson et al., SpecialProject: The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL
L. REv. 760, 789-830 (1983) (stating that facts are not protected as work-product, that
"ordinary work product" has qualified protection that will give way upon a showing of
substantial need and unavailability, and that attorneys' opinions, strategies, and legal analyses
are almost always protected).
304. See, e.g., First Heights Bank v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 827, 829 (Fed. Cl. 2000)
(stating that work-product material that can be described as an attorney's mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories "can be discovered only in very rare and extraordinary
circumstances" (quoting In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977))).
305. The party seeking to overcome the presumption of work-product immunity must make
a showing of substantial need and an inability to obtain the same materials without undue
hardship. See generally WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 115 § 2025 (2d ed. 1994); First Heights
Bank, 46 Fed. Cl. at 829.
306. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975) (recognizing that the
work-product of the attorney's agent is protected); Otto v. Box U.S.A. Group, Inc., 177 F.R.D.
698, 699 (N.D. Ga. 1997) ("[A] plaintiff who creates work-product material before hirihg an
attorneyis still permitted to take advantage of the work-product doctrine."); Mahoneyv. Sisters
of Charity Hosp., 165 F.R.D. 26, 30 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding statistical reports made by a
hospital human resources director at the suggestion of an attorney were made in anticipation
of litigation and were thus protected); Ward v. Maritz, Inc., 156 F.R.D. 592,595 (D.N.J. 1994)
(tape recordings made by a client are normally protected).
307. In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the Supreme Court suggested that oral
statements might be given greater protection than tangible work-product because requiring
counsel to reveal oral statements made to him would present "grave dangers of inaccuracy and
untrustworthiness," and would transform the lawyer from "an officer of the court" to an
ordinary witness. Id. at 513. One article argues that intangible work-product deserves greater
protection because revelation ofnontangible work-product will expose more of the attorney's
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The two most common justifications for the work-product doctrine are: 1) that
work-product protection is necessary to ensure that attorneys adequately prepare for
litigation,3" and 2) that it is a necessary corollary to the adversarial system.310 Courts
and many scholars believe that work-product immunity creates at least a marginal
increase in attorney preparation, and that it facilitates efficient case preparation by
allowing attorneys to freely memorialize their analysis, strategy, and organizational
efforts?" This increase in effort and efficiency in turn benefits the client, who
receives relativelybetter legal representation than she would have absent the doctrine.
Because the doctrine extends to all attorneys, it strengthens the adversarial system by
allowing each party to present its best possible case without revealing its hand prior
to trial.
The arguments in favor of the doctrine are controversial, and many scholars have
questioned their strength."' But it is not necessary to judge the merits of the work-
strategy and thought process than revelation oftangible work-product, and because juries might
give undue weight to an attorney's oral statements. See Anderson et al., supra note 303, at 839-
40.
308. See, e.g., United States v. 266 Tonawanda Trail, 95 F.3d 422, 428 n.10 (6th Cir. 1996)
(stating that "[w]hen applying the work product privilege to such nontangible information, the
principles enunciated in Hickman apply, as opposed to Rule 26(b)(3) ... which applies only
to 'documents and tangible things"); Alexander v. FBI, 192 F.R.D. 12, 19 (D.D.C. 2000)
(holding that President Clinton's private investigator did not have to answer a question
regarding whether he had investigated Linda Tripp, because it would reveal the attorney's
thought processes); Maynard v. Whirlpool Corp., 160 F.R.D. 85, 87 (S.D. W. Va. 1995)
(holding that the defendant's expert witness need not answer a deposition question regarding
whetherthe defendant's attomeyhad expressed dissatisfaction with aprevious expert's opinion
because the answer would reveal nontangible work product, that is, the defense attorney's
opinions, and nontangible work product is protected under Hickman).
309. See James A. Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client Privilege:
Privilege and "WorkProduct" Under Open Discovery (pt. 2), 42 U. DET. L.J. 253,270 (1965);
Allen et al., supra note 80, at 385-87 (arguing that work-product protection benefits the system
by encouraging attorneys to uncover both favorable and unfavorable facts about the case);
Anderson et al., supra note 303, at 786 (stating that "[t]he zone of privacy also removes serious
disincentives to thorough preparation").
310. See, e.g., Robert F. Kane, The Work-ProductDoctrine--CornerstoneoftheAdversary
System, 31 INS. COUNS. J. 130 (1964) (arguing that work-product protection is an essential part
ofthe adversary system); Anderson et al., supra note 303, at 784-85 (arguing that "[t]he central
justification for the work-product doctrine is that it preserves the privacy of preparation that
is essential to the attorney's adversary role"); Note, Protection ofOpinion WorkProduct Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 VA. L. REV. 333, 334 (1978) (same). But see
Elizabeth Thomburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L. REv. 1515, 1524-30 (1991)
[hereinafter Thomburg, WorkProduct] (setting out the various arguments that have been made
in furtherance of the general proposition that work-product is a necessary aspect of the
adversarial system, but concluding that all of those arguments are unpersuasive).
311. See Allen et al., supra note 80, at 386-87 (arguing that forced disclosure of attorneys'
investigative work would decrease the incentive to discover all relevant facts); Anderson et al.,
supra note 303, at 786.
312. For a thorough argument that none of the justifications for the work-product doctrine
are compelling, see Thomburg, WorkProduct, supra note 310. See also Frank H. Easterbrook,
Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information,
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product debate to determine whether the government should benefit from the doctrine.
If work-product is not defensible (as perhaps it is not), then it should be abolished
with respect to all attorneys. But if private attorneys are entitled to the doctrine's
benefits, then a serious inequality would result if the doctrine were not extended to
government attorneys as well. During discovery, government attorneys would be
forced to reveal strategy, legal analysis, and all of their case-preparation work. But
they could not require their adversaries to produce comparable information. The
resulting imbalance would undermine the objectives of the adversary system to the
government's disadvantage. There is no clear reason to allow this to occur.
The absence of work-product protection for government attorneys might create
imbalance in another way; government attorneys might be less willing than their
private counterparts to commit trial preparation to writing, which would impede
efficient case preparation." 3 There is no readily apparent justification for denying
government attorneys the ease of preparation that private attorneys enjoy.
Consequently, if private attorneys can assert work-product immunity, then
extension of the work-product doctrine to government attorneys isjustifiable to ensure
that the government can operate on a level playing field throughout the litigation. But
if the aim in extending work-product immunity to government attorneys is to create
a level playing field, it would be important that all nonlegal government employees'
communications to government counsel, both oral and written, made in anticipation
of litigation, be protected by the doctrine. Due to the government's unique structure,
revelation of many employee-attorney communications would reveal the government's
litigation strategy and legal analysis. For instance, suppose an agency recommends
that the Department of Justice pursue litigation against a corporation. To enable the
litigation attorneys to do their jobs, agency employees (both legal and nonlegal) must
communicate all relevant information concerning the case. Nonlegal employees may
communicate to counsel factual summaries of events leading to the decision to
recommend litigation, analysis of applicable legal regulations, and opinions regarding
the strengths and weaknesses of the case. Even if the communicant is not an attorney,
the specialized nature of her job makes it likely that she possesses some knowledge
of applicable law, and the facts that she chooses to emphasize will reveal her analysis
of the case. This is likely to be true whenever government employees (both lawyers
and nonlawyers) consult with government litigation attorneys. Currently, courts often
protect communications between nonlawyer government employees and government
lawyers made in preparation for litigation by invoking the attorney-client privilege. In
the absence of a government attorney-client privilege, protecting those
communications would be necessary to promote a level playing field, because similar
statements made by the government's adversary would be protected by the attorney-
client privilege, if not the work-product doctrine.
1981 SuP. CT. REv. 309, 362 (arguing that the doctrine does create an incentive for attorney
preparation, but that it may encourage overinvestment in preparation); Fischel, supra note 79,
at I (arguing that all rules governing attorney confidentiality, including the work-product
doctrine, benefit the attorney at the client's expense).
313. See Anderson et al.. supra note 303, at 786. 1 do not mean to suggest that the
communications will not occur, or that the employee will omit relevant facts from her
communication, only that the efficiency of trial preparation may be slightly impeded as the
employee takes pains to transmit some matters verbally instead of in writing.
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This view is consistent with Uniform Rule of Evidence 502. Although the drafters
of the Uniform Rules did not fully articulate this justification for their approach,31 4
their final decision to limit the government attorney-client privilege to the litigation
and investigation settings is sound and considerably more satisfying than Proposed
Federal Rule 503's treatment of the issue. Indeed, a number of state legislatures have
implicitly recognized that the "level playing field" justification is the only solid basis
for a government attorney-client privilege, and have adopted the Uniform Rule's
limitation."' There is no indication that government entities in those states have been
frustrated in their ability to seek and receive necessary legal advice.
In sum, to ensure that the government can operate on a level playing field in
litigation, it is justifiable to allow the government to withhold from discovery
communications, both written and oral, between government litigation counsel and
other government employees, both legal and nonlegal. The analysis presented in this
Article is equally applicable to state and municipal governments, although with some
modifications, depending upon particular state statutes or constitutional provisions.
V. LOOKING BACKWARD: MAKING SENSE OF THE GOVERNMENT
ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Preceding Parts have shown that the attorney-client privilege is not necessary to
encourage government employees to speak freely with government lawyers. Yet, if the
thesis of this Article is correct, why have so many courts sustained the federal
government's attorney-client privilege claims? The sheer numbers seem to cast doubt
on this Article's thesis-surely, so many able federal judges could not be wrong.
The answer lies in a close analysis of the early cases. Before litigation over federal
government attorney-client privilege claims became commonplace, courts crafted a
narrow government privilege that is at odds with the attorney-client privilege's
justification but consistent with the adversary system's demand for a level playing
field. Despite broad dicta that seemed to sanction a broad privilege coextensive with
the corporate one, courts implicitly, if not expressly, recognized the dissonance
between the privilege's objectives and the workings of government, and tailored
privilege protection accordingly. In situations where granting the government privilege
protection ensured that the government would not be disadvantaged in litigation
preparation, courts have sustained the government's privilege claim.3"6 In other
situations, courts refused to sustain government claims of privilege, even where the
communications at issue mettheprivilege's doctrinal requirements.3 7 Taken together,
these early opinions reveal courts' understanding that privilege protection was not
necessary to encourage speech between government actors and government attorneys,
but that some type of protection was necessary to assure that the government would
314. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
315. At least four states, including Arkansas, Maine, North Dakota, and Oklahoma, have
adopted the narrowed government privilege advocated by Uniform Rule 502(d)(6). See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1987); ME. R. EVID. 502(d)(6); N.D. R. EVID.,
502(d)(6); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502(D)(6) (West 1993).
316. See supra Part IV.
317. See supra Part III.B.2.d.
20021
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
not be unfairly disadvantaged in litigation.
This raises a question: If courts were primarily concerned with providing
government litigators with a level playing field, why did they not simply hold that the
communications at issue were protected by the work-product doctrine? First, the
work-product doctrine was not codified until 1970'" The first federal appellate cases
adjudicating government attorney-client privilege claims were issued in the 1960s.
During that time, it was not clear whether work-product protection extended to
communications made by clients and others to attorneys, or whether the immunity was
limited to documents generated bythe attorney alone. Moreover, because the attorney-
client privilege granted absolute protection to client communications, courts usually
did not consider whether work-product protection was necessary in those instances.
Typically, courts assumed that the attorney-client privilege covered client-attorney
communications, and work-product covered documents prepared by attorneys. But
because nonlawyer government employees often assisted in case preparation (out of
necessity), some kind of protection was necessary to keep the playing field level. So
courts simply slapped on the attorney-client privilege label to afford the government
that protection.
Those courts that did view work-product as covering client communications
contributed to the confusion. In many such cases, courts, in broad strokes, held that
the communications were protected by both the attorney-client and work-product
privileges, without stopping to think of the possible ramifications of setting a
precedent for a government attorney-client privilege. Thus, attorney-client privilege
got its foot in the door in the 1960s and never left.
As the 1980s progressed, it became common for the government to assert numerous
FOIA exemptions in a single case, and the attorney-client privilege got lost in the
commotion; courts began to read earlier cases at face value, and the broad,
freewheeling government attorney-client privilege was born.
A. 1963-69: A Limited Litigation Preparation Privilege
Examine the early cases in which courts sustained federal government attorney-
clientprivilege claims. These cases are inconsistent with the attorney-clientprivilege's
instrumental justification; it seems likely thatthe communications at issue would have
occurred even absent the promise of privilege protection. On the other hand, requiring
the government to reveal the communications might have put it at an unfair
disadvantage against its litigation adversary, which could shield comparable materials
from discovery by invoking the work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege.
First, recall United States v. Anderson,319 the first reported decision sustaining an
attorney-client privilege claim by the federal government.32 In Anderson, the Small
318. See Thornburg, Work Product, supra note 310, at 1520.
319. 34 F.R.D. 518 (D. Colo. 1963).
320. Prior toAnderson, two courts had held that communications between state ormunicipal
government employees and government attorneys could be protected by the attorney-client
privilege. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Rowley v.
Ferguson, 48 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio App. 1942). Both opinions are conclusory and simply assume
that the privilege applies to governmental entities. In Connecticut Mutual Life, the court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the privilege did not attach to communications between
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Business Administration ("SBA") was a secured creditor in the Durox bankruptcy
proceedings.32' After Durox's plan was confirmed, the government sued the
guarantors of the note seeking recovery of the loan amount.32 The guarantors argued
that actions that the SBA had taken during Durox's reorganization proceedings
relieved the guarantors of liability on the note.3" The SBA admitted taking those
actions, which were a matter of public record,324 but denied that the actions relieved
the guarantors of liability.
The guarantors demanded that the SBA produce documents that SBA employees,
SBA counsel, and Justice Department attorneys had generated during the
reorganization proceedings. These documents memorialized the discussions and
conflicts between SBA attorneys regarding how the SBA should protect its secured
claim in the Durox reorganization proceedings. 3" The SBA alleged, and the court
agreed, that all documents between government attorneys were protected by the work-
product doctrine, because they contained opinion, strategy, and legal analysis, and
because the guarantors had no need for the documents."2 6 The government also alleged
that documents drafted by government counsel to the SBA Regional Director, and vice
versa, were protected by the attorney-client privilege. 2 The documents contained
either requests for information to enable counsel to formulate a strategy with regard
to the reorganization, or attorneys' legal opinions on the same subject.3" In a quick
paragraph, the court held that the documents were protected by the attorney-client
privilege.3
29
In holding that the government did not have to produce those documents, the court
reached the right result for the wrong reason. Application of the attorney-client
privilege here cannot be justified. The two documents drafted by nonlawyer
government employees to government counsel requested advice or suggested taking
action to preserve the SBA's position in the reorganization. The attorney-client
privilege simply was not necessary to encourage SBA employees to reveal
confidential facts, because the SBA's legal interest in collecting its debt simply did
government employees and attorneys, stating that "plaintiffs state no cases in support of this
proposition," and reasoning that "the policy of the privilege seems ... to provide no ground
for the distinction which plaintiffs suggest." 18 F.R.D. at 450. Similarly, in Rowley v.
Ferguson, the case upon which Connecticut Mutual Life relied, the court flatly concluded in
two sentences that the documents "were confidential communications between attorney and
client," and that "the fact that both attorney and client were public officials should make no
difference." 48 N.E.2d at 248.
321. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. at 520.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 522.
325. See id. at 521-22.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 522-24.
328. Id. at 523-24.
329. The court held that the documents met "the criteria" of privilege doctrine, and thus
were privileged "insofar as they do not comment or report on information coming from persons
outside the government or from public documents, or are summaries of conferences held with
or in the presence of outsiders, and were produced with the idea of obtaining or receiving legal
advice." Id. at 523.
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not concern confidential facts known only to the SBA.3 °
The court's determination that the documents were privileged is better understood
as consistent with the level-playing-field theory. The documents would have revealed
the back-and-forth process of formulating litigation strategy. The Durox bankruptcy
proceedings and the SBA's claim against the guarantors were inextricably intertwined.
The documents showed that government attorneys were aware that the government
would have to proceed against the guarantors after the debt was discharged. No doubt
the government formulated its position in the bankruptcy with the guarantors in mind.
Had the guarantors been involved in multiple litigation, the combination of attorney
work-product and attomey-client privilege would have allowed them to keep their
legal strategy to themselves. Leaving aside the question whether work-product
protection is justified as a general matter, given that it exists, it would have been
patently unfair to allow the guarantors to claim the protection of the doctrine, but at
the same time to force the government to reveal its strategy and legal analysis. The
court's failure to use a work-product analysis instead of an attorney-client privilege
theoryto protect the documents can probablybe attributed to the government's failure
to argue that the documents were work-product and the then-prevailing view that
work-product covered only documents generated by attorneys.33'
Anderson, then, could easily have been read as ensuring that the government is on
a level playing field with its adversaries, and not more broadly to privilege all
confidential communications between government employees and government
counsel. And indeed, in the eighteen years following Anderson, courts granted
privilege protection only when necessary to afford the government a level playing
field in litigation and to facilitate efficient case preparation. 3 2 During the same time
330. The SBA did not argue, and the court did not consider, whether this set of documents
could be protected as attomeywork-product. At the time of the litigation, the work-product rule
had not yet been codified, and case law was inconsistent regarding whether and to what extent
opinion work-product was protected. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15
F.D.R. 224, 235-36 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolica Petroleum
Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257, 261-62 (D. Neb. 1959). The government seems to have assumed that
work-product would not apply to the communications involving nonlawyers, and so the court
did not address that issue. See Anderson, 34 F.R.D. at 518.
331. See, e.g., S. Ry. Co. v. Campbell, 309 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that
"statements taken by a claim agent are not generally considered to be the 'work product of a
lawyer in preparation for the defense"); De Bruce v. Pa. R.R. Co., 6 F.R.D. 403,404 (E.D. Pa.
1947) (noting that in Hickman v. Taylor, "[t]hroughout the opinion at every point at which
occasion arose the Court explicitly stated that what was under review was discovery ... of
statements obtained by an attorney for his client in preparation for trial"). But see Alltmont v.
United States, 177 F.2d 971,976 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950) (holding
that material prepared by client's agent was protected by the work-product doctrine).
332. First, in Detroit Screwmatic v. United States, 49 F.R.D. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the
government successfully argued that a "Chief Counsel's defense letter" to the government
"client," written after commencement of the litigation at issue and detailing the United States's
position in the litigation, should be protected by both the attorney-client privilege and work-
product doctrine. Id. at 78. Forcing disclosure of the document would have forced the
government to lay out its theory of the case. Similar evidence generated by the government's
opponent, however, would have been protected, thus giving the government's adversary an
unfair advantage in the litigation. Then, in 1972, in a patent infringement case brought by
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General Electric against the United States, the Justice Department asserted the privilege to
protect factual summaries and legal analysis provided to it by attorneys for various branches
of the armed forces to enable Justice to defend the case. Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, No.
81-70, 1972 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 442, at *1-4 (Sept. 19, 1972). The attorneys had made the
communications to the Justice Department when General Electric instigated the lawsuit,
pursuant to a statutory directive that required government agents to provide the Justice
Department with all information necessary to litigate the government's case. Id. at *6 (stating
that all government agencies are required to provide the Justice Department with "all facts,
circumstances, and evidence concerning the claim in ... [their] possession or knowledge"
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 520 (1994))). General Electric argued that the documents should not be
privileged, because protecting them was not necessary to further the privilege's objectives. Id.
at *11. Because government agents were required to make the communications, General
Electric argued, the incentive provided by the attorney-client privilege was not necessary. Id.
The court did not address General Electric's argument directly, but merely responded that it
found the argument "unpersuasive," because "under such reasoning nothing transmitted to the
Justice Department pursuant to this statutory provision would be exempt from discovery." Id.
Although the court understood that its decision could not be justified by the rationale for
attorney-client privilege, it intuitively knew that the information had to be protected. The court
stressed that "since most Government agencies employ their own attorneys, it is common for
in-house counsel to obtain or prepare the required information. In this case, it appears that all
post-suit documents... were prepared by [the] attorneys employed by the involved agencies."
Id. at *8. Obviously, setting a precedent that failed to protect information communicated by
government agencies to the Justice Department would significantly undermine the Justice
Department's ability to prosecute the case. The decision would have been better justified on
a work-product rationale.
In the decade following General Electric, government privilege claims were sustained in a
dozen poorly explained cases. The language used in the opinions, if taken at face value, seems
uncritically to validate a government privilege. But in fact, those that are detailed enough to
be analyzed can bejustified as providing the government with a level playing field in litigation.
See, e.g., SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., 92 F.R.D. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (applying attorney-
client privilege to avoid revealing government attorneys' strategy), modified on other grounds
by 567 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Moody v. IRS, No. 77-1825, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10461 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 1980) (sustaining a government attorney-client privilege claim
regarding a letter from an IRS worker to IRS counsel, because counsel used it to formulate
strategy); Grolier v. FTC, No. 79-1215, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10388 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 1980)
(holding that a letter from an FTC employee to a Justice Department attorney regarding an
antitrust investigation is privileged), vacated in part on other grounds, 671 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, FTCv. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19 (1983); Dema v. IRS, No. 78
C 3992, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9025 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 1979) (sustaining work-product and
government privilege claims over documents prepared by a government attorney in assisting
the IRS in litigation); Eisenberg v. IRS, No. 77 C 339, 340, 1979 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 14184
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1979) (holding that the government does not have to produce documents
protected bythe attorney-client privilege in response to a FOIA request because the documents
would reveal the government's strategy against the plaintiff in pending tax court litigation);
Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Coleman, 432 F. Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (holding that the
government did not have to produce documents in response to a FOIA request because the
documents were prepared by the government and its attorneys "in anticipation of litigation");
Thill Sees. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 57 F.R.D. 133 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (protecting communications
between the SEC and attorneys for the Justice Department).
Other cases sustaining government privilege claims are too vague to analyze. See Sterling
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period, courts rejected attorney-client privilege claims that would have been sustained
if the "client" had been an individual or corporation.333 In each of these eleven cases,
the communications at issue involved a government employee conferring
confidentially with government counsel, for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.
Nonetheless, courts rejected the government's contention that the communications
should be protected by the attomey-client privilege. In some cases, privilege
protection was properly denied because the communications arose in settings that
involved no confidential facts known only to the government. But in other cases,
courts contradicted well-established privilege doctrine to permit disclosure of
communications between government employees and their lawyers while personally
acknowledging the established "rule" that the attorney-client privilege applies in the
government context.
334
First, whenever the government claimed the privilege over documents that were
generated in the course of making or enforcing policy, courts rejected this argument
on the theorythat the privilege was not necessary to encourage government employees
to reveal facts to counsel. In the most notable case, Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
Department of Energy,335 the court expressly stated that the absence of confidential
facts rendered the privilege inapplicable.3 36 In that case, the government claimed that
communications between employees of the Department of Energy ("DOE") and its
counsel were protected by the attorney-client privilege, and thus exempt from
disclosure under FOIA.337 The communications at issue were memoranda generated
by counsel in response to requests by DOE employees conducting compliance audits
of oil companies. 338 Specifically, during the course of the audit, questions would arise
concerning the application of specific discovered facts to the law, and the auditor
would write to counsel requesting advice. DOE counsel would respond with a detailed
memo analyzing the applicable regulations in light of the specific facts raised.339 In
rejecting the government's privilege claim, the court emphasized that "[w]e have
difficulty in perceiving any purpose which would be served by applying the attorney-
client privilege in this case.... It is hard to imagine the 'confidential information'
Drug Inc. v. Harris, 488 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (sustaining government attorney-client
privilege claim over communications involving issues relevant to a certain litigation); Heames
v. IRS, No. 77-225 C (3), 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11281 (E.D. Mo. July 2, 1979).
333. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Niemeier v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 565 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1977); Falcone v.
IRS, 479 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Bank of Am. v. United States, No. C-76-1757, 1978
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17554 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 1978); United States v. Bd. of Trade, No. 71 C
2875, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11307 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1973).
334. In contrast, only three courts rejected government privilege claims because the
government failed to meet the burden of proving that the traditional doctrinal requirements of
the privilege were met. See Canadian Javelin v. SEC, 501 F. Supp. 898 (D.D.C. 1980); King
v. IRS, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16256 (N.D. 111. 1981); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of
Energy, 644 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1980).
335. 617 F.2d 854.
336. Id. at 863.
337. Id. at 858 n.2.
338. Id. at 858.
339. Id. at 858-59.
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which an auditor might have communicated to regional counsel."'
Courts also rejected governmentprivilege claims when the communications at issue
had been generated as the government acted in the same capacity as a private party,
and it was therefore conceivable that the government employees would wish to discuss
confidential facts with counsel. In Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Department of the Air
Force,3 1 the court reversed the lower court's ruling that three documents drafted by
government attorneys and sent to government employees during the course of the Air
Force's contractnegotiations with West Publishing Company("West") were protected
by the attorney-client privilege. The documents gave legal advice regarding whether
the Air Force needed to obtain a license from West, whether copyrighted material
used by the Air Force would be subject to FOIA requests, and how the Air Force
should proceed in its negotiations with West.342 After negotiations terminated, Mead
Data Central made a FOIA request, demanding that the Air Force produce all
documents generated during the Air Force's contract negotiations with West. The
government claimed that three of the documents were protected by the attorney-client
privilege, and thus fell under exemption five of the FOIA.343
340. Id. at 863. Similarly, in Falcone v. IRS, 479 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Mich. 1979), the court
found that Field Service Advice Memoranda issued by the Office of Chief Counsel for the IRS
in response to requests from field personnel for legal guidance were not privileged, and thus
not exempt from disclosure under FOIA. Id. at 990. In addition, the court found that statements
of agency policy and interpretations adopted by the agency were not privileged
communications. See id. In so holding, the court confused the elements of attorney-client
privilege and work product immunity, stating that the government could not claim the attorney-
client privilege over documents that were "not prepared in anticipation of litigation," and that
the privilege would have been available in that setting because "it is essential that the agency
be able to prepare its case with some privacy." Id. The opinion, though muddled, reveals the
court's understanding that privilege protection could be justified only under a work-product
theory. See also Bank of Am. v. United States, No. C-76-1757, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17554,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 1978) (determining that attorney-client communications which were
"primarily factual or explanatory and which reflect the history and development of the relevant
treasury regulations" were not privileged).
In Niemeier v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 565 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1977), the
court rejected the government's claim that amemorandum written by counsel to the Watergate
Special Prosecutor recommending that President Nixon not be indicted was protected by the
attorney-client and deliberative privileges. Even though the attorney's communication to the
Special Prosecutor was confidential and based on facts provided by his "client," the Special
Prosecutor, the court found that the memo was not protected by the attorney-client or work-
product privileges because it was not prepared "in anticipation of litigation." Though
inadequately explained, the decision is sound for all of the reasons examined in Parts III & IV
of this Article. Simply put, the privilege was not necessary to encourage the Special Prosecutor
to confer freely with his counsel. The Special Prosecutor does not fit the attorney-client
privilege conception of the client who is reluctant to reveal confidential facts that might be
relevant to her case. To do his job, the Special Prosecutor had to reveal the facts to counsel. He
faced no personal embarrassment, liability, or exposure as a consequence of revealing the facts
necessary to gain legal advice.
341. 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
342. Id. at 249.
343. Id. at 248.
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In rejecting the government's claim, the court emphasized the importance of the
attorney-client privilege, and reasoned that the government had as much need for it as
any other "client," because "the opinion of even the finest attorney... is no better
than the information which his client provides." Yet after determining that the
communications at issue were between attorney and client for the purpose of securing
legal advice, the court took a startling turn: it determined that the privilege did not
apply because the facts that the client had supplied to counsel, and upon which
counsel relied in formulating their opinion, were not "confidential" because they were
known to third parties. 5 This was a radical take on the confidentiality requirement;
most courts at that time (and to this day) required only that the attorney
communication be based on facts supplied by the client in confidence; there was no
requirement that the facts that the client communicated in confidence be unknown to
any third party.' The court remanded to the district court for a determination as to
whether the communications contained any facts unknown to third parties." In doing
344. Id. at 252.
345. Specifically, the court stated that "[i]t must also be demonstrated that the information
is confidential. If the information has been or is later shared with third parties, the privilege
does not apply." Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
346. See Bryan S. Gewdy, Note, Should the Federal Government Have an Attorney-Client
Privilege?, 51 FLA. L. REv. 695, 713 (1999); see also Mead, 566 F.2d at 263-64 (McGowan,
J. dissenting).
347. The Mead court cited four cases as supporting its view of the confidentiality
requirement. 566 F.2d at 253-54 nn.23 & 26 (citing United States v. McDonald, 313 F.2d 832
(2d Cir. 1963); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd sub noa. 453 F.2d
1375 (2d Cir. 1972); Cmty. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 68 F.R.D. 378,
382 (E.D. Wis. 1975)). Of those four cases, only one, Community Savings and Loan Ass'n,
actually held that the facts communicated must be confidential for the privilege to apply. In that
case, several savings and loan associations sought judicial review of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board's decision to allow First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Wisconsin to
open a new branch office in an area already crowded with banks. The decision was a change
in position on the board's part. During discovery, the board declined to produce a memo
written by its Office of General Counsel which presumably contained legal advice regarding
First Federal's application. In a short, terse paragraph, the court held that the memo was not
protected by the attorney-client privilege because the information that the board had provided
to counsel, and upon which counsel had based its legal opinion, was "almost entirely...
material which was in the public record." Cmty. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 68 F.R.D. at 382. Whether
the court intentionally made this historic and dramatic change in the government attorney-client
privilege is unclear.
The other cases the court cites do not support its position. In United States v. McDonald,
the court required an attorney to produce copies of real estate contracts and closing documents
that the attorney's client had produced to its adversary at the closing. This interpretation of the
attorney-client privilege fits within the standard interpretation of the confidentiality
requirement; courts have never allowed clients to use the privilege to avoid producing
otherwise relevant documents simply by funneling them through their attorneys. In the
remaining two cases the court cites, the opinions merely restate the boilerplate language of the
confidentiality requirement.
348. The court directed that:
On remand, the court should order disclosure of these documents unless the Air
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so, it strongly suggested that the communications at issue should not be protected
because the facts supplied by the client were known to West. 49 In dicta, the court also
suggested that communications from the client to the attorney were privileged only to
the extent that they contained facts unknown to a third party."
Whether the court intentionally made this radical departure from privilege law is
unclear. In a strong dissent, Judge McGowan argued that the majority's new standard
would "go a long way toward eliminating the attorney-client privilege altogether."
351
In remanding the case for further determinations, the court took pains to note that, to
the extent that the information communicated by the client was a summary of the Air
Force's negotiations with West, the lower court could not find the communication
privileged because West was aware of the information."
Although the Mead court affirmed the government privilege in the abstract, when
faced with a concrete application of the doctrine it struggled with the lack of fit
between the doctrine's instrumental justification and the reality of the government
enterprise.
While the stricter standard pioneered by the D.C. Circuit is logically consistent with
the privilege's objectives, it is ultimately not a satisfactory method for dealing with
the problems created by the government attorney-clientprivilege. First, it increases the
cost of adjudicating privilege issues by virtually requiring an in camera inspection of
Force demonstrates either that the attorney-client privilege does apply to these
documents because the information on which they are based was supplied by the
Air Force with the expectation of secrecy and was not known by or disclosed to
any third party, or that they fall within exemption five for some other reason.
Mead, 566 F.2d at 254.
349. Id. at 254 n.27.
350. Id. at 255 n.32 (discussingafourth document, drafted byan AirForce employee, which
summarizes the Air Force's negotiations with West to that date, and requests legal advice). The
court states that even though the Air Force did not claim that the document was protected by
the privilege, "[The document] is just the kind of communication which the privilege is
designed to protect." Id. However, the communication would still have to meet the
confidentiality requirement, as the court defined it, to be privileged. Id.
351. Id. at 264. Professor Rice, for one, agrees, and has strongly criticized the line of
precedent flowing from Mead. See Rice, Continuing Confusion, supra note 9, at 983-88. Rice
argues that "[t]he nature of the information contained in the communications from the client
to the attorney is irrelevant to the communications' privileged status. Regardless ofwhere the
client acquired the information, or the information's confidential or public nature, the content
of the client's communication with his attomeyis privileged." Id. at 985 (emphasis in original).
Rice warns that the D.C. Circuit's restrictive standard, if universally followed, "would, at the
veryninimum,jeopardize theprivileged status ofthe legal advice obtained byall governmental
regulatory bodies." Id. at 988. He declines'to consider, however, whether that result would
have any deleterious effect on the ability of government actors to obtain legal advice. Rice
acknowledges, in a footnote, that the government's case for asserting the privilege is weaker
than a corporation's, since "citizens have a pressing need to know the standards by which the
government's enormous powers are being employed against them." Id. at 988 n.88. If so, he
argues, such aneed argues in favor of abolishing the privilege altogether. One might infer from
this statement that Rice intuitively understands that the privilege is not necessary to ensure that
government actors obtain competent legal advice.
352. Mead, 566 F.2d at 255.
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every document in every case. Moreover, because the opinion failed to realize that
communications containing confidential facts would have occurred even if there were
no privilege, it did not go far enough. Concerns for case preparation and judicial
economy suggest that the better course would be to abolish the privilege entirely, and
create instead a limited government litigation privilege.
Nonetheless, the precedent set in Mead gave courts a tool for rejecting a large
number of government attorney-client privilege claims. Several cases within the early
eighteen-year period followed Mead's lead, applied the sharply restricted
confidentiality standard, and rejected government privilege claims.3'-
In sum, at the end of the 1970s, the government simply did not enjoy an attorney-
client privilege analogous to the one applied to corporations. The cases taken together
show that courts rejected the utilitarian underpinnings of the privilege in the
government setting. Cases that sustained the privilege did so not on instrumental
grounds, but to ensure that the government was not at a disadvantage against its
litigation adversaries. In cases where privilege protection was not necessary to ensure
a level playing field, courts rebuffed the government's privilege claims. This suggests
that the 1974 version of Uniform Rule of Evidence 502, which validated government
attorney-client privilege claims only ifthe communication concerned a pending claim
or action,"" more accurtely captured the existing law than did the Federal Rules'
much broader protection for all attorney-client communications. But because courts
did not carefully articulate that the government privilege was confined to work-
product, and instead used broad language that seemed to validate the attorney-client
privilege, an expanded government attorney-client privilege was cemented into law.
B. The Government Attorney-Client Privilege from 1980 to Today:
FOIA and Broader Protection
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the federal courts faced a surge in attorney-client
privilege claims by government agencies."' The surge was attributable, in large
353. See, e.g., Slack v. FTC, No. 79-973-S, 79-959-S, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14996, at *4-
5 (D. Mass. Nov. 18, 1980) (following Mead to deny government's privilege claims where
documents summarize negotiation proceedings with government adversary); Bast v. IRS, No.
77-0829,1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18060 (D.D.C. Apr. 28,1978) (holding that memos prepared
by attorneys in the Disclosure Division of the IRS's Office of Chief Counsel containing advice
with respect to plaintiff's appeal of the agency's decision on a previous FOIA request are not
privileged because the legal communications are not based on confidential facts, but that they
are protected by the government privilege, so nonfactual information may be withheld).
354. See UNIF. R. EvID. 502(d)(6)(1974), 13 U.L.A. 257 (1986) ("There is no privilege
under this rule... [a]s to a communication between a public officer or agency and its lawyers
unless the communication concerns a pending investigation, claim, or action and the court
determines that disclosure will seriously impair the ability of the public officer or agency to
process the claim or conduct a pending investigation, litigation, or proceeding in the public
interest.').
355. See Schlefer v. United States, 702 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Coastal States Gas Corp.
v. Dep't of Energy, 644 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 198 1); Brinton v. Dep't of State, 636 F.2d 600 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United
States v. Crocker, 629 F.2d 1341 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1980); Murphyv. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
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measure, to the increased volume of FOIA litigation, and to Section (b)(5), which
permits the government to assert certain evidentiary privileges, including attorney-
client, as grounds for withholding government documents in response to FOIA
requests." For the most part,3s courts in the early 1980s sustained privilege claims
571 F. Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 1983); Norwood v. FAA, 580 F. Supp. 994 (W.D. Tenn. 1983);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 102 F.R.D. 1 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Rachel v. Dep't of Justice,
No. 83C0434, 83C1420, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15000 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1983); Dames &
Moore v. Dep't oftheTreasury, 544 F. Supp. 94 (C.D. Cal. 1982); LSB Indus. v. Comm'r, 556
F. Supp. 40 (W.D. Okla. 1982); Green v. IRS, 556 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Savoie v.
IRS, 544 F. Supp. 662 (W.D. La. 1982); King v. IRS, No. 80C3006, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16256 (N.D. Ill. July2, 1981); FDIC v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 942 (S.D. W. Va. 1981);
SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., 92 F.R.D. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1981); United States v. Kin-Buc, No.
79-514, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18414 (D. N.J. May 21, 1981); Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86
F.R.D. 514 (D. Del. 1980); United States v. Exxon Corp., 87 F.R.D. 624 (D.D.C. 1980);
Jupiter Painting Contracting Co., Inc. v. United States, 87 F.R.D. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Canadian Javelin, Ltd. v. SEC, 501 F. Supp. 898 (D.D.C. 1980); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Harris,
488 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Slack v. FTC, No. 79-973-S, 79-959-S, 1980 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14996 (D. Mass. Nov. 18, 1980); Moody v. IRS, No. 77-1825, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10461 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 1980); Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, No. 79-1215, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10388 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 1980), rev'd in part, affd in part, 671 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 19 (1983); Dema v. IRS, No. 78C3992, 1979 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9025 (N.D. 11. Oct. 22, 1979); Eisenberg v. IRS, No. 77C339, No. 77C340, 1979 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14184 (N.D. Il. Feb. 26, 1979); Falcone v. IRS, 479 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Mich.
1979); Hearnes v. IRS, No. 77-225C(3), 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11281 (E.D. Mo. July 2,
1979); Kanter v. IRS, 478 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Il. 1979); Gregory v. FDIC, 470 F. Supp. 1329
(D.D.C. 1979); Bast v. IRS, No. 77-0829, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18060 (D.D.C. Apr. 28,
1978).
356. Between 1978 and 1983, the vast majority of cases involving federal government
claims of attorney-client privilege arose in response to citizens' FOIA requests. See Schlefer
v. United States, 702 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy,
644 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1981); Brinton v. Dep't of State, 636 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Coastal
States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Murphy v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 571 F. Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 1983); Norwood v. FAA 580 F. Supp. 994 (W.D. Tenn.
1983); Rachel v. Dep't of Justice, No. 83C0434, 83C1420, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15000
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1983); Dames & Moore v. Dep't of the Treasury, 544 F. Supp. 94 (C.D. Cal.
1982); LSB Indus. v. Comm'r, 556 F. Supp. 40 (W.D. Okla. 1982); Green v. IRS, 556 F. Supp.
79 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Savoie v. IRS, 544 F. Supp. 662 (W.D. La. 1982); King v. IRS, No.
80C3006, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16256 (N.D. Il. July 2, 1981); Canadian Javelin, Ltd. v.
SEC, 501 F. Supp. 898 (D.D.C. 1980); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Harris, 488 F. Supp. 1019
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Moodyv. IRS, No. 77-1825,1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10461 (D.D.C. Feb. 28,
1980); Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, No. 79-1215, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10388 (D.D.C. Feb. 21,
1980), rev'd in part, aff'd inpart, 671 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'don other grounds, 462
U.S. 19 (1983); Slack v. FTC, No. 79-973-S, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14996 (D. Mass. Nov.
18, 1980); Dema v. IRS, 78C3992, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9025 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 1979);
Heames v. IRS, No. 77-225C(3), 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11281 (E.D. Mo. July 2, 1979);
Eisenberg v.IRS, No. 77C339, 77C340, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14184 (N.D. 111. Feb. 26,
1979); Falcone v. IRS, 479 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Kanter v. IRS, 478 F. Supp. 552
(N.D. I1. 1979); Gregory v. FDIC, 470 F. Supp. 1329 (D.D.C. 1979); Bast v. IRS, No. 77-
0829, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18060 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 1978).
357. Some opinions are not susceptible to categorization or analysis because they include
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only when the documents involved were prepared to assist in litigation. 58 Moreover,
too sparse a description of the facts underlying the privilege claim. See FDIC v. United States,
527 F. Supp. 942 (S.D. W. Va. 1981) (lacking detailed description of contested documents);
Gregory v. FDIC, 470 F. Supp. 1329 (D.D.C. 1979) (protecting one document because it
concerned the government's strategy with respect to an administrative hearing, but failing to
describe the other documents); Heames v. IRS, No. 77-225C(3), 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11281
(E.D. Mo. July 2, 1979) (listing relevant documents in unpublished appendix).
358. See Schlefer v. United States, 702 F.2d 233, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (overruling
government's attorney-client privilege claim because the factual information that formed the
basis of the government counsel's opinions came from third parties, and was not confidential
information concerning the agency); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d
854, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the attorney-client privilege could not apply to
communications that contained facts known to third parties); United States v. Crocker, 629
F.2d 1341,1344-45 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1980) (remandingto require lowercourtto conduct
in camera inspection of documents claimed privileged); Rachel v. Dep't of Justice, No.
83C0434, 83C1420,1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15000, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1983) (upholding
privilege claim where memoranda contained factual and legal analysis of future litigation);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 102 F.RID. 1, 10 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (sustaining privilege
where documents were drafted in contemplation ofpending litigation); LSB Indus. v. Comm'r,
556 F. Supp. 40,42-43 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (sustainingprivilege claim overdocuments prepared
to assist in litigation); Green v. IRS, 556 F. Supp. 79, 85 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (holding that letter
from IRS to Chief Counsel recommending prosecution of taxpayer was protected by
governmentand attorney-client privileges); Kingv. IRS, No. 80C3006,1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16256, at *7-8 (N.D. Il. July 2, 1981) (denying government's privilege claim because
government did not prove that documents were kept confidential or that the communications
within the documents were based on confidential facts); SEC v. World Wide Coin Invs., 92
F.R.D. 65, 66-67 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (sustaining privilege claim over documents prepared in
anticipation of litigation); Slack v. FTC, No. 79-973-S, 79-959-S, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14996, at *4-5 (D. Mass. Nov. 18, 1980) (rejecting the government's attorney-client privilege
because the communications were based on facts known to third parties); Moody v. IRS, No.
77-1825, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10461, at *18-19 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 1980) (holding that
government could withhold document written by IRS employee to IRS regional counsel
because counsel used the document to formulate litigation strategy); Grolier, Inc. v. FTC,
No.79-1215, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10388, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 1980), rev'd in part, aff'd
in part, 671 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 19 (1983) (holding
that letter from the Secretary of the FTC to the Acting Chief, Consumer Affairs Section of the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department is privileged because the letter addresses the
FTC's determination regarding litigation strategy); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Harris, 488 F. Supp.
1019, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (sustaining government's attorney-client privilege claim where
attorney-client communications were made in anticipation of litigation); Eisenberg v. IRS, No.
770339, 77C340, 1979 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 14184, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1979) (holding that
government did not have to produce documents in response to FOIA request because the
documents would have revealed the government's strategy in pending litigation against citizen
in tax court); Falcone v. IRS, 479 F. Supp. 985, 988 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (holding that IRS
counsel's communications containing statements of agency policy and interpretations of
regulations were not protected from disclosure by attorney-client privilege because they were
not prepared in anticipation of litigation, and emphasizing the importance of not allowing
government to develop a body of "secret law"); Bast v. IRS, No. 77-0829, 1978 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18060, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 1978) (holding that memos prepared by IRS attorneys
were not protected by the attorney-client privilege because the plaintiff/taxpayer was aware of
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courts were careful to require the government to establish each and every element of
the privilege claim with respect to each document for which the government claimed
privilege.3
59
The intervening two decades, however, have brought a gradual but noticeable
change injudicial treatment ofthe governmental attomey-cientprivilege. Courts have
more often sustained attorney-client privilege claims with respect to all
communications between government employees and attorneys?'6 They have done so
the facts upon which the communications were based). But see Murphy v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
571 F. Supp. 502, 607 (D.D.C. 1983) (sustaining government privilege claim to protect
communications generated during Tennessee Valley Authority's settlement negotiations with
third party).
359. See, e.g., Brinton v. Dep't of State, 636 F.2d 600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (reversing
district court determination that lawyer's communications to client were protected by attorney-
client privilege because government did not prove that the lawyer's communications were
based on confidential facts supplied by the client, but holding that the deliberative process
privilege did apply); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 984-85 (3d
Cir. 1981) (remanding and requiring government to create a more detailed Vaughn index to
support its privilege claim); Norwood v. FAA 580 F. Supp. 994, 1004 (W.D. Tenn. 1983)
(holding that the privilege did not apply because the government had failed to prove that the
documents were kept in confidence); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 102 F.R.D. 1, 9
(N.D.N.Y. 1983) (holdingthatprivilege did not applyto attorney communications where it was
not clear that attorney was acting in capacity as attorney); King v. IRS, No. 80C3006, 1981
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16256, at *7-8 (N.D. 111. July2,1981) (denying government's privilege claim
in part because government does not prove that documents were kept confidential); United
States v. Kin-Buc, No. 79-514, 1981 U.S. Dist LEXIS 18414, at *4 (D.N.J. May 21, 1981)
(remanding and requiring government to substantiate privilege claim document by document);
Canadian Javelin, Ltd. v. SEC, 501 F. Supp. 898,902 (D.D.C. 1980) (rejecting privilege claim
because the SEC did not take pains to prove that the documents were kept confidential); Jupiter
Painting Contracting Co. v. United States, 87 F.R.D. 593, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (emphasizing
that "in a government top heavy with lawyers" it is important "to construe the [attorney-client]
privilege narrowly to conform to its purposes," and holding that attorney's notes summarizing
interviews with nonparties are not protected byprivilege); Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D.
514,521-22 (D. Del. 1980) (holding that the government had failed to establish with sufficient
particularity that the privilege applied to each communication for which it was claimed,
rejecting government's offer to further substantiate privilege claim, and ordering that
government produce allegedly privileged documents).
360. For example, inBucknerv. IRS, 25 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ind. 1998), taxpayer Buckner
sought, via a FOIA request, to obtain files of IRS employees and attorneys in his attempt to
determine why the IRS had labeled him an "Illegal Tax Protester/Extremist" and had garnished
his wages and filed several liens against his property, causing him to file for bankruptcy. Id.
at 809, 895-96 & n.2. The IRS withheld seventy-one pages of documents and eleven partial
pages, citing numerous FOIA exemptions, including the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine. Id. at 895, 899. After reviewing affidavits supplied by various IRS employees
and attorneys, the court sustained all of the IRS's work product and attorney-client privilege
claims. Id. at 899-900. Some of the documents were protected because the IRS prepared them
in anticipation of its involvement in litigation in plaintiff's bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 900.
The court then, however, held that the attorney-client privilege protected all documents "that
are communications among attorneys or between IRS personnel and agency attorneys," no
matter when the communications occurred. Id. at 899. See also Jernigan v. Dep't of the Air
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by divorcing the earlier cases from their factual contexts, and relying on broad dicta
in earlier opinions. Indeed, two cases courts most frequently cite as support for the
government privilege are Coastal States Corp.361 and Mead3 62 -two cases in which
courts rejected government privilege claims."
The nature of FOIA litigation has contributed to this trend. First, in FOIA cases,
government defendants often assert numerous statutory exemptions to resist a single
FOIA request. As a result, courts sometimes focus inadequate attention on each of the
individual justifications the government offers to support its position.'" Second, in
Force, No. 97-35930, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22708, at *6-8 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 1998) (holding
that an Air Force attorney's report, which contained a "legal review" of a Navy investigation,
"falls squarely within the traditional attorney-client privilege"); Ariz. Rehab. Hosp., Inc. v.
Shalala, 185 F.R.D. 263, 270 (D. Ariz. 1998) (holding that documents exchanged between
government employees and attorneys that explained the proposed changes in agency
regulations and the proposed rule for public comment were protected by attorney-client
privilege); FTC v. Digital Interactive Assocs., No. 95-Z-754, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3520, at
*10 (D. Colo. Mar. 17, 1997) (holding that the attorney-client privilege shielded draft
documents that contained attorney notes regarding the relationship between the FTC and the
FCC, and thus the government did not have to produce the documents in response to
defendant's discovery request); Lacefield v. United States, No. 92N1680, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4521, at *8 (D. Colo. Mar. 10, 1993) (stating that "[i]t is important to note that the
privilege applies in all situations in which a client seeks an attorney's legal advice, not only
when there is ongoing litigation or a specific dispute") (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980); CIT Group/Equip. Fin., Inc. v. United
States, 24 Cl. Ct. 540,543 (Ct. Cl. 1991) (holding that ' Takings Impact Analysis" drafted by
the Army Corps of Engineers, and which resulted in the government's denial of plaintiff's
permit to develop his property, was confidential legal advice rendered by government attorney
to his client, the government).
361. 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
362. 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
363. See, e.g., Better Gov't Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw (In re Allen), 106 F.3d 582, 600 n.8
(4th Cir. 1997) ("'[I]t is clear that an agency can be a 'client' and agency lawyers can function
as 'attorneys' within the relationship contemplated by the privilege. "(quoting Coastal States
Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 863) (alteration in original)); Ariz. Rehab. Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 185
F.R.D. 263, 269 (D. Ariz. 1998) (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. for the proposition that
"[c]ourts have applied [the attorney-client] privilege to communications between government
agencies and their counsel"); Buckner v. IRS, 25 F. Supp. 2d 893, 899 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (citing
Mead for the proposition that "attorney-client privileged material is exempt from FOIA");
Lacefield v. United States, No. 92 N 1680, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4521, at *7 (D. Colo. Mar.
10, 1993) (stating that the privilege is necessary "'to assure that a client's confidences to his
or her attorney will be protected and therefore encourage[s] clients to be as open and honest
as possible with attorneys' (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 862) (alteration
in original)); Starkey v. IRS, No. C-91-20040 JW, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18374, at *10-11
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1991) (citing Mead for the same proposition).
364. See, e.g., Buckner v. IRS, 25 F. Supp. 2d 893, 899-900 (N.D. Ind. 1998); Starkey v.
IRS, No. C-91-20040 JW, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18374, at *3-11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1991)
(government asserting FOIA exemptions (b)(3) (taxpayer information), (b)(7)(A) (records
compiled for law enforcement purposes), (b)(5) (claiming deliberative process privilege, work-
product protection, and attorney-client privilege), and (b)(2) (information related solely to the
internal personnel rules and practices ofan agency); in addressing government's attorney-client
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FOIA cases, the court's focus is on the request for information, not on the underlying
purpose or claim that has generated the request for information. As a consequence, a
court evaluating a FOIA request is less likely to appreciate that sustaining a broad
claim of government privilege may ultimately result in inaccurate fact finding and
potential injustice-the very concerns that have traditionally led courts to be cautious
in sustaining privilege claims. Moreover, once courts use a broad brush in FOIA
cases, other courts apply the same broad statements in non-FOIA cases, resulting in
a more general expansion in the scope of the government attorney-client privilege.
Another possible contributing factor to the privilege's expansion is attorney self-
interest. Lawyers have consistently pushed for expansive privilege protection.365 For
example, the recently published third edition of The Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers3 puts the stamp of approval on the broadestpossible government
attorney-client privilege." The authors seem to recognize that the only compelling
justification for a government attorney-client privilege is the level-playing-field
theory, because it is the only theory that they offer in its defense.368 But the level-
playing-field justification supports only a limited litigation-preparation privilege; one
might think, then, that the drafters would cart out otherjustifications to support a more
privilege claim, the court, after considering government's Vaughn index, simply concludes that
IRS documents "contain information which qualifies for protection under the deliberative
process privilege, the attomey-client privilege, and include work product"); Wilder v. Comm'r,
607 F. Supp. 1013, 1015 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (government asserted FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(e)
and (b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(5) (attorney-client privilege); the court sustained attorney-client
privilege claim after in camera review with a one-sentence explanation).
365. More than one commentator has pointed out that confidentiality rules give lawyers a
market advantage over other professionals and that the advantage to lawyers might not confer
a benefit on clients. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 78, at 360 (noting that "the presence of
confidentiality may explain why clients are willing to pay high fees to lawyers when
nonlawyers might be able to provide similar services more cheaply"); Stephen Gillers, What
We Talked About When We TalkedAbout Ethics: A Critical View ofthe Model Rules, 46 OHIo
ST. LJ. 243,256,259 (1985) (stating that "confidentiality rules... benefit the profession," and
that "with few exceptions, the Rules embrace the client's interests when it is painless, even
beneficial, for lawyers to do so").
366. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE LAW GOvERNING LAWYERS § 74 (2000).
367. Section 74 states that "the attorney-client privilege extends to a communication of a
governmental organization as stated in § 73 and of an individual employee or other agent of
a governmental organization as a client with respect to his or her personal interest as stated in
§§ 68-72." Id.
368. The comments suggest that
the legal system has recognized the strategic concerns of a public agency or
officer in establishing and asserting public legal rights .... The public acting
through its public agencies is entitled to resist claims and contentions that the
agency considers legally or factually unwarranted. To that end, a public agency
or employee is entitled to engage in confidential communications with counsel
to establish and maintain legal positions .... Otherwise governments would be
at an unfair disadvantage in litigation, in handling claims and in negotiations ....
A privilege that would cover only litigation, including claims or investigations,




expansive privilege. Instead, they are content to support what they see as "the
generally prevailing view,"369 and they politely reject out of hand cases that attempt
to limit the privilege to the litigation context.37
Although a number of courts have resisted this expansion of the privilege, the
general trend is troubling for the reasons highlighted throughout this Article:
extending a privilege to communications between government officials and their
lawyers keeps relevant evidence away from the fact finder without any commensurate
gain. Because the privilege plays no real role in encouraging most conmmnunications
between government officials and their lawyers, the usital justification for attorney-
client privilege is simply inapplicable.
A recent case makes this point clearly. In In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine,
Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Products Liability Litigation,37' the plaintiffs, who
sued drug manufacturers, alleged that certain weight loss drugs (popularly known as
"phen-fen") that they had ingested had caused heart valvulopathy 72 One of the
defendants relied heavily on the "FDA defense," claiming that it had acted reasonably
in distributing the drug because neither the FDA nor the medical community at large
knew of any potential adverse effects of phen-fen at the time the FDA approved the
drug.373 In support of the FDA defense, one of the defendants relied on an article
written by six FDA officials and published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association.374 The article substantiated the defendants' claim about the state of
medical knowledge when the FDA approved the drug. 75 The plaintiffs' counsel wrote
to the FDA, alleging that medical evidence of adverse drug effects had indeed been
available to the defendants prior to the approval date, and suggested that the
defendants had withheld this troublesome evidence from the FDA. 7 The FDA
responded with a letter denying that the FDA was in possession of this evidence at the
time the article was published. 77 In a startling about-face, the defendants' counsel
then wrote to the FDA, stating that the defendants had in fact provided this
information to the FDA before the article was published. 7 After taking a few months
to search its records, the FDA informed the plaintiffs that it had been in possession
of the information at the time the article was published. 79
369. After asserting that the privilege is justified when the government is preparing for
litigation, the authors simply conclude that, "[t]his Section, however, states the generally
prevailing rule that governmental agencies and employees enjoy the same privilege as
nongovernmental counterparts." Id.
370. The authors note that some decisions have suggested that a "'contemplation of
litigation' limitation.. . should be imposed on the governmental-client privilege.... That
suggestion is not followed in the Section or Comment." Id. at note on governmental privilege
in the context of democratic government.
371. No. 1203, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15170 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2000).




376. Id. at *3.
377. Id.
378. Id. at *3-4.
379. Id. at *4.
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In response, the plaintiffs directed various questions to the FDA to determine,
among other things, why the authors of the article and other key FDA employees
appeared not to have been aware of the negative medical research.38 The plaintiffs
suspected that the defendants had "buried" the information in their FDA submission,
which had caused FDA employees to overlook it.38 As a result, the plaintiffs also
requested that the government produce all internal documents that the FDA generated
in the course of the FDA's internal search for the medical evidence.3 82 The
government, asserting both the deliberative process privilege and the attomey-client
privilege, declined to produce 132 documents 83
The court rejected the government's deliberative process privilege claim, holding
that the communications did not concern discussions regarding agency policy, but
rather concerned "whether the FDA possessed certain documents, what those
documents were[,] and who they were being sent to within the agency."" However,
the court sustained the attorney-clientprivilege claim overall the documents forwhich
it was asserted, on the grounds that the documents were "between FDA officials and
FDA attorneys," were generated in the course of responding to subpoenas and to
letters from the plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel, were marked "Sensitivity:
Confidential," and were "apparently" accessible only to agency employees.
385
Because the court sustained the government's attorney-client privilege claim, it is
not possible to determine the contents of the communications with certainty. It seems
likely, however, that the privileged documents can be divided into two categories.
First, some of the privileged documents concerned the actual search for the missing
scientific evidence. Presumably, attorney-client communications in this category were
simply reports concerning the ongoing search and suggestions regarding how the
search should proceed. Second, other documents memorialized attorney-client
communications generated as the FDA determined whether and how to respond to the
letters from the defendants' counsel (which charged that the FDA already possessed
the relevant scientific evidence) and the plaintiffs' counsel (which asked the FDA to
explain how it missed the documents and whether, in light of the evidence, it had
altered its position regarding the drug's safety). Taken together, the privileged
documents might have shown that the documents were in fact found buried in other
documents that the defendants had produced to the FDA. Or, the privileged
communications might have revealed that the FDA's own negligence (or worse)
contributed to the agency's failure to inform its own scientists of the potentially
troubling scientific evidence. Determination of this issue was relevant to key issues
in the case-whether the defendants acted reasonably in distributing the product, and
whether and to what extent punitive damages were warranted. Knowledge of these
facts would also have influenced settlement negotiations.
More importantly, while the privilege clearly obstructed the search for the truth, it




383. Id. at *4-5.
384. Id. at *12-13.
385. Id. at *15-16.
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to ensure that the FDA received necessary legal advice. With regard to the first
category of documents, those generated as part of the search for the scientific
evidence, it strains credulity to argue that the FDA would not have searched for and
found the missing scientific evidence absent the assurance ofconfidentialityprovided
by the attorney-client privilege. No specialized legal advice was necessary to enable
the FDA to search its own files. Most importantly, the FDA had no legal position to
protect; it was not a party in the lawsuit, and, in fact, was immune from suit
concerning its decision to approve the diet drugs. Thus, employee discussions with
attorneys could not have concerned the FDA's legal position. More likely, the
employee-attorney discussions concerned either how to minimize the FDA's
embarrassment (if in fact the FDA was negligent in failing to consider the documents)
or whether to publicly accuse the defendants of burying the evidence. Because neither
of these possibilities implicated the FDA's legal interests, the privilege played no role
in assuring that the agency received necessary legal advice. The attorney-client
privilege obstructed fact finding for no compelling reason.
The gradual expansion of government privilege law has created great disparities
from circuit to circuit, from court to court. Some courts practically "rubber stamp"
government claims of privilege over all communications between agency employees
and government attorneys. A few have gone so far as to relieve the government of the
burden of proving the confidentiality requirement.3" Other courts, however, continue
to view claims of government privilege suspiciously, requiring particularized proof
that each document meets the privilege's elements38 or rejecting privilege claims
when the communications do not contain confidential facts. 8' Some courts have gone
386. See Hollar v. IRS, No. 95-1882, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12846, at *16 (D.D.C. Aug.
7, 1997) (holding that "because the IRS engaged in communications with DOJ attorneys as
would a private person soliciting advice to protect his or her legal interests[,] [i]t is reasonable
... to infer the confidentiality of the [documents]"); Alamo Aircraft Supply v. Weinberger, No.
85-1291, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29010, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 1986) (sustaining government
attorney-client privilege claim even though government's affidavit did not state that the
attorney-client communications were "initiated with the expectation ofconfidentiality" because
"an expectation of confidentiality may readily be inferred").
387. See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 489,499-500 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(holding that the government's proof of confidentiality was insufficient); Rattner v. Netbum,
No. 88 Civ. 2080, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6876, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. June 20,1989) (attorney-
employee communications held not privileged because attorney was acting as press agent, not
giving legal advice); Delco Wire & Cable, Inc. v. Weinberger, 109 F.R.D. 680, 680-89 (E.D.
Pa. 1986) (rejecting government's privilege claim because government offered insufficient
evidence that elements of privilege were met).
388. See Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In Tax Analysts, the court
followed D.C. Circuit precedent, finding that communications that did not contain confidential
facts that concerned the agency could not be privileged. The D.C. Circuit rejected a claim by
the IRS that Field Service Advice Memos ("FSAs") are protected by the attorney-client
privilege. FSAs are documents issued by the office of IRS chief counsel in response to requests
from IRS field personnel for legal guidance, usually with regard to the audit of a specific
taxpayer. Id. at 609. In requesting legal guidance, the IRS field worker transmits all necessary
facts regarding the particular taxpayer to counsel, who uses those facts to formulate legal
advice. Id. The purpose of the FSA is to ensure that IRS employees correctly and consistently
apply the law. Id. Tax Analysts, a nonprofit corporation, made a FOIA request for certain
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further, manipulating doctrine" 9 or creating new exceptions3" to defeat government
privilege claims. As a result, the doctrine of government attorney-client privilege is
radically uneven. That these inconsistencies exist further undermines the instrumental
justification; what government employee would rely on a privilege when she cannot
know, at the time of the communication, whether a court will later determine whether
the privilege attached?
CONCLUSION
The reflexive assumption that a government attorney-client privilege is necessary
to ensure that government actors communicate openly with government counsel is a
FSAs. Id. at 608. The government refused to make the documents available on a number of
grounds, among them that the documents were protected by the attorney-client and work-
product privileges. Id. at 618-20. The IRS also argued that FSAs fell under FOIA exemption
3, because the information within them was "return information" as defined by§ 6103(b)(2)(a),
id. at 611, and that FSAs were protected by the deliberative process privilege, id. at 616.18.
The court rejected both claims.
Under traditional privilege doctrine, FSAs should have been privileged; they were
confidential communications between government employees and government counsel, made
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. But the court applied the more restrictive test
formulated by the Coastal States court and consistently applied in the D.C. Circuit, holding
that the privilege could apply only if the information contained in the documents were
confidential facts concerningthe agency and unknown to third parties. Id. at 618-19. The only
portion of the FSAs that could be withheld were those that would reveal "the scope, direction,
or emphasis of audit activity." Id. at 619-20. The court also denied work-product immunity,
except to the extent an FSA was prepared in anticipation of litigation. Id. at 620.
The result in Tax Analysts makes sense. IRS field workers had sufficient motivation to
communicate with counsel-the need to perform their jobs correctly. Moreover, they faced no
disincentives to act with candor because their communications to counsel did not concern
confidential facts that they would be hesitant to reveal absent some promise of confidentiality.
The only material that the IRS could justifiably withhold was that which would compromise
its ability to conduct the audit or pursue litigation. These are the justifications that underlie the
investigatory privilege and work-product immunity.
389. See, e.g., Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 1998). In Reed, the court held that two
city council members were not "clients" of the city attorney, and thus the city waived the
attorney-client privilege when two employees shared confidential attorney-client
communications with them. In a previous case, United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury
Subpoena), 886 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1989), the same court had held that the Detroit City
Council was a client of the city's attorney, when council members met with the attorney in
condemnation hearings. Reading the two opinions together, it appears that whether a particular
government employee can be termed a "client" of the entity's lawyer depends on the subject
matter of the conversation. If the privilege were necessary to encourage employees to consult
with counsel, the Sixth Circuit's approach would be highly problematic, because employees
could not predict whether their interests might later be viewed as "divergent" from other
employees with whom they shared the privileged information. The Sixth Circuit's willingness
to reject the city's privilege claim in the face of precedent indicates that the court might have
doubts about the privilege's instrumental justification.
390. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997).
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fiction. At most, government entities should be able to claim a limited litigation
privilege that enables them to shield communications made in furtherance of trial
preparation. This approach would be consistent with early case law. In addition, it
would make government entities more accountable to the citizens they serve, at no
cost to government's ability to function effectively.
